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Abstract  
 
This thesis constructs unique CEO performance measurements and rankings, which focus on 
long-term firm performance from different dimensions. 
The first empirical analysis of this thesis defines CEO Champions and examines whether 
CEO Champions can be successfully replaced by their successors. Two CEO Champion 
Leagues are constructed, and performance of these CEOs and their successors are tested. The 
documented results show that CEO Champions' successors outperform the successors of 
Non-Champions' on average. Although Champions’ successors cannot sustain their 
predecessors’ performance in the univariate framework due to luck reversion, growth 
cyclicality and priorities diversion, they tend to generate as superior operating performance as 
their predecessors did after controlling for growth cyclicality in the multivariate framework. 
These robust findings suggest that corporate boards can effectively replace CEO Champions 
on average by hiring better successors. Also, predecessors’ legacies left within the firms after 
stepping down substantially affect their successors’ performance in voluntary turnover 
events. 
The second analysis of the thesis explores under what circumstances the successors tend to 
outperform their champion predecessors. It examines corporate governance, successor origin, 
predecessor influence and controls for changes in CEO and firm characteristics. It documents 
a robust and negative relation between insider dummy and successful replacement, indicating 
that outsiders are more likely to replace champion predecessors successfully. In line with the 
reputational capital view of directorships, a busy board is found to have better capability to 
replace CEO Champions effectively. Champion predecessors tend to be reappointed to the 
board, and their successors tend to sustain their success. Champion founders' successors are 
demonstrated to have greater performance improvement after turnover events, which suggest 
that champion founders are less likely to be entrenched.  
The final empirical analysis focuses on constructing two effective CEO performance 
measurement indices to build CEO rankings and reveal Top 100 CEOs in each CEO list. 
Results show that the weighted performance CEO ranking is negatively and significantly 
associated with the forced turnover dummy, suggesting that higher ranked CEOs are less 
likely to be forced out. Also, the weighted performance CEO ranking in this study has better 
prediction power than other forced turnover prediction models with single performance 
measure. 
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Part I Introduction to the Thesis 
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"There are so many reasons for leaders to focus on the short term: slow 
growth, shareholder activism, political turmoil—to name just a few. Yet some 
CEOs still manage to train their sights on the long-term and deliver strong 
performance over many years." 
        The Best-Performing CEOs in the World 2016, Harvard Business Review 
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1. Overview 
 
Harvard Business Review highlights the issue of some CEOs' short-sighted financial goals at 
the expense of shareholders' long-run interest. The main objective of this thesis is to construct 
efficient long-term performance-based CEO ranks and to reveal who the top performers are. 
After defining the CEO Champions
1
, I aim at examining whether, and under what 
circumstance these champions can be replaced effectively. Also, the CEO rankings are tested 
for forced turnover predictions. 
1.1 Motivation 
As key corporate decision makers, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are critical for their 
organisations’ success (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2007; Mackey, 2008) and their performance tends to be in the spotlight. 
CEO succession events constitute strategic junctures in the lifetime of a firm and corporate 
boards are often faced with the challenging task of having to replace their chief executives. 
Although the CEO turnover literature has offered extensive evidence that changes at the c-
suite’s helm tend to enhance corporate performance, more notably following corporate 
failures resulting in CEO dismissals (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, Matalesta and 
Parino, 2004 and Alexandridis, Doukas and Mavis, 2016), much less is known about the 
outcomes of replacing successful top executives. During the tenure of leading exemplars such 
as Steve Jobs, Jack Welch, Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg, 
among many others, their businesses have fostered ingenious innovation and delivered near 
continuous growth, solid financial performance, and long-term shareholder gains. Given the 
value of such CEO Champions to their organisations, shareholders and the economy as a 
whole, the question of whether they can be replaced successfully becomes central. With the 
vast majority (around 90%) of CEO turnovers being voluntary, having to replace successful 
CEOs due to retirement, illness, or other voluntary departures are not unusual. Replacing 
such corporate leaders with new CEOs that will successfully step into their shoes is anything 
but straightforward.  
The first aim of this thesis is to define CEO Champions based on their long-term performance 
of various dimensions. By examining the voluntary turnover sample of CEO Champions, my 
                                                          
1
 In this study, CEO Champions are defined as successful performers (in terms of operating, stock, EPS surprise 
and investment performance measures), who have created value for shareholders over their tenure (maximum 10 
years). As initial screening criteria, CEOs’ firms should be S&P1500 firms and their tenure should be no less 
than 5 years. 
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objective is to investigate whether CEO Champions can be replaced successfully. Defining 
CEO Champions and measuring CEO success has been the subject of extensive debate. 
Potential approaches to defining champions include but not limited to media award-winning 
status, CEO ability, prior firm performance, and CEO or firm-specific characteristics. I 
compare, select and modify prior firm performance measures from four different dimensions 
to define CEO Champions. Moreover, top executives are more likely to have the incentives to 
focus on short-term financial goals at the expense of long-run performance. This short-term 
perspective has been criticised widely and regarded as the prime culprit of the most recent 
financial crisis. Increasingly, shareholders and corporate boards are more interested in how 
CEOs handle the ups and downs of managing companies over the long run. In 2010, Harvard 
Business Review introduced a scorecard that evaluated chief executives over their entire 
tenure in office. They built a ranking system based on three different measures of corporate 
performance during CEOs’ tenure and aim at identifying the top 100 best-performing CEOs 
in the world
2
. Their methodology is improved, and eight performance metrics are 
innovatively used to create two sets of CEO rankings on firms' operating, stock, investment 
performance and Earnings per Share (EPS) surprise, to capture more dimensions of firm 
performance. By introducing long-term performance measures of various dimensions, this 
thesis aims at improving the traditional approach that investors, analysts, and board of 
directors used to assess CEOs and providing a new judgemental standard for CEOs who have 
created long-term value for their shareholders. Given CEOs should be evaluated over the long 
run; their compensation is also expected to be associated with long-term performance. 
This study provides new evidence on CEO turnover and CEO succession literature. To my 
knowledge, no existing literature studied the consequence of value-boosting CEO 
Champions' departure and whether corporate boards can successfully replace these 
champions. Chapter Three contributes to the CEO literature in the following aspects. Given 
performance changes after forced turnover events have been studied extensively, this study is 
the first to examine the performance comparisons of top performed CEOs and their 
successors. It provides consistent results that although champions' successors cannot 
outperform their predecessors due to luck reversion, priority diversion or growth cyclicality, 
they can outperform other successors of non-champions. From the univariate test results, the 
superior performance over predecessors’ tenure of newly hired CEOs’ is because that they 
                                                          
2
 Harvard Business Review 2010 CEO list available at https://hbr.org/2010/01/the-best-performing-ceos-in-the-
world  
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took office at an earlier stage in firms' life and enjoyed a higher growth rate. Moreover, there 
is continuous superior performance and no significant performance reversion when 
successors take offices from their champion predecessors. In contrast, the multivariate test 
results show that CEO Champions and their successors have similar superior operating 
performance (AROA) than their peers after controlling for firm cyclical variables, year and 
industry fixed effects. The similar coefficients for champions and their successors compared 
to their peers (0.0688 and 0.0602) indicate that CEO Champions' successors can beat their 
peers as much as their champion predecessors did before the turnovers. Thus, corporate 
boards can successfully replace CEO Champions by hiring better successors available, i.e., 
corporate boards are able to hire new successors who can outperform other non-champions’ 
successors. Moreover, the predecessor legacy hypothesis is tested in both univariate and 
multivariate frame. Predecessors’ performance ranking is found to be the most significant 
element in explaining successors’ rankings performance in the voluntary turnover events. 
There is continuous superior performance and no significant performance reversion when 
successors take offices from champions.  
Regarding CEO and firm characteristics, CEO Champions are more likely to be (co) 
founders, earned higher compensation during their tenure and still served on the board after 
stepped down as CEOs than bottom-performed CEOs. Despite less experience in terms of 
age, champion's successors usually earn higher compensation than bottom-performed CEOs' 
successors. The characteristics differentials between champions and bottom-performed CEOs 
before and after the turnovers are similar. Firms tend to have the larger size and lower growth 
rate during successors’ tenure. Also, Chapter Three contributes to the CEO success literature 
by examining success measures, i.e., stock performance, operating performance, investment 
performance and EPS Surprise, respectively, and building the CEO ranking indices to test 
whether the successors can inherit CEO Champions' superior performance. 
To facilitate smooth CEO succession, especially for CEO Champions' voluntary turnover, the 
board of directors tends to make succession plans beforehand, and corporate governance may 
also be crucial in leading successful CEO turnover. Existing literature on forced turnover has 
documented that firms with better board quality tend to terminate poorly-performed CEOs. 
The sensitivity of turnover to performance increases with higher quality boards (Brickley, 
2003). Regarding successor origin, however, there is a divergence of views on the relations 
between firm performance and insider/outsider succession since replacement by insiders can 
either suggest good succession plans or increased managerial entrenchment. There is a 
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controversy for the relation between CEO succession origin and firm performance. While 
some scholars highlight the benefits of outside succession, others consider outsider CEO 
succession as a disruptive and disadvantageous event for the firm. Organisational Adaptation 
view of succession implies that outsider CEOs possess the more external knowledge and 
information compared to insiders (Helmich and Brown, 1972). Thus, outsiders are better 
equipped to expand the resource base of the firm and promote innovation, learning, and high 
performance (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003).  On the other hand, organisational disruption view 
of succession regards outside succession as a disruptive event related to costs for the firm 
(Vancil, 1987). Firm unfamiliarity and the difficulty of integrating into the incumbent top 
management team causes disruption to internal processes and leads to low performance 
(Friedman and Saul, 1991; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). Georgakakis and Ruigrok 
(2017) reconcile the two opposing theoretical perspectives, and document that outside CEO 
succession outweighs the costs when the new CEOs socio-demographically resembles 
incumbent executives, or possesses rich experience, or is hired by a well-performing firm 
operating in a munificent industry. The expected sign of the coefficient of the insider/outsider 
replacement choice is ambiguous for a forced turnover. For CEO Champions' voluntary 
turnover, to my knowledge has not been examined by previous literature. Given the 
conflicting predictions regarding the association between the effect of insider/outsider 
choices and firm performance after turnovers, the successor origin decision on a successful 
replacement is investigated thoroughly in Chapter Four.  
Previous studies examining CEO succession events mainly focus on forced turnovers, while 
this study fills the research gap by examining successful CEOs’ departure. There is criticism 
of outsiders who did not perform well when the firms were in trouble while outsiders tend to 
require higher compensations. Accordingly, the second aim of this thesis is to further explore 
under what circumstances successors can successfully replace their champion predecessors 
and intend to provide new evidence to succession literature. In detail, whether corporate 
governance, successor origin, predecessor influence play a vital role in successful 
replacement for CEO Champions are examined. I provide new evidence to management 
succession literature which is consistent with Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017)'s conclusion 
that outsiders tend to be the better choices for the board of directors when replacing well-
performing CEOs. In specific, the results of this study present a negative relation between 
insider dummy and successful replacement around turnover events, indicating that CEO 
Champions are more likely to be successfully replaced by outsiders, rather than insiders. The 
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results of this chapter suggest that outsiders tend to replace CEO Champions better when the 
firm performance is above average, which provides new evidence to succession literature and 
substantially contributes to existing literature on CEO turnover.  
Regarding the relation between corporate governance and firm performance, the results 
suggest that busy board tend to have better capability to replace CEO Champions efficiently, 
which is in contrary to previous findings for forced turnovers that busy boards are less likely 
to dismiss underperformed CEOs (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). Directors serving on multiple boards are more likely to provide champions 
with broader experience, more visibility and commercial contacts rather than overpaying 
CEOs or under-monitoring. For predecessors' influence variables, successful former CEOs 
are more likely to be reappointed to the board after stepping down, and successors tend to 
sustain success, which is in line with Fahlenbrach, Minton and Pan's (2011). In terms of 
Champions' founder status in affecting successful replacement, successors of champion 
founders' are demonstrated to have greater performance improvement than non-founders' 
successors, which suggests that champion founders are less likely to be entrenched as 
Schwert (1985) documented. 
The final aim of this thesis is to develop the universal long-term performance-based ranking 
methodologies which can be applied to rank CEOs involved with a turnover or still in office. 
Ranking measures provide corporate boards with valuable reference, which can prompt 
directors to restore poor performance proactively by hiring new CEOs and reward CEO 
Champions. Harvard Business Review used shareholder returns and changes in market 
capitalisation to build a scorecard for CEOs. I extend and improve their method by 
incorporating more dimensions and imposing more restrictions when defining top CEOs. 
Existing studies have examined the relations between firm performance and CEO turnover, 
and suggest that each single performance measure, i.e., stock, operating, investment 
performance and EPS surprise have explanatory power in forced turnover events. Along with 
this line, I also aim at testing CEO rankings in forecasting forced turnover events, and the 
relation between CEO rankings and the probability of dismissals. From the Univariate Test 
results, forced out CEOs do have significantly worse rankings, in terms of Weighted INDEX 
Rank I and Rank II and Un-weighted INDEX Rank I and Rank II, than voluntarily left CEOs 
and CEOs still serving at firms. This finding suggests that the combined CEO rankings with 
more dimensions in this study provide more stable performance measure and are effective in 
forced turnover predictions. Better-ranked CEOs are less likely to be forced out. Also, CEO 
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Rankings capture more dimensions and tend to be more consistent in measuring performance. 
Consistent with the findings from univariate analysis, Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores is 
negatively and, both statistically and economically, significantly associated with the forced 
turnover dummy. The specifications with INDEX Rank І Z-scores have higher Pseudo R and 
ROC curve Area than other single performance measures, i.e., Weighted AROA, ABHAR, 
EPS Surprise Indices and M&A CARs, suggesting that the combined CEO rankings have 
better prediction power in explaining forced turnover than any single performance measures 
in the multivariate analysis. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis and Original Contribution 
This thesis falls into three sections. The first section reviews the general literature on CEO 
turnover, succession plans and CEO Championship measurements, focusing primarily on 
existing findings for forced turnover and the key factors influencing successful replacement. 
The summary of literature provides the foundation for the following empirical studies 
specific to the topic of the individual chapters. Notably, the literature provides valuable 
implication for champions' voluntary turnovers. 
The second part of this thesis provides three in-depth analyses of CEO successions. Chapter 
three first improve HBR’s method of defining CEO Champions by incorporating more 
dimensions and restrict CEO Champions to have at least five years tenure. Prior research has 
demonstrated the high sensitivity of firm performance and forced turnovers (Warner et al., 
1988; Huson et al., 2004; Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Jenter and Lewellen, 2014), and corporate 
boards manage to find better successors to replace outgoing value-destroying CEOs. 
Although previous literature has documented that corporate boards can replace value-
destroying CEOs successfully, no one examined the consequence of value-boosting CEO 
Champions’ departure. To fill in the research gap, I extend the CEO turnover and managerial 
succession research area by examining under both univariate and multivariate framework 
whether CEO Champions can be successfully replaced.  
Given the current research on factors in determining successful replacement focus mainly on 
forced CEO turnover only, chapter four further investigate the champions' voluntary turnover 
sample for under what circumstance can successors better replace their champion 
predecessors. In chapter five, I mainly examine the forced turnover sample and compared 
with voluntary and none turnover sample. I compare and extend the existing studies on the 
forced turnover by constructing the universal performance-based ranking method, which 
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takes into account four metrics of firm performance measures demonstrated to be essential in 
explaining forced turnover events. The prediction power is compared with other single 
performance measurements as well. 
2. General Literature Review 
 
This thesis connects several research areas within corporate finance, including CEO turnover, 
succession plans, corporate governance, and CEO Championship measurements. This chapter 
lays down the theoretical framework relevant to this thesis. The first section presents 
literature on the relation between CEO turnover, including forced, voluntary turnover and 
predecessors' unexpected deaths, and firm performance. The second strand of the literature is 
on the relation between board quality, corporate governance, CEO succession, predecessors’ 
retention on the board and firm performance. In the third section, the literature on CEO 
Championship measurements and the potential approaches to defining CEO Champions are 
reviewed extensively. 
2.1 CEO Turnover and Firm Performance 
CEOs play a fundamental role in organisation success. To identify the value of CEOs to their 
companies, prior researchers have examined the connections between stock, operating, 
investments, analyst forecast surprise performance and CEO turnover events.  
2.1.1 Forced Turnover and Firm Performance 
Existing literature has documented extensively that the likelihood of management turnover is 
negatively related to firm performance. Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) find that firms' 
CEOs, presidents, or chairmen/women are more likely to be replaced when their firms 
experienced stock price fall. Weisbach (1988) also shows that industry-adjusted earnings are 
negatively related to top management turnover. Along with these lines, Denis and Denis 
(1995) study top executive and top management performance changes in the U.S. from 1985 
to 1988 and find that forced turnovers are preceded by significant stock, and operating 
performance deteriorates and followed by great performance improvements; whereas 
voluntary turnovers are followed by smaller performance improvements. The performance 
improvements after forced turnover are robust to selling underperforming assets, mean 
reversion, and earnings manipulation. Furthermore, the lower performance before and the 
higher performance proceeding the turnover events is concentrated on the top executive 
changes rather than the top management changes, which indicates that top executive turnover 
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events are economically more important. For the factors driving forced turnover, two-thirds 
of their forced turnover sample is driven by external monitoring factors; whereas the rest 
results from effective board monitoring. Their findings suggest that external monitoring plays 
a crucial role in replacing poorly-performed CEOs.  
Kim (1996) derives a model where he relates CEO turnover to firm performance and assumes 
that firm performance over any time interval is the sum of managerial quality and a random 
component of chance. The random component of changes can be industry, firm or manager 
specific shocks, which are transitory. This chance-driven component of firm performance is 
mean-reverting, and the changes in performance are negatively related to previous shocks. 
Moreover, the results are consistent with the notion that stock performance has a persistent 
adverse effect on turnover probability. Fee and Hadlock (2004) report similar evidence that 
industry-adjusted stock performance is negatively associated with CEO turnover and the 
likelihood of turnover amongst the top five executives is significantly higher when the CEO 
is dismissed.  
Similarly, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) study forced and voluntary turnover 
events over a broader period between 1971 and 1994, and document significant deterioration 
in control group adjusted operating performance before CEO turnover events followed by 
substantial performance improvements after that, for forced but not for the voluntary turnover 
sample. This result is in line with their improved managerial hypothesis that forced turnover 
tends to increase managerial quality, and therefore expected firm performance. They also find 
evidence that corporate governance mechanisms penalise underperformed CEOs and the 
degree of performance improvement afterward is positively related to the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings, outsider-dominated board, and outsider successors. Moreover, 
CEOs are more likely to be terminated following a major financial restatement that required 
firms to reduce net income (Srinivasan, 2005; Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton, 
2006).  
On the other hand, some researchers hold different views that forced CEO turnover is not 
particularly sensitive to firm performance. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) study CEO 
turnover events from 1971 to 1994 and find that both forced turnover and outsider succession 
frequency has increased during the period. Although they find significant relations between 
board composition, director stock ownership and the possibility of forced turnover, the 
relations between the likelihood of forced turnover and firm performance does not change 
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significantly during the period examined. A study by Strategy& 
3
 further support their 
argument. In detail, for lowest-tercile performed firms, the probability of forced CEO 
turnover increased only by 5.7 percent given their stock returns underperform their industry 
peers by 45% over a two-year period. This result suggests that forced CEO turnover is not 
sensitive to firm performance. In contrast, by employing new methodology and more 
prolonged period, Jenter and Lewellen (2014) recently provide new evidence of greater 
sensitivity between forced turnover and firm performance. Compared with CEO terminations 
in the top quintile (17%), more CEOs in the bottom quintile (59%) are forced out, and the 
difference is more significant for higher quality boards.  
Regarding investment performance, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find evidence that CEOs 
could be penalised for making value-decreasing acquisition decisions. They examine the 
relation between firm acquisition performance and the probability of being acquired at a later 
stage and find that firms with weak acquisition performance are more likely to receive a 
takeover bid. This finding suggests that poorly-performed CEOs are indeed disciplined and 
are more likely to be replaced. Along with this line, Lehn and Zhao (2006) examine the 
relations between acquirer returns and the probability of CEO turnover. They further support 
Mitchell and Lehn's (1990) results that stock market performance deteriorates, following 
poor acquisition decisions, which in turn leads to CEO dismissal. They also document that 
short-term acquisition performance can better explain the likelihood of CEO turnover than 
the firm’s prior stock performance, suggesting that CEO turnover more likely results from 
poor acquisition rather than stock performance.  
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Weisbach (1988) document that earnings are 
significant predictors of CEO turnover. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) provide supporting 
arguments that share prices reflect the market’s expectations regarding the CEO’s continued 
employment, which partially confounds the link between stock returns and CEO turnover. As 
a result, corporate boards tend to rely more heavily on accounting-based measures in making 
CEO succession decisions. With regards to analyst forecasted Earnings per Share, a 
proprietary survey cited by Larcker and Tayan (2015) suggested that more than 90 percent 
executives and board members would terminate a CEO after failing to meet analyst 
forecasted quarterly earnings for eight quarters.  
                                                          
3
 Per-Ola Karlsson, Gary L. Neilson, and Juan Carlos Webster, “CEO Succession 2007: The Performance 
Paradox,” Booz & Company, Inc., strategy+business 51(Summer 2007).  
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Overall, corporate boards have been demonstrated to monitor corporate performance and act 
to replace poorly performing and value-destroying CEOs successfully.  
2.1.2 CEO Unexpected Deaths and Firm Performance 
To mitigate the difficulty of separating other types of concurrent events and interpreting 
results around forced turnover events (Warner et al., 1988; Denis and Denis, 1995), prior 
researchers focus solely on abnormal returns around unexpected deaths of CEOs. The main 
advantage is that, unlike other types of voluntary turnovers, such as retirement or normal 
succession, unexpected death event is hard to anticipate. In specific, Johnson, Magee, 
Nagarajan and Newman (1985) study sudden death events and find no average effect 
overall; however, abnormal returns tend to be lower for firms with higher prior performance 
and CEO pay. Sala (2010) hand-collects data from 1972 to 2008 and uses stock price reaction 
to sudden deaths to measure managerial entrenchment. He proposes that if a highly effective 
CEO died unexpectedly, the stock returns reaction should be negative when the predecessor 
is hard to be replaced with a better successor and should be zero if the departed CEO is easier 
to be replaced. On the other hand, if death removed an entrenched CEO when the board 
would or could not, the short-term stock market reaction should be positive. While age and 
tenure only weakly correlate with the stock reaction to sudden death, the reaction is strongly 
positive at 6.8% if the executive’s tenure exceeds ten years or abnormal stock returns over the 
past three years are negative. Moreover, he suggests that an existing succession plan
4
 is likely 
to make it less stressful to replace the predecessor who left the firm unexpectedly. 
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2008) document that sudden deaths are 
significantly associated with deteriorating operating performance, asset growth and sales 
growth. Unexpected deaths events are not excluded from the voluntary turnover sample and 
are considered in defining CEO Champions.  
2.2 Board Quality, Corporate Governance, and CEO Succession Plans  
CEO succession events constitute strategic junctures in the lifetime of a firm and corporate 
boards are often faced with the challenging task of replacing firm CEOs. To facilitate smooth 
CEO succession, the board of directors tends to make succession plans beforehand, and 
corporate governance also plays a crucial role in successful CEO succession. 
                                                          
4
 Sala (2010) uses successor origin (insider/outsider dummy) and number of competitors in the same industry as 
proxies for successor plan. The argument for the second proxy is that there is a larger pool of possible 
replacements for deceased executives when there are more firms operating in the same industry. 
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2.2.1 Board Quality 
Prior literature has documented that firms with better board quality tend to terminate poorly-
performed CEOs. The sensitivity of turnover to performance increases with the higher quality 
board; whereas it decreases with the lower quality board and when the CEO belongs to the 
founding family of the firm (Brickley, 2003). Jenter and Lewellen (2014) defined higher 
quality boards as smaller boards with more independent directors and higher directors’ stock 
ownership.  
Weisbach (1988) suggests that outside directors hold an active role in monitoring CEO 
performance and are more likely to replace underperformed CEOs compared to insider 
directors. Moreover, a high percentage of outsiders on corporate board could be helpful in 
reducing managerial entrenchment or managerial overconfidence (Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack, 1997; Heaton, 2002). Accordingly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest that 
poorly-performed firms should increase the number of outside directors to monitor firm 
performance more effectively. Mace (1986) regard independent directors as valuable and 
reputational capital since they could bring prestige, visibility, and commercial contacts to the 
firms. Shivdasani (1993) and Brown and Maloney (1999) use the number of board seats 
independent directors held as a proxy for the director’s reputation in the external labour 
market. Boards with a more substantial number of executive officers as directors are regarded 
as captured by the management of the firm; and consequently, are less likely to challenge or 
question CEO's decisions. Conversely, boards with more independent directors are 
considered as holding the incumbent CEOs more accountable for their actions and subsequent 
performance (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). This is accounted for by the 
independent director's percentage, which is the number of directors not employed as officers 
of the firm divided by the total number of directors on the board. On the other hand, Harris, 
and Raviv (2008) argue that an insider-dominated board could be preferable since insiders 
have specific expertise which is beneficial in enhancing shareholder value when outsiders are 
the minority; thus, insider-dominated boards is preferred when insiders’ expertise is more 
valuable than the agency costs causing by insider-dominated boards.   
Given the number of directorships is perceived to be closely related to directors’ reputational 
capital, too many directorships may lower the effectiveness of board monitoring (Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999; Core et al., 1999). Besides, a firm with a large percentage of 
institutional investors in its shareholders' composition is more likely to force 
underperforming CEOs out. Apart from board quality measures that have been extensively 
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examined, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that “busy boards” are less likely to dismiss 
poorly-performed CEOs. “Busy boards” are defined as boards on which a majority of 
independent directors serve on three or more boards, and they assume these directors will not 
adequately monitor. Thus, to examine whether the higher quality board can more successfully 
replace champion CEOs, board size, the percentage of independent directors, directors’ stock 
ownership and “busy boards” are examined in this thesis. 
2.2.2 Successor Origins: Insiders vs. Outsiders  
To select the right successors, the board of directors must understand the company's 
strengths, weaknesses and the main factors for success (Petrovic, 2008); and accordingly, 
identify the appropriate candidate with the skill sets and capability to manage the firm’s 
resources. Most prior research assumes that there is a distinctive difference between outside 
successors and insiders when evaluating the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
succession plan (Zajac, 1990). According to Dalton and Kesner (1985), outsiders will only 
be appointed as CEOs when there is expected incremental improvement relative to insiders 
because outsiders require higher compensations and it is more costly to appoint an outsider. 
Given the size limitation of the CEO labour market and certain un-transferable executive skill 
sets among various industries, cultural fit, most companies prefer to train and promote talents 
within. In general, the majority of newly appointed CEOs are insiders. Karlsson, Neilson, 
and Webster (2008) report that almost 80 percent successions involve an internal promotion. 
Similarly, the sample of Sala's (2010) includes 79.1% insiders. Familiar with their 
companies', insiders tend to be the first choices of boards. Having witnessed and evaluated 
insiders' performance, leadership style, and cultural fit over time, the board of directors is 
more confident that insiders may perform to their expectations. Successful companies prefer 
insiders, who can bring continuity and smooth transition; whereas outsiders are preferable 
when they have unique experience the companies need or boards are dissatisfied with firm 
performance and intend to change operation strategy. Accordingly, Sala used the dummy 
variable that executive replaced by an insider as a proxy for the likelihood of having a 
succession plan beforehand, and suggested that an existing succession plan would make the 
firm easier to replace the outgoing CEO.  
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) find evidence of positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement of internal CEO replacements. In line with their findings, Warner et al. 
(1988) and Huson et al. (2004) present the negative relation between stock returns and 
outside succession. On the other hand, Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996) 
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document that abnormal stock returns are signiﬁcantly positive for outsiders and signiﬁcantly 
negative for insiders around the forced turnover announcement, indicating that the 
appointment of an outsider is perceived as more beneﬁcial to shareholders. Similarly, 
Brickley (2003) conclude that the probability of hiring outsiders is inversely associated with 
prior firm performance and is highest when the predecessor was forced out. Investors regard 
hiring outsiders after terminating an underperformed CEO as good news, and there is 
significant positive abnormal returns follow such announcements (Huson et al., 2001). 
Considerable evidence has shown that internal CEOs outperform outside CEOs, which may 
partly because outside CEOs are more likely to be hired in worse performance condition. 
However, the expected sign of the coefficient of the insider/outsider replacement choice is 
ambiguous, since replacement by insiders can either suggest good succession programs or 
increased managerial entrenchment. Moreover, a recent report by Strategy &
5 
indicate that 
even an internal promotion can deteriorate shareholder values and successors tend to 
underperform predecessors. Hence, I also explore the influence of insider or outsider 
replacement decision on firm performance and intend to provide new evidence to succession 
literature. 
2.2.3 CEOs’ Retention on the Board   
Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan (2011) provide evidence that more successful and powerful 
former CEOs tend to be reappointed to the board after stepping down and their firms tend to 
have better accounting performance and higher relative turnover-performance sensitivity of 
the successor CEO. The former CEO’s retention on the board is considered to be good news, 
and stock market reaction to succession announcements is greater, indicating that firms 
should retain predecessors and not grant successors too much power to improve long-run 
performance (Perry, Yao and Chandler, 2011). Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer (2010) 
document that the likelihood of retention is higher when CEO is voluntarily leaving, is a 
founder or member of founding family or succeeded by an insider. 
2.2.4 Corporate Governance 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) examine extensively in an essential 
dimension of corporate governance, i.e., the market for corporate control. The market for 
corporate control plays a crucial role in discouraging corporate empire building since firms 
                                                          
5
 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary Neilson, “2014 study of CEOs, governance, and success: The value of 
getting CEO succession right”, Strategy &, April 14, 2015 
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that made poor acquisitions are more likely being acquired at a later stage (Mitchell and 
Lehn, 1990). However, Antitakeover Provisions (ATPs) tend to undermine the effectiveness 
of the market for corporate control to perform its function properly by substantially delaying 
the process and reducing the probability of a successful takeover (Bebchuk, Coates, and 
Subramanian, 2002
6
). Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2004), Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) find evidence of negative relations between ATPs and firm value, long-term stock 
performance; whereas Masulis et al. (2007) document evidence of negative relations 
between ATPs and acquisitions bidder returns. In specific, they examine the corporate 
governance mechanisms of acquirers and hypothesise that acquirer managers who are better 
protected by antitakeover provisions are more likely to destroy shareholder value. They find 
that acquirers with more antitakeover mechanisms tend to have significantly lower abnormal 
returns. On the other hand, separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board or 
operating in more competitive industries can provide acquirers with higher abnormal returns.  
2.2.5 Firm fixed effects and CEO style effects 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) examine whether and how CEO fixed effects matter for 
corporate policies and performance after controlling for firm fixed effects and other 
significant variation. They construct a manager-firm matched panel dataset to track the top 
managers across different firms over time and find that all the investment, financing, and 
other organizational strategy variables systematically depends on the specific executives in 
charge. Besides, some of the managerial differences in corporate practices are systematically 
related to differences in corporate performance.  
The neoclassical view of the firm makes the extreme assumption that top managers do not 
matter for corporate decisions and firm performance. In contrast, standard agency models 
hold the opposite view. However, these models do not imply corporate behaviour will vary 
with managers. Instead, these models attribute variations in corporate behaviour to 
heterogeneity in corporate governance, i.e., firms’ ability to control managers. The 
                                                          
6
 Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) document that staggered boards tend to reduce shareholder returns 
significantly in a hostile takeover, mainly by forcing bidders to wait for another year until the next annual 
meeting before gaining control. Given the elections for seats on the board occur at a different time, hostile 
bidders are forced to win two seats on the board. Furthermore, staggered boards can implement a poison pill to 
further deter hostile bidders who have won one seat. Compared to the average 43.4% price increase to 
shareholders of companies with non-staggered boards, shareholders in companies with staggered boards can 
only benefit from 31.8% increase in the nine months after a hostile takeover bid was announced. 
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managerial differences can translate into corporate choices through two paths. For the first 
path, managers can impose their styles on companies if corporate control is poor or limited. 
Accordingly, better-governed firms are more likely to select managers with performance-
enhancing styles. For the second channel, managers do not impose their styles on firms they 
lead but are purposefully selected by firms because their specific attributes may benefit firms’ 
current strategic need. Thus, manager effects in corporate practices are only expected to be 
identified if firms’ optimal strategies change over time. Otherwise, incoming managers’ style 
would only be the continuation of the prior manager’s style. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
have provided some evidence suggesting that the observed managerial fixed effects cannot be 
reasonably explained by the second optimal matching path alone. They find that most of the 
changes in firm policy happen after the managers join the firms, indicating managers are not 
hired in response to changes in the firms. Their findings imply that CEOs’ idiosyncratic style 
do have impacts on firms they manage and successors’ management styles are not expected 
to be the continuation of the prior manager’s style given firm strategies not altered.  
Furthermore, there might be persistent differences in practices across firms due to specific 
unobservable factors, which might be correlated with the manager fixed effects. It implies 
that manager fixed effects should have been separated from firm fixed effects to study 
individual CEO’s performance. However, this study focuses on voluntary turnovers, with 
80% CEO successors are promoted within. The effect of managers on corporate practices 
cannot be estimated separately from their firm fixed effects for these insiders. Also, top 
executives are not randomly allocated to firms. 
Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) propose three hypotheses regarding the causal managerial-
style effects in firm policy choices. Lack of style hypothesis assumes there is no substantive 
causal style effect in firm policy choices. Idiosyncratic style hypothesis supports that causal 
managerial-style effects are idiosyncratic and not fully anticipated, observed and controlled 
by the board. The selected style hypothesis argues that causal managerial-style effects are 
deliberately selected by the board to induce the corporation to move in a particular direction.  
Most top management changes are highly endogenous events. This endogeneity makes it 
difficult to determine whether managerial style plays a causal role in a firm’s choices and 
performance. Board of directors is likely to make simultaneous changes, including changing 
top executives, along with changes in investment or financing decisions. Thus, they try to 
separate selection from managerial style effects by studying exogenous CEO departures using 
18 
 
an extensive and comprehensive sample of Compustat firms from 1990 to 2007. Exogenous 
CEO departures include events precipitated by death or a health problem, augmented in some 
cases by natural retirements, i.e., voluntary turnover events. If managerial style plays a causal 
role in firm policy choices, abnormally large changes in firm policies or performance are 
expected to be observed after exogenous leadership transitions. However, they fail to find 
supporting evidence, i.e., after exogenous departures, successors do not make changes that 
display any directional drift or abnormal variability compared with CEOs from matched 
firms, indicating a profound lack of style. In contrast, they find substantial evidence of 
abnormally large policy and performance changes after forced turnover events (endogenous 
CEO departure). The causal effect might be explained by either idiosyncratic style hypothesis 
or selected style hypothesis or unobservable elements associated with endogenous turnover 
events. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest that managerial style is a fixed characteristic 
that can be observed by examining the policy choice biases of an executive at his or her 
employer. Following their methodology, Fee et al. (2013) also use the estimated manager 
effect at a new employer to regress against the estimated manager effect at the prior 
employer. However, they do not find any convincing evidence that managerial style can be 
observed by examining manager-level biases in policy choices at prior employers. It thus 
casts some doubt on the idea that managerial style is a fix or inherent individual 
characteristic. Their finding is consistent with a causal relationship between style and firm 
policies and with the board’s anticipation of these effects in their choice of replacement 
(selected style hypothesis). They also find evidence that managerial styles are not transferred 
across employers. 
2.3 CEO Championship Measurements 
The third strand of literature to which this thesis is related consists of research on the CEO 
ability, firm performance, CEO and firm characteristics measurements used to define 
champion CEOs. Admittedly, since CEOs are not randomly assigned to firms, it is hard to 
isolate CEOs' championship attributes from firm characteristics attributes. However, CEO 
turnover events provide us with excellent opportunities to examine championship of CEOs. 
Prior researchers use various methods to identify and measure CEOs' championship and 
ability. I summarise, compare and modify their methodology and construct the unique 
definition of champion CEOs. 
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2.3.1 Potential Approaches to Defining CEO Champions-Media Awards 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) define superstar CEOs as CEOs who experience status shift 
through awards from a prestigious media press, such as Business Week, Financial World or 
Forbes. They investigate the relationship between these award-winning CEOs and their 
subsequent performance and find strong evidence that superstar CEOs underperform their 
matched non-winning CEOs over one, two or three years following the award. Specifically, 
they construct the nearest-neighbour matching sample to compare the performance of award-
winning superstar CEOs with non-winning CEOs. To predict CEO awards, they use firm 
characteristics (market capitalizations, B/M ratio, past return), CEO characteristics (CEO age, 
gender and tenure) and past performance. Further to their studies, Ammann, Horsch and 
Oesch (2016) analyse the effect that superstar CEOs have on their competitors and find that 
superstar CEOs’ competitors outperform these superstar CEOs significantly. As their 
evidence demonstrate the deteriorating performance of superstar CEOs, this media-induced 
method is not selected to define Champion CEOs. 
2.3.2 Potential Approaches to Defining CEO Champions-CEO Ability 
Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2012) use a novel data set to study CEO abilities in firms 
involved in buyout and venture capital transactions. They discover a clear link between 
buyout CEOs' general ability and subsequent corporate performance. They find that success 
is highly associated with execution, resoluteness, and overconfidence-related skills. Chang, 
Dasgupta and Hilary (2010) study firm performance and market value changes around CEO 
turnover events (both voluntary and forced) and find that CEO ability differences exist and 
better CEO ability can contribute to better firm performance. They assume that short-term 
market reaction to turnover events, the relative pay of the CEO before the turnover and firm 
performance prior to CEO’s departure could reflect the predecessor’s managerial ability 
(championship). They conclude that a more negative abnormal stock return around turnover, 
higher prior CEO pay and better prior firm performance are associated with better CEO 
ability and worse post-departure firm performance. They find evidence that in support of the 
managerial ability hypothesis, which suggests that financial market attributes changes in 
performance around turnover to differences in the CEO's managerial ability. However, the 
relative pay of the CEO is not chosen as championship measurement in this study since 
whether differences in CEO pay reflect their ability is a contentious issue. CEO pay
7
 might be 
unrelated to either the CEO's ability or to the CEO's ability to extract rents as skimming 
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 CEO compensation is included as control variable in the analysis. 
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hypothesis
8
 suggested or negatively related to firm performance due to rent extraction by 
entrenched CEOs (Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer, 2008). Short-term market reaction to 
turnover is not employed since Huson et al. (2004) propose that financial market reactions 
around CEO turnover reflect investors' expectations rather than reveal true outcomes. Thus, I 
mainly focus on various measures of firm performance before predecessors’ departure to 
define CEO Champions. 
2.3.3 Potential Approaches to Defining CEO Champions-Prior Firm Performance 
Prior firm performance might be the most direct and efficient proxy for CEO Championship 
since it reveals information about a CEO's ability to create firm value. Industry-adjusted 
stock returns and industry-adjusted ROA have been commonly used in previous literature to 
investigate the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance (Brickley, 2003; 
Chang et al., 2010; Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda, 2014). In detail, Denis and Denis (1995) 
rely on unadjusted OROA, average and median industry-adjusted OROA to measure 
performance changes. However, the performance improvements they observe could be due to 
mean reversion of the accounting performance time series rather than management turnover. 
To mitigate mean reversion issue, I do not limit CEO measures to accounting performance, 
but do find similar pattern across all performance measures. Chang et al. (2010) examine 
change in industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) from the year before to the first or the 
third year after the year of CEO departure. ROA is adjusted by subtracting the 
contemporaneous median measure of all non-CEO-turnover firms with the same 2-digit SIC 
code. They also calculate three-year industry-adjusted buy-and-hold stock return (BHAR) to 
measure firm performance under the CEO's management before the turnover. They find that 
more capable predecessors are associated with worse subsequent operating performance. 
Masulis et al. (2007) also use pre-acquisition operating performance to proxy for bidder 
CEO quality. 
2.3.3.1 Operating Performance Measures 
Barber and Lyon (1996) demonstrate that matching sample firms on industry, size, and pre-
event performance produce better test statistics when examining operating performance 
around corporate events. Given accounting performance measures have the tendency to revert 
to their mean values, their method is especially useful for firms that have experienced 
                                                          
8
 Under Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001) skimming theory, CEOs “set their own pay” in poorly governed 
firms and those who with a longer tenure tend to be more entrenched, so that they can extract more monetary 
benefits in the form of asymmetric pay-for-luck. 
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abnormal operating performance before events. However, champion CEOs tend to have 
normal succession rather than unexpected or abnormal performance shock; thus this method 
is not employed. Changes in industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) is used to measure 
operating performance following Chang et al. (2010)’s in this study.  
2.3.3.2 Stock Performance Measures 
To compare and select the best way to measure CEO Champions’ stock performance, I 
review and examine different long-run return estimation methods following Lyon, Barber 
and Tsai (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). Namely, Calendar Time Abnormal 
Return, which is the universal average of all mean monthly abnormal return observations 
estimated in calendar time where the benchmark return is based on 25 size- and book-to-
market reference portfolios. Lyon et al. (1999) also estimate the long-run stock performance 
by using buy-and-hold model and the benchmark portfolio is the return of the corresponding 
25 size- and book-to-market reference portfolios. In their BHAR approach, they estimate a 
benchmark from 1,000 pseudo-portfolios of randomly matched firms based on size- and 
book-to-market. Barber and Lyon (1997) use bootstrapped t-statistics, and standard errors 
are calculated using 1,000 replications to draw consistent inferences since buy-and-hold 
returns are shown not normally distributed. The performance of this study mainly is 
examined over CEO’s tenure, which is unique for each CEO and not transferable. Thus, the 
CTAR and pseudo-portfolios measures are not used due to the nature of the random match. In 
contrast, industry-adjusted returns are utilised to both reflect CEO-specific performance and 
control for industry variation. Changes in industry-adjusted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) is employed in this thesis to measure stock performance following Chang et al. 
(2010)’s.  
2.3.3.3 Analyst forecast Surprise Measures 
Farrell and Whidbee (2003) find evidence that board of directors put more emphasis on 
deviations from earnings performance expectations (analyst forecasts) rather than the 
performance itself when making CEO turnover decisions, i.e. CEO turnover is more 
negatively related to analyst forecast errors rather than earnings or stock returns. Grahama, 
Harveya and Rajgopal (2005) conduct surveys and in-depth interviews with executives and 
find that analyst forecast earnings surprise and seasonally adjusted earnings changes are key 
metrics used in measuring CEOs performance. The executives have strong preferences for 
smooth earnings, which are perceived by shareholders as less risky; thus, they view earnings, 
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especially EPS (Earnings per Share), as the most critical metric reported to shareholders and 
investors. They focus more on quarterly earnings and analyst consensus estimates since 
failure to hit earnings benchmarks creates uncertainty about a firm’s prospects and raises the 
possibility of hidden problems in the firm. Dikolli et al. (2014) document evidence that CEO 
turnover events are more likely to be triggered when firms have more negative stock returns 
and return on assets, and a greater number of negative quarterly performance surprises. Of 
particular relevance to this study, they use the consensus analyst forecast error and the 
number of quarterly earnings surprise relative to median consensus analysts’ forecast to 
measure CEO performance in addition to industry-adjusted returns.  
However, all the performance measurements in their study are constructed only over the 
preceding four quarters before the turnover. In contrast, CEOs’ long-term performance is 
measured over their tenure (maximum ten years) in this study. To enhance the power of the 
tests, they also allow for asymmetric effects and employ separate measurements of positive 
and negative components of stock returns and return on assets. I adopt the similar 
methodology and apply the positive or negative components method (beat percentage 
performance measures) to all four measures.  
2.3.3.4 Investment Performance Measures 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are amongst the largest and most readily visible forms of 
corporate investment and has been extensively studied by researchers. These investments also 
tend to intensify the inherent conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders in the 
large public corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). CEOs may make value-destroying 
acquisitions and extract private benefits at the expense of their shareholders when firms have 
abundant cash flows but seldom profitable investment (Free Cash Flow Hypothesis by 
Jensen, 1986
9
; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989; 
1990) also identify several types of acquisitions, e.g., aiming at diversification or high growth 
targets, where CEOs fulfill their personal objectives rather than maximise shareholder value. 
                                                          
9
 Agency theory analyses the conflicts between shareholders and managers, while free cash flow is the excess 
cash flow after funding all positive net present value projects in a firm (Jensen, 1986). With regards to the 
agency problems when firms have free cash flow, conflicts of interest over payout policies are induced. Free 
cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) proposed that the conflicts between shareholders and managers lead to 
acquisitions since managers would rather employ free cash flows to make acquisitions than distribute them to 
shareholders through dividend pay-out or share repurchases. Also, Jensen (1986) implied that excessive free 
cash flows are typically used to make low benefit or even value destruction acquisitions. The theory was 
supported by Harford (1999), who found evidence that cash-rich firms tend to make more acquisitions than 
other firms. Harford (1999) demonstrated that cash-rich bidders tend to acquire less-attracted targets in different 
industries and these deals typically destroy their corporates’ cash reserve by almost 7% on average. 
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Specifically, they are willing to make diversifying deals since their human capital risks can 
be diversified and their jobs can be secured. Also, they have incentives to entrench 
management through diversifying deals since their compensation and bonuses can be 
increased, and their comparative managerial advantage can be enhanced. Consequently, CEO 
who try to entrench management through making diversifying deals are more likely to be 
overpaid (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Goel and Thankor (2010) build a model to 
demonstrate that CEO envy could cause a merger wave even if the economic shock, which 
started the wave, were idiosyncratic. They suppose that CEOs are envious of other CEOs’ 
compensation. Envious CEOs are induced to make size enlarging but not necessarily value-
boosting deals to increase their compensation since CEOs’ compensation is increasing with 
the firm size and firm value, and therefore, envy among CEOs could trigger a merger wave. 
Based on the premise that envious CEOs are more likely to initiate M&A deals and are more 
willing to pay a higher premium, they also predict that the earlier mergers in a wave tend to 
have the characteristics of creating higher synergies. These earlier mergers tend to involve 
smaller targets, generate higher acquirer returns and produce more significant increases in top 
management compensation than the later ones in the wave. 
CEO Champions should not realise substantial personal gains from empire building, and 
damage shareholders returns, which is measured in this study by sum CARs of all M&A 
deals initiated, if any, during CEOs’ tenure (maximum ten years). The long-term window is 
selected to leave enough time to examine CEO investment performance following the 
justification in Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2013)’s, where CEOs are demonstrated to invest 
less at the beginning of their tenure. Not surprisingly, poor acquisition performance has been 
identified as one of the key drivers of forced CEO turnover. Lehn and Zhao (2006) 
demonstrate a strong inverse relation between mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
announcement returns and the likelihood of subsequent CEO turnover. They provide 
evidence that investment performance is instrumental in the board of directors’ assessment of 
CEOs’ success. Corporate boards tend to restore poor investment decisions by replacing 
incumbent CEOs. Given that negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in firms' 
Mergers and Acquisitions performance tend to ousted CEOs, investment performance is also 
a valuable measure for CEO Championship. While Lehn and Zhao (2006) show that forced 
CEO turnovers arise from poor past investment decisions, Alexandridis, Doukas, and 
Mavis (2016) find evidence that poor investment outcomes would further lead to CEO 
successions events, with superior subsequent investment performance.  
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Golubov, Yawson, and Zhang (2015) document that acquirer returns are persistent among 
top-performed acquirers. Specifically, top-performed acquirers are more likely to make better 
M&A deals than bottom-performed acquirers. In this sense, CEO Champions with superior 
investment performance are expected to continue to outperform their peers. CEOs are not 
necessary to initiate takeover deals to be qualified as CEO Champions, but investment 
performance does provide a critical judgemental dimension for who have initiated deals 
during their tenure. Thus, investment performance is included as one of the four dimensions 
to measure CEO Championship. 
In sum, I mainly focus on various measures of firm performance, i.e. operating performance, 
stock performance, earnings surprise performance and investment performance, over 
predecessors’ tenure (maximum ten years) before departure to define CEO Champions. 
2.3.4 CEO Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Mackey (2008) studies a sample of 92 CEOs at 51 companies from 1992 to 2002 and 
measures the contribution of the CEOs to overall firm performance. By including firms with 
CEOs worked for more than one firm, he finds that CEOs account for 29.2% of the 
unexplained variance in ROA and 12.7% in business segment profitability. Similarly, 
Hambrick and Quigley (2014) study a sample of 830 CEOs of 315 companies from 1992 to 
2011 and apply more detailed control mechanisms to measure the contribution of CEOs to 
their firms' performance. They adjust the industry and firm-specific controls across each 
CEO's tenure and find that CEOs account for 35.5% of ROA. Thus, CEOs have a significant 
impact on firms' overall performance. Given CEOs have the capacity to affect firm values, 
the specific CEO characteristics which play the key roles in determining firm performance 
are thus further examined by researchers. Differences in CEO characteristics before and after 
CEO turnover are also expected to affect the outcome of CEO replacement.  
2.3.4.1 CEO Tenure, Age, Gender and Compensation 
Wang, Holmes, Oh, and Zhu (2016) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on 
CEO attributes and firm performance. Based on 308 studies as of March 2015, they conclude 
that CEO characteristics (CEO age, tenure, formal education, and prior career experience) are 
positively related to future firm performance. On the other hand, CEO personality is related 
to strategic choices rather than firm performance. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and 
Weisbach (1988) document a strong relation between CEO turnover and CEO age. In 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993)'s model, the likelihood of CEO turnover is higher as CEO 
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age increases and when the CEO age is 64 or 65. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) test 500 
CEOs' age, education and conclude that CEO age is positively correlated with lower risk 
business practices and CEOs with MBAs tend to generate higher stock and operating 
performance. As CEO tenure increase, continuously revealed firm performance reduces the 
uncertainty about a CEO’s ability and the demand for monitoring; hence, their firms tend to 
choose less costly and weaker governance structures. Dikolli et al. (2014) suggest that CEO 
tenure is associated with superior past performance, although longer CEO tenure might also 
reflect their entrenched power and thereby reducing the probability of performance-related 
dismissal. Jenter and Lewellen (2014)
10
 creatively drop the classification between forced 
and voluntary turnover and introduce performance-induced CEO turnover. They indicate that 
poorly-performed CEOs are more likely to be dismissed in their early eight years of tenure. In 
detail, around 50% of turnovers in the first eight tenure years are estimated to be performance 
induced, which is substantially higher than the percentage of forced turnover in previous 
literature. The probability of performance induced turnover slowly increases with CEO tenure 
and peaks at around tenure year 8, which suggested that the learning process about a CEO’s 
ability is quite slow and the costs of dismissing a CEO are quite high, or the incumbent CEOs 
are expected to have better ability than potential successors. Following their justifications, no 
less than five years tenure for predecessors is imposed since the board of directors would 
need enough time to learn whether a CEO have good ability to create value for the firm. 
Furthermore, it ensures that performance measures capture CEO skill rather than luck (see 
improved managerial hypothesis in Huson et al. 2004). This tends to marginally reduce 
performance-induced turnover from my sample, and consequently slightly increase 
predecessors’ performance relative to the successors’ performance (as shown in stock and 
operating performance comparisons in chapter three). Martin, Nishikawa and Williams 
(2009) study a sample of 70 female CEOs appointed between 1985 and 2007 and matched 
with 70 male CEOs. They find that market have no bias towards gender, as indicated by the 
positive abnormal returns for both male and female announcements. Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) document that CEO compensations are positively associated with 
companies’ risk. Firms with more operational or financial problems tend to award CEOs 
higher salaries.  
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 Jenter and Lewellen (2014) do not distinguish between forced and voluntary turnovers as prior literature did. 
This tends to avoid biases due to misclassifications. Moreover, CEOs can be forced out for reasons unrelated to 
their performance, such as conflicts with firm culture or policy, and departures can result from bad performance 
without being forced out, such as poorly-performed CEOs might voluntarily retire earlier. 
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2.3.4.2 CEO Prior Experience and Founder Status 
Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2015) study 2,195 CEOs of S&P 1500 companies from 1993 to 
2005 to examine the associations between CEO prior experience, compensation, and firm 
performance. They demonstrate that companies pay a premium for CEOs based on industry 
credentials, reputation in the press, and educational background, which are justified based on 
subsequent ROA. Thus, experienced CEOs tend to have higher compensation and perform 
better. Cai, Sevilir, and Yang (2015) identify 36 companies from 2,335 CEOs in S&P 1500 
from 1992 to 2010 which train the most future CEOs
11
. They compare the performance of 
471 “factory CEOs” and 1,864 “non-factory CEOs” and document that market reacts 
positively to the appointment of CEOs from these companies and the years they spent at these 
companies. These CEOs deliver superior 3-year post-performance (in terms of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q), suggesting that high-quality managerial training is associated with positive future 
performance. 
Firm founders are more likely to have specific knowledge which is valuable to the firms, and 
they tend to perform better (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Palia, Ravid and Wang, 2008; Adam, Almeida and Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 
2009). Some founders are uniquely talented and hard to replace; however, others might also 
become entrenched and are reluctant to step down once their performance deteriorates 
(Schwert, 1985). Thus, I do not limit champion CEOs to founder CEOs, but examine their 
founder status in successful replacement since they seem hard to be replaced in either case.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework within which this thesis is formulated. 
This review of the literature has focused mainly on firm performance around CEO turnover, 
the key drivers of successful replacement and potential measures in defining successful 
CEOs. Section 2.1 describes the relations between CEO turnover and firm performance, 
especially for forced turnover events, which have been examined extensively in the previous 
literature. Having identified the research gap for successful CEOs’ voluntary turnover, I 
review the key drivers of a successful replacement for forced turnover in Section 2.2, which 
might also play a fundamental role in explaining voluntary turnover replacement. Finally, 
Section 2.3 highlights that potential measures to define successful CEOs. Measures are 
summarised, compared and modified to construct the unique definition for CEO Champions. 
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 e.g., General Electric, IBM, Procter & Gamble, and Pepsico 
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3. The day after CEO Champions: Can they be successfully replaced? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
CEO succession events are often critical junctures for organisations, and corporate boards are 
often faced with the difficult task of replacing their CEOs (Grusky, 1960; Khurana, 2002), 
notwithstanding a successful one
12
. Steve Jobs, the former co-founder and long-time CEO of 
Apple Inc., was successfully replaced by the insider successor Tim Cook, who spent more 
than 14 years working along with Jobs as his right hand. Similarly, when Burberry's former 
CEO Angela Ahrendts decided to leave, Christopher Bailey, who had helped Ahrendts 
building Burberry into the famous luxury fashion houses worldwide, was chosen as her 
successor since “no one else knows the business better”, according to Ahrendts. Both cases 
suggest that, as CEOs, apart from managing firms, cultivating internal talent and paving the 
way for their successors is also an important task. While maintaining consistency is desirable, 
even the strongest performing companies are not always successful in identifying the right 
internal candidates. Having managed Nike for over 30 years, its long-term founder and CEO 
Champion Phil Knight was finally successfully replaced by the long-time insider Mark 
Parker. However, before that, Knight had already tried to step away from daily management 
twice, promoted insider Thomas Clarke in 1994 and later appointed outsider William Perez in 
2004, but both failed, and Knight had to resume CEO jobs. 
On the other hand, champion CEOs' successors might not as successful as their predecessors 
due to luck reversion
13
, growth cyclicality, and diverted priorities, but are likely to 
outperform their peers. Steve Ballmer, the previous CEO of Microsoft, had been blamed by 
clients, industry analysts, company insiders, and investors for not as successful as his 
champion predecessor Bill Gates. Admittedly, Microsoft's stock price did not perform as 
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 Failure to replace the outgoing CEOs may lead to unnecessary operation disruption (Barron, Chulkov, & 
Waddell, 2011), strategic misalignment (Hambrick & Gregory, 1991) and deteriorated firm performance 
(Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Karaevli, 2007). 
13
 The improved management hypothesis of Huson et al.’s (2004) suggests that reduced firm performance could 
result from either poor manager quality or bad luck. Thus, successors' performance after the turnover is expected 
to increase due to either the projected increase in manager quality or the reversion of bad luck. On the other 
hand, based on the agency models of Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Mirrlees (1976), the scapegoat 
hypothesis argues that managers not different regarding quality and only unlucky ones, viewed as scapegoats, 
are fired. Turnover will not increase manager quality or firm performance since successors have the same 
quality as their predecessors. However, the expected change in performance following turnover is positive since 
bad luck triggered turnover and subsequent performance should revert to mean levels, i.e., turnover is triggered 
by bad luck, and firm performance tends to recover after the turnover events due to the reversion of bad luck of 
predecessors. In line with Huson et al. (2004)'s theory, I conjecture that manager quality varies across CEOs. 
CEO Champions' superior performance could due to either superior manager quality or good luck. Thus, their 
successors are highly likely to underperform their champion predecessors due to luck reversion. 
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great while Ballmer was at the helm; however, he took over at the height of internet bubble 
when Microsoft was massively overvalued and with fewer growth opportunities. During his 
tenure, Microsoft's annual revenue surged from $25 billion to $70 billion, and gross profit 
was double that of Google or International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
14
. When 
Ballmer handed the reins over to his successor Satya Nadella, Microsoft was the third most 
valuable company in the world. With fewer growth opportunities, Ballmer was not as 
successful as Bill Gates, but to some extent, he outperformed his peers.  
CEO succession is demonstrated to be a difficult task, even for the top-performed firm with a 
succession plan in place beforehand. Having succession plans in place, some CEO 
Champions seem hard to be replaced, and their departure brings uncertainty to companies' 
shareholders. Investors and customers were nervous about Apple’s future when Steve Jobs 
announced his poor health condition and decision to step down as CEO. Similarly, analysts 
and employees were shocked by Peter Voser’s unexpected retirement; while shareholders and 
investors are anxious about Warren Buffett’s departure some day in future. These CEO 
Champions have made their companies, even the world, immeasurably better and have left 
behind companies that only they could have built. Their unavoidable departures bring shocks 
and uncertainties, and consequently, investors show great concerns over these companies’ 
future. To my knowledge, no prior research investigates the replacement of these successful 
top executives, though CEO turnover literature has examined value-destroying CEOs' 
departure.  
Recent evidence suggests that corporate boards can replace value-destroying CEOs 
successfully. CEO turnover literature has documented performance reversals around the 
replacement of dismissed CEOs, i.e., worse stock, operating or investing performance tend to 
increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and the incoming CEOs tend to perform 
better when predecessors were forced out than voluntarily left (Denis and Denis, 1995, 
Huson et al., 2004 and Alexandridis et al. 2016). There is high sensitivity between firm 
performance and forced turnover, but no significant changes around voluntary turnover 
events which tend to occur much more frequently. In Huson et al.'s (2004) sample, voluntary 
turnover events account for 84% of their sample of 1,344 CEO turnover events during the 
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Annual profit growth over Ballmer's tenure at Microsoft (16.4%) surpassed that of General Electric's Jack 
Welch (11.2%) and IBM's Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. (2%). Ovide, Shira (August 25, 2013). "Next CEO's Biggest 
Job: Fixing Microsoft's Culture". Wall Street Journal. Vance, Ashlee (January 12, 2012). "Steve Ballmer 
Reboots". Businessweek.  
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period from 1971 to 1994. While previous studies focus on cases that typically involve failed 
predecessors or full voluntary departures sample, no study investigates the replacement of 
successful CEOs. Replacing champion CEOs is undoubtedly a more challenging task, and its 
ultimate success or failure can provide insights into the effectiveness of CEO replacement 
decisions in their entirety. Examining successful CEOs adds more value since they attract 
more public attention than bottom performed CEOs. Shareholders and investors are more 
anxious about their departure and curious about whether their successors can sustain their 
superior performance. Previous studies examining CEO succession events did not focus 
particularly on successful predecessors, which might present an incomplete picture. For 
underperformed companies, better successors who successfully replace their predecessors 
may not as good as other successors who took office from top-performed predecessors. These 
successors outperform their poorly-performed predecessors might because it is easier to 
exceed relatively low performance as a starting point. On the other hand, it not necessary 
means these successors are unsuccessful if they could not outperform, given these firms have 
trapped in the poor financial situations already and involved with higher risks which make 
them harder to turn around. This, in turn, explains why outsider executives usually require 
higher compensation (Jongjaroenkamol and Laux 15 , 2016), regarded as risk premium 
mitigating the higher chance of failure. By examining CEO Champions' voluntary turnover 
sample, I try to avoid this issue and evaluate whether successors outperform their champion 
predecessors, and outperform other successors of non-champions. 
CEO Champions are defined as strong performers, in terms of industry-adjusted operating, 
industry-adjusted stock, EPS surprise and investment performance measures, who have 
created value for shareholders over their tenure (maximum ten years). All predecessors are 
ranked based on eight performance measures mutually exclusively. Two measure indices are 
then constructed based on each of the four measures, respectively. Champion League І 
consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index One, which is ranked 
base on the average rank of AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs. Champion 
League ІІ are the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measure Index Two, ranked base on 
the average rank of the four beat percentage performance measures AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS 
Surprise2 and M&A CARs2. The ranking methodology contributes to the CEO performance 
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 They conclude that boards tend to recruit CEOs from outside when firms' performance measures are harder to 
manipulate. Outsider CEOs engage in greater accounting manipulation, receive steeper incentive pay, and obtain 
higher expected compensation than CEOs promoted from within. Furthermore, outside CEOs are expected to 
have a shorter (longer) tenure when performance measures are hard (easy) to manipulate. 
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measurement literature since each measure captures a different dimension of corporate/CEO 
success. Moreover, by using innovative long-term performance measures, I intend to provide 
supporting justifications that the board of directors' examination and CEOs' self-evaluation 
should take into account the long-term performance rather than merely meet the short-term 
goals. 
CEO Champions build thriving organisations that create massive value for their shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Although expected, their departures typically give rise to uncertainty 
about the companies’ future. Investors seem nervous about Champion CEOs' departure 
regarding the negative Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CARs) around champions' turnover 
announcement. For Champion League I, all 458 events generate value-weighted mean VAR 
at -0.14% and equally weighted mean CAR at -0.22% over the (-1, +1) window using market 
model
16
. For Champion League II, all 458 events generate value-weighted mean VAR at -
0.24% and equally weighted mean CAR at -0.34%. The need to replace them when the time 
comes poses a significant challenge for their organisations. This chapter investigates whether 
CEO Champions manage to build strong legacies over long tenure by cultivating core 
strengths within the organisation and whether they can pave the way for their successor to 
step into their shoes. Moreover, I investigate the common characteristics these role-models 
have. Aiming at easing shareholders’ concerns over CEO Champions’ unavoidable departure, 
I investigate CEO Champions’ succession events and intend to solve the following research 
questions: Will these companies still perform well after CEO Champions’ departure? Do 
CEO Champions’ spirits and legacies still play key roles after their successors take office? 
Driven by the CEO Champions' effective replacement conjecture, legacy conjecture, and 
remaining influence conjecture, CEO Champions are expected to be successfully replaced, 
i.e., better predecessors tend to be replaced by better successors. Results of this chapter show 
that CEO Champions' successors outperform other successors on average. Moreover, new 
CEO’s performance depends on their champion predecessors’ performance. 
Performance differentials between predecessors and successors are assessed by examining 
actual performance differentials and ranking differentials to tackle the problem that firms are 
subject to various growth rate across the firm lifecycle. On average, the top tercile CEOs in 
both champion leagues performed exceptionally well for each measure. CEOs in the 
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 Following Brown & Warner (1985), Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated over (-1, +1) 
window using CRSP value-weighted/ equally weighted index (the value-weighted/ equally weighted return on 
all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks). Market model parameters were estimated over (-250,-15) window 
relative to the succession announcement day. 
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champion league I deliver an industry-adjusted return on assets (AROA) of 19.79% over their 
tenures (maximum ten years). They also produce 126.36% industry-adjusted buy-and-hold 
returns (ABHAR) and generate the average EPS 14.32% beyond analyst forecasted EPS. For 
deals initiated by CEO Champions during their tenure, they produce the sum of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) at 13.22%. Although successors of top tercile-performed CEOs’ 
underperform their predecessors due to luck reversion, growth cyclicality or diverted 
priorities, they outperform other bottom CEOs' successors. Corporate boards seem to have 
replaced CEO Champions effectively. Moreover, in the cross-sectional regressions in Tables 
3.6-3.8, I compare and contrast in a regression framework the same issue in the difference 
tests and find evidence supporting hypothesis one. After controlling for firm cyclical 
variables, year and industry fixed effects, CEO Champions and their successors have superior 
operating performance (AROA) than their peers. The similar coefficients for champions and 
their successors compared to their peers (0.0688 and 0.0602) indicate that CEO Champions' 
successors can beat their peers as much as their champion predecessors did. Thus, hypothesis 
one that corporate boards can successfully replace Champion CEOs by hiring better 
successors available, i.e., corporate boards are able to hire new successors who can 
outperform other non-Champion CEOs’ successors is supported. Moreover, the legacy 
hypothesis is tested in both univariate and multivariate frame, and supporting evidence are 
provided. I find evidence in the regression analysis of successors against predecessors’ 
ranking z-scores that predecessors’ performance ranking is the most significant element in 
explaining successors’ rankings. There are continuous superior performance and no 
significant performance reversion when successors take offices from champions. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 that predecessors’ legacy significantly affect successors’ performance in 
voluntary turnover events is supported. 
Differentials between predecessors and successors' CEO and firm characteristics are also 
examined. Compared with bottom performed CEOs, CEO Champions are more likely to be 
(co) founders, earned higher compensation during their tenure and still served on the board 
after they stepped down as CEOs
17
. Despite less experience in terms of age, champion's 
successors normally earn higher compensation than bottom performed CEOs' successors. The 
differences in the Top-Bottom CEO characteristics differentials between predecessors and 
successors are significant only for chairman duality, suggesting that the characteristics 
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 In line with this, successors of champion CEOs are less likely to be chairman of the board simultaneously 
because champion CEOs tend to remain on the board as chairman after their successors took offices.  
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differentials between champions and bottom CEOs before and after the turnovers are similar. 
Firms tend to have larger sizes (regarding total assets) and the lower growth rates (regarding 
Market to Book ratio, Q, and growth in sales) during successors’ tenure18. The differences of 
Top-Bottom firm characteristics differentials between predecessors and successors are all 
significant, suggesting that champions’ successors do not have much higher growth rate than 
their peers as their predecessors beat their peers before the turnovers. Also, compared with 
that during their predecessors’ tenure, firm size in champion successors’ hands are even 
smaller than their peers. 
This study provides new evidence on CEO turnover and CEO succession literature. To my 
knowledge, no existing literature studied the consequence of value-boosting CEO 
Champions' departure and whether corporate boards can successfully replace these 
champions. This chapter contributes to the CEO literature in the following aspects. Given 
performance changes after forced turnover events have been studied extensively, this study is 
the first to examine the performance comparisons of top performed CEOs and their 
successors. It provides consistent results that although champions' successors cannot 
outperform their predecessors due to either luck reversion, priority diversion or growth 
cyclicality, they can outperform other successors of non-champions. From the univariate test 
results, the superior performance over predecessors’ tenure is because that they took office at 
an earlier stage in firms' life and enjoyed a higher growth rate. In contrast, the multivariate 
test results show that CEO Champions and their successors have similar superior operating 
performance (AROA) than their peers after controlling for firm cyclical variables, year and 
industry fixed effects. Thus, corporate boards can successfully replace CEO Champions by 
hiring better successors available, i.e., corporate boards are able to hire new successors who 
can outperform other non-champions’ successors. On the other hand, this chapter contributes 
to the CEO success literature by examining success measures and building the CEO ranking 
indices to test whether the successors can inherit CEO Champions' superior performance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, hypotheses are built, and 
champion CEOs are defined, followed by Data and Sample in Section 3, where descriptive 
statistics and the performance measures distributions are presented. I also present the vertical 
analysis of the performance measures distribution over time. In Section 4, I explain the 
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 Although firms are growing slower in successors' hand, the median growth rate of champion CEOs' firms is 
significantly higher than that of bottom performed CEOs' firms, which is 7.58% higher for champion 
predecessors and 2.78% higher for their successors in terms of growth in sales. 
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difference tests results of univariate analysis. Section 5 investigates the CEO and firm 
characteristics. I perform multivariate analysis on the performance of champions and their 
Successors and present results in section 6. Section 7 describes more univariate test results in 
decile performance tables which aim at further testing the legacy hypothesis. Section 8 
concludes. 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Research Questions and Successful Replacement Conjectures  
This chapter is mainly guided by the following research questions: After CEO Champions’ 
voluntary leave, can corporate boards successfully replace them by hiring better successors 
available? Will predecessors’ legacy still play a vital role in firms' operations and affect their 
successors’ performance after they step down?  To solve the above questions, I make the 
following conjectures. 
3.2.1.1 CEO Champions Effective Replacement Conjecture 
The first force behind the potential successful replacement could be the good corporate 
governance lies in a firm’s success. Huson et al. (2004) propose improved management 
hypothesis, which holds that forced turnover tends to increase management quality, and 
therefore firm performance. They find evidence that corporate governance mechanisms 
penalise underperformed CEOs and the degree of performance improvement afterwards is 
positively related to the percentage of institutional shareholdings, outsider-dominated board, 
and outsider successors. In line with Huson et al. (2004)'s theory, I conjecture that corporate 
governance mechanisms play a key part in successful replacement. Directors sitting on a 
higher quality board, in terms of the traditional board quality measures (i.e. board size, 
independent directors percentage, stock ownership), and directors who made succession plans 
beforehand are more likely to hire equally talented and successful successors. As part of this 
structure, CEO Champions might also involve in the succession plans as mentors. 
3.2.1.2 CEO Champions Remaining Influence Conjecture 
The second potential force is CEO Champions themselves. Successful CEOs tend to be 
reappointed to the board as directors or as chairmen/chairwomen. Their firms tend to have 
better accounting performance after the turnovers (Fahlenbrach, Minton and Pan, 2011). 
The likelihood of retention is higher when the CEO voluntarily left, is a founder or a member 
of the founding family, or succeeded by an insider (Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer, 
2010). Champion predecessors play a crucial role in training their successors and guiding the 
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new management team so that performance remains robust irrespective of new successors' 
quality.  
3.2.1.3 CEO Champions Legacy Conjecture 
The third conjecture is the continuous good firm quality. Champion CEOs are assumed to 
have left legacies to their successors, and their spirits are still the foundation of these 
companies so that it is easier for new CEOs to become successful. These CEO Champions 
have built strong firms and have a long-run strategic plan in place; thus, whoever the 
incoming CEOs are, these firms will still perform well in the medium term under the 
guidance of the new CEOs since they are managing stronger and more successful firms built 
by CEO Champions. The better the predecessors and the firms they have built, the luckier the 
new incoming CEOs.  
Driven by the above three conjectures, CEO Champions are expected to be successfully 
replaced by incoming CEOs, i.e., better predecessors tend to be replaced by better successors. 
Their successors are expected to be able to sustain the above average performance, and new 
CEOs’ performance depends on their champion predecessors’ performance. To test the 
research questions, I develop two hypotheses. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Based on the above conjectures, I expect CEO Champions can be successfully replaced. 
However, due to luck reversion, growth cyclicality and divert priorities, successors’ 
performance is not always comparable to their predecessors, which makes the comparisons 
between champions’ successors and successors of non-champions a better approach in 
examining the research questions.  
3.2.2.1 Luck Reversion 
Huson et al. (2004)’s improved management hypothesis suggests that forced turnover tends 
to increase management quality and firm performance. Under this hypothesis, manager 
quality is not observable and varies across managers. The board of directors attempts to 
utilise realised firm performance as a proxy for manager quality and tends to replace poorly-
performed incumbent managers given the implied low quality. Furthermore, poor firm 
performance could result from either poor manager quality or bad luck. Thus, successors' 
performance after the turnover is expected to increase due to either the projected increase in 
manager quality or the reversion of bad luck. They also find evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms penalise underperformed CEOs and the degree of performance 
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improvement afterward is positively related to the percentage of institutional shareholdings, 
outsider-dominated board, and outsider successors.  
In contrast, the scapegoat hypothesis (Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979; Mirrlees, 1976) 
argues that manager quality does not vary across managers since poor performance arises 
from bad luck alone, but not from poor management. Under this hypothesis, managers are not 
different in terms of quality and only unlucky ones, viewed as scapegoats, are fired. The 
board of director fires poorly performed manager to induce other managers to offer desirable 
effort. Unlike improved management hypothesis, turnover will not increase manager quality 
or firm performance since successors have the same quality as their predecessors. However, 
the expected change in performance following turnover is positive since turnover was 
triggered by bad luck and subsequent performance should revert to mean levels. 
In line with Huson et al. (2004)'s theory, I conjecture that manager quality varies across 
CEOs. CEO Champions' superior performance could due to either superior manager quality 
or good luck. Thus, their successors are highly likely to underperform their champion 
predecessors due to luck reversion.  
3.2.2.2 Growth Cyclicality and Divert Priorities 
CEO turnover events, either voluntary or forced turnover, tend to divert corporate priorities 
and result in an inward focus (Favaro, Karlsson and Neilson, 2015). Also, predecessors 
manage firms at the earlier stages in their firms’ life cycles, which involve with more growth 
opportunities and inevitably manifested performance, particularly for stock returns which 
reflect more growth expectations than other measures. Firms tend to have higher growth rates 
during predecessors’ tenure. These lead to my conjecture that predecessors generally 
outperform successors due to cyclicality, and successors can perform as well as their 
predecessors after controlling for cyclicality. Consequently, I cannot simply claim that 
performance differences between successors and their predecessors are indicators of actual 
differences in CEO skills. Instead, two unique measures indices are constructed to indicate 
and compare CEO ability. Based on CEO Champions effective replacement and remaining 
influence conjectures, although the incomparable growth opportunities,  divert corporate 
priorities and luck reversion might precipitate successors underperform their champion 
predecessors, these champions should be successfully replaced by better successors available, 
i.e., champion CEOs' successors are expected to outperform other non-Champions’ 
successors. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1: Corporate Boards can successfully replace CEO Champions by hiring 
better successors available (Corporate boards can hire new successors who can 
outperform other non-Champions’ successors) 
Support: Champions’ successors outperform Non-Champions’ successors  
Reject: Champions’ successors cannot outperform Non-Champion CEOs’ successors  
An additional question is whether the successors’ performance is driven by their 
predecessors’ (legacy hypothesis).  These champion predecessors have set solid foundations 
for their firms; and thus, I expect that their legacy would still play a vital part in firms' 
management and their spirit would still guide their successors in making strategic plans. 
According to this hypothesis, the Champion CEO has built a great company and the 
successor then simply steps into his/her shoes and rides on the coat-tails. If there is a positive 
relation, it would suggest that replacing Champion CEOs is not that much of a challenging 
task given their legacy. Based on this conjecture, incoming CEOs' performance is supposed 
to correlate with their champion predecessors’ performance. This leads to the second 
hypothesis, i.e., predecessor legacy hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (Predecessor Legacy Hypothesis): Predecessors’ legacy significantly affects 
successors’ performance in voluntary turnover events. (i.e., Successors' performance 
depends on their predecessors' performance in general) 
Support: Performance of successors is related to performance of their Champion CEOs  
Reject:  Performance of successors is not related to that of their Champion CEOs   
3.2.3 The definition of the CEO Champions 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) define superstar CEOs as CEOs who experience status shift 
through awards from a prestigious media press. This media-induced method is not chosen in 
this study since they find evidence of deteriorating performance of these award-winning 
superstar CEOs, compared to their matched non-award-winning CEOs. Chang, Dasgupta, 
and Hilary (2010) assume that short-term market reaction to turnover events, the relative pay 
of the CEO prior turnover and firm performance before the CEO departure could reflect 
predecessors' championship. However, the relative pay of the CEO is not selected as 
championship measurement since CEO pay might be unrelated to either the CEO's ability or 
the CEO's ability to extract rents or even negatively related to firm performance due to rent 
extraction by entrenched CEOs (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2008). Short-term market 
reaction to turnover is also not utilised since Huson et al. (2004) propose that financial 
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market reactions around CEO turnover reflect investors' expectations rather than reveal true 
outcomes. Thus, I mainly focus on various measures of firm performance before 
predecessors’ departure to define CEO Champions.  
Firm founders are more likely to have specific knowledge which is valuable to the firms, and 
they tend to perform better. Some founders are uniquely talented and hard to replace; 
however, others might also become entrenched and are reluctant to step down once their 
performance deteriorates (Schwert, 1985). I do not limit CEO Champions to founders, but 
test founder status since they seem hard to be replaced in either case. Prior firm performance 
might be the most direct and efficient proxy for CEO’s championship since it reveals 
information about a CEO's ability to create firm value. Industry-adjusted stock returns and 
industry-adjusted ROA have been commonly used in previous literature to investigate the 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) find 
evidence that board of directors puts more emphasis on deviations from earnings performance 
expectations (analyst forecasts) rather than the performance itself when making CEO 
turnover decisions. Lehn and Zhao (2006) document that negative Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) in firms' Mergers and Acquisitions performance tend to ousted CEOs, which 
implies that investment performance is also a valuable measure in defining champions. In 
sum, operating, stock, investment and EPS surprise are selected in defining CEO Champions. 
Harvard Business Review ranked CEOs based on corporate performance during CEOs' 
tenure, which meant to be a measure of enduring success, and aims to identify the top 100 
best-performing CEOs in the world. For each CEO’s tenure, they evaluate three long-term 
financial performance metrics, i.e., the country-adjusted total shareholder return, the industry-
adjusted total shareholder return and change in market capitalization. These CEOs are then 
ranked from best to worst for each financial metric. The three rankings are finally averaged to 
obtain the CEO's overall ranking. Similarly, ten years’ time window is employed (or CEO 
tenure) to assess CEOs' performance in this chapter. One downside of their methodology is 
that their rankings only take into account objective measures (total shareholder returns and 
change in market capitalization)
19
, which may accidentally include CEOs who have 
disappointed shareholders on other dimensions. To cope with this, I employ eight 
performance metrics and create two sets of CEO rankings on firms' operating, stock, 
                                                          
19
 In the November 2015 issue of the best -performing CEOs in the world, they further included a measurement 
of each company’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. They gave 80% weight to long-
term financial results (total shareholder return and change in each company’s market capitalization) and 20% to 
ESG performance. 
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investment performance and Earnings per Share (EPS) surprise performance to capture more 
dimensions of CEOs' performance. By introducing the long-term performance measures, I 
aim at altering the traditional approach that investors, analysts, and directors assessing CEOs 
and providing a new judgemental standard for CEOs who have created long-term value for 
their shareholders. 
To define CEO Champions, I investigate 1786 turnover events amongst S&P 1500 firms, 
including all S&P 500, S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap firms, between 1992 and 2009 and 
examine these firms’ performance elaborately from 1982 to 2012. Across Harvard Business 
Review's five issues on top 100 performed CEOs lists since 2010, more than half of the best-
performing CEOs run firms with U.S.-based operational headquarters. Accordingly, this 
study focuses only on the U.S. public companies. S&P 1500 firms are selected since these 
firms have public history so that I can access the data for performance measures. Also, they 
cover 90% of U.S. firms’ market capitalization. Jenter and Lewellen (2014) suggest that the 
learning process about a CEO’s ability is quite slow and the costs of dismissing a CEO are 
quite high, or the incumbent CEOs are expected to have better ability than potential 
successors. As CEO tenure increase, continuously revealed firm performance reduces the 
uncertainty about a CEO’s capacity and the demand for monitoring. Thus, I impose no less 
than five years tenure for predecessors since the board of directors would need enough time 
to learn whether a CEO has good ability to create value for the firm. Also, it is to ensure 
CEOs performance measurements capture skill rather than luck, whereas successors’ minimal 
tenure requirement is set to 1 year to avoid survivorship bias.  
In this study, CEO Champions are defined as successful performers (in terms of operating, 
stock, EPS surprise and investment performance measures), who have created value for 
shareholders over their tenure (maximum ten years). As initial screening criteria, CEOs’ 
firms should be S&P1500 firms and their tenure should be no less than five years. Then, I 
compare the performance of these CEOs with that of their corresponding successors using 
eight distinct measurements, i.e., AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise, M&A CARs, AROA2, 
ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2. For AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise 
measurements, I require at least five years data available before and at least one-year data 
available after the turnover events to ensure continuity. I also impose the requirement that 
each CEO should have data for at least any three of the four measures. By doing this, 
champion CEOs are not limited to those who have to initiate M&A deals during their tenure. 
I rank each CEO—from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst)—for each metric and average the four (three 
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if anyone is missing) performance measures’ rankings (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and 
M&A CARs) to obtain the AVG RANKING 1. AVG RANKING 1 is then re-ranked from 
one to bottom to define Measures Index One. Champion League І consists the top tercile 
performed CEOs from Measures Index One. Measure Index Two is constructed in the same 
way, by which I re-rank the average ranking of the four (three if anyone is missing) beat 
percentage performance measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2). 
Champion League ІІ consists the top tercile performed CEOs from Measure Index Two. 
Accordingly, I construct two sets of CEO Champion sample (458 CEOs each) ranked by 
either to what extent or how many times they beat their peers or market expectations. 
Incorporating two sets of four metrics is a balanced and robust approach. While Measures 
Index One's risk, including industry-adjusted operating and stock performance's, being 
skewed toward smaller companies (it is easier to achieve high returns for small firms), 
measure index two takes into account only how many times CEOs beat their peers and thus 
free from firm size skewness bias.   
3.3 Data and Sample  
3.3.1 Data Selection and Sample Construction  
To define CEO Champions and to test the two hypotheses, I study 1786 turnover events 
amongst S&P 1500 firms, including all S&P 500, S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap firms, 
between 1992 and 2009 and examine these firms’ performance elaborately from 1982 to 
2012. Turnover events, CEO characteristics and executive compensation are derived from 
ExecuComp. When former CEOs re-joined the same company, Execucomp treats them as 
new CEOs and fills the previous date became CEO as the recently joined date. Thus, I 
manually collect date became CEOs if it is missing or incorrect in ExecuComp. Reasons for 
the turnover events, step down announcement for predecessors, hire announcement for 
successors and more CEO characteristics are hand-collected from LexisNexis, Businessweek 
website and firm proxy statement. I calculate performance measurements for predecessors 
(successors) over their tenure (maximum ten years) before (after) the turnover event (or until 
2012). Specifically, annual industry and firm financial data are from Compustat, and monthly 
stock market data is gathered from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Quarterly 
actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) and the corresponding consensus median analysts’ 
forecasted EPS immediately preceding the quarterly earnings announcement date is collected 
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from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) unadjusted detail history database
20
 
and board of director related information are achieved from ISS Governance Services 
RiskMetrics database.  
The turnover sample is first derived from ExecuComp between 1992 and 2012 and covers 
3593 turnover cases. 3455 cases remained after excluding firms not covered in CRSP. Since I 
aim at studying Champion CEOs who are permanent and sole CEOs with a long run 
perspective in the firms, interim CEOs who succeed on temporary base and Co-CEOs who 
served in the firms during the same period are identified from LexisNexis and eliminated. For 
interim CEOs, they are deleted as both successors in prior turnover cases, and predecessors in 
the later cases and the next permanent CEOs who succeed the interim CEOs are then taken as 
the valid successors in the previous turnover cases and leave the turnover sample with 3286 
cases. Apart from interim CEOs, I also exclude 307 cases for which successors have less than 
one year's tenure21 to ensure operational continuity and avoid survivorship constraint, and the 
sample is further reduced to 2979 cases. I also require departed chief executives have no less 
than five years tenure in the firm since the board of directors would need enough time to 
evaluate CEO’s ability22. This reduces the sample substantially to 1953 cases but ensures that 
CEOs performance measures capture CEO skill rather than luck. I further exclude 88 cases 
when imposing the restriction that successors need to take office before the end of 2009 to 
assess their performance after the turnovers23. 27 more cases without turnover information 
from LexisNexis are also excluded. Finally, I require at least five continuous years’ Industry-
adjusted Return on Asset (AROA) data available before the turnover and at least one year’s 
AROA data available on Compustat after turnover events to ensure firms are not delisted 
after turnover events and to ensure continuity. The final turnover sample consists of 1786 
turnover cases from 1992 to 2009. I examine the full turnover sample in descriptive statistics 
                                                          
20
 To make proper comparisons between IBES and Compustat, unadjusted (for splits and stock dividends) IBES 
forecasts and actual earnings are employed. After extracting the estimates from the IBES Unadjusted file based 
on the ibes tickers, actuals are linked to the estimates. They are on the same basis by adjusting for stock splits 
using CRSP adjustment factor. The median of analyst forecasts made in the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date are calculated accordingly. Earnings definition (primary or diluted EPS) is indicated in IBES 
21
 Successors’ tenure is estimated from the date they became CEO to 2012.12.31 for those who have not left 
office yet until the sample end since my sample only covers CEO information until 2012.  
22
 Restriction that predecessors should have no less than 5 years tenure is imposed so as to leave enough time for 
CEOs to implement business strategies. Including CEOs with less than 5 years tenure would not allow me to 
realistically assess the CEOs performance. However, I did not impose the same restriction for successors since 
excluding successors with less than 5 years tenure is likely to remove cases where the successors were actually 
unsuccessful and thus introduces the survivorship bias. In untabulated tests, I also examined a subsample with 
predecessors and successors both have no less than 5 years tenure. 
23
 I leave three years space for successors before sample end since I require sufficient data range for successors 
follow the turnover events in order to measure their performance and compare with their predecessors’ 
performance. 
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and performance distribution tests, and voluntary turnover sample in univariate and 
multivariate analyses.  
Turnover events are classified as forced or voluntary based on the news from LexisNexis 
around turnover announcement date. Similar to Parrino (1997), I classify the turnover as 
forced when a CEO is fired, forced out of the position, or leave due to policy differences or 
conflict; whereas retirement, resignation, normal succession, accept other position or pursue 
other interests, deceased or poor health are categorised as voluntary turnover. Accordingly, 
the 1786 turnover cases are divided into 1641 voluntary, and 145 forced turnover cases. For 
the 1641 voluntary turnover cases, around half predecessors stepped down due to retirement
24
 
(761). 210 voluntary turnovers are associated with CEO resignation; whereas 135 turnovers 
are triggered by their acceptance of other position or pursuit of other interests. Death or poor 
health causes 60 CEOs left. The remaining voluntary turnover reasons include mergers (25), 
the spinoff (23), separation of chairman and CEO position (11), restructuring (5) and buy out 
(1)
25
. With regards to forced turnovers, the majority predecessors are forced out (86) or fired 
(17). 33 CEOs left due to poor performance. The rest are dismissed due to policy differences 
(5) or conflict (4). Take into account the destination of departed CEOs’, most of the CEOs 
that left voluntarily are typically retained within the firm either as (Vice) chairman, (vice) 
president (937), the board of directors (189) or other employees (46). In contrast, the vast 
majority of CEOs in forced turnover left firm eventually. Voluntary (unexpected death events 
included) and forced turnover events are included in this thesis. Only voluntary turnovers are 
included to define champion CEOs and test champions' successors to ensure that performance 
improvement after the turnovers for predecessors at the bottom terciles are not resulted from 
including more forced turnover cases than top-tercile performed predecessors. 
Finally, merger and acquisition announcements and deal characteristics are collected from 
Thomson Financial SDC and deals are announced between 1980 and 2012. Acquirers are 
U.S. public firms and targets are either U.S. or non-U.S. public, private or subsidiary firms. 
Spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions 
of remaining interest, exchange offers and privatisations are excluded from the M&As 
sample. After limiting the deal transaction value at no less than 1 million dollars and 
                                                          
24
 Some firms promote a potential candidate to chief operating officer (COO) or president position, where they 
can be groomed for eventual succession. Firms in 269 turnover events nominated their next successors, normally 
the COO or president in the news announcement which implies that succession plans are made beforehand, and 
the turnovers are normal succession events.  
25
 141 cases have voluntary turnover information available on LexisNexis, but no further unambiguous turnover 
reasons are given. 
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including only completed deals, the sample is reduced to 42809 deals. Moreover, Acquirer's 
ownership of the target is required to be less than 10% before acquisition announcement and 
more than 50% following the deal completion. Target to acquirer relative size should be no 
less than 1%, and the targets and the bidders are different companies (their parent companies 
should have different CUSIP). The initial M&A deals sample consists of 39939 deals. Then 
the 39939 M&As deals sample from SDC are matched with the 1786 turnover sample using 
6-digit CUSIP to get 3996 predecessors initiated, and 2191 successors initiated deals over 
their tenure (maximum ten years).   
Annual turnover events over time for the 145 forced and 1641 voluntary turnover cases are 
presented in Figure 1. The number of voluntary turnover cases fluctuates around an overall 
upward trend; while the distribution of forced turnover cases seems quite stable and boards 
tend to dismiss CEOs at a slightly higher rate in the 2000s than in the 1990s. The increase in 
forced turnover cases since 2000 can be attributed to the regulatory and legislative reaction to 
corporate scandals, institutional shareholders’ involvement, and corporate governance 
improvement. As can be seen from the figure, there is high turnover events concentration in 
the end of 1990s, when the Internet bubble occurred, and in the middle of 2000s, which is 
similar to the pattern of Karlsson, Neilson and Webster’s (2008) finding. 
Figure 3.1: Annual Forced and Voluntary Turnover Events 
 
          This figure presents the annual turnover events for the 145 forced vs.1641 voluntary turnover cases. 
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3.3.2 Methods 
3.3.2.1 Measurements of CEO Champions 
Measure of operating performance- industry Adjusted Return on Assets (AROA) 
Annual median industry-adjusted ROA 𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as the average of median 
industry-adjusted ROA over CEO tenure (maximum ten years). 2-digit Compustat SIC code 
is used (1-digit Compustat SIC code is used if the 2-digit code is missing) and firms in the 
sample are excluded from calculating the industry median ROA for the same 2-digit (1-digit) 
Compustat SIC code and same year as sample firms. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), 
ROA is calculated as Operating Income after Depreciation divided by the average of the 
Beginning period and Ending period Total Assets. AROA is winsorised at the 1 and 99 
percentile. The requirement that at least five consecutive years’ AROA before the turnover 
and at least one year’s AROA after the turnover is imposed to ensure continuity. Annual 
median industry-adjusted ROA for firm i over CEO’s tenure, 𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as below. 
                                                                            
𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∏(winsorised 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − median 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑖,𝑡)
𝑠+𝑇 
𝑡=𝑠
                            (1) 
Where s is the date became CEO, and s+T represents the date CEO stepped down. N is the 
total number of years over CEO’s tenure (maximum ten years). 
Measure of operating performance- AROA2 
AROA2 is calculated as the number of years where AROA is positive over CEOs’ tenure 
(maximum ten years) divided by the corresponding total number of years, N. 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
𝑁
                       (2) 
 
Measure of stock performance-industry Adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (ABHAR) 
To capture the stock performance dimension and compare those before and after turnover 
events, I follow Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010) to calculate annual median Industry-
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Adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (ABHAR). The monthly abnormal return over 
CEO’s tenure 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is calculated as the firm BHAR over CEO tenure less the median 
BHARs of firms in the same industry over the same period. 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is annualised to get 
annual median industry-adjusted BHAR,  𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, as shown in Eq. (3).  
 
           𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =   
1
𝑁
[ ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) ]                                              (3)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠
 
Where s is the date became CEO, and s+T represents the date CEO stepped down.  ∏ (1 +𝑠+𝑇𝑡=𝑠
𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the buy and hold return of firm i over CEO's tenure (maximum 10 years) from s to 
s+T, and ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠  is the median buy and hold return of all firms in the same industry 
(same 2-digit Compustat SIC code or 1-digit if 2-digit code is missing) for the same period. 
To ensure continuity, I impose the requirement that at least five consecutive years’ stock 
return before the turnover and at least one year’s stock return afterwards.  Compustat SIC 
code is used across all databases to do industry-adjusted analysis since more than 36% of the 
classifications between Compustat and CRSP disagree at the 2-digit level and Compustat 
matched samples are more powerful than CRSP matched samples in detecting abnormal 
performance (Kahle and Walkling, 1996). N is the total number of years over CEO’s tenure 
(maximum ten years). 
 
Measure of stock performance-ABHAR2 
ABHAR2 is calculated as the number of years where 𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is positive over CEOs’ tenure 
(maximum ten years) divided by the corresponding total number of years, N. 
 
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑁
                 (4) 
Measure of analyst forecast surprise - Earnings Per Share (EPS) Surprise 
I follow Dikolli et al. (2014) to use consensus analyst forecast error and the number of 
quarterly earnings surprise relative to median consensus analysts’ forecast to measure CEO 
performance.  
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𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒% 𝑡,𝑘=
𝑒𝑡,𝑘−?̂?𝑡,𝑘
|?̂?𝑡,𝑘|
                                                                 (5) 
In specific, 𝑒𝑡,𝑘 is the actual EPS announcement for company k in quarter t, and ?̂?𝑡,𝑘 is the 
corresponding analyst forecasted EPS for company k in quarter t. |?̂?𝑡,𝑘| is the absolute value 
of analyst forecasted EPS for company k in quarter t. Analyst forecasted EPS is the median 
forecast from all analysts those made a forecast in the last 90 days before firms' earning 
announcement. If an analyst made multiple forecasts during this period, the most recent one 
is taken. The requirement that at least five consecutive years’ EPS Surprise before the 
turnover and at least one year’s EPS Surprise after a turnover is imposed to ensure continuity. 
EPS Surprise is winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile. For each firm k over CEO’s tenure 
(maximum ten years), the average 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑡,𝑘 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑘 =
1
𝑁
∏ 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒% 𝑡,𝑘
𝑠+𝑇 
𝑡=𝑠
                                                      (6) 
Where 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑘 is the average EPS Surprise of each firm k, over CEO’s tenure 
(maximum ten years). S is the date became CEO, and s+T is the date CEO stepped down. N 
is the total number of years during CEOs’ tenure (maximum ten years). 
Measure of analyst forecast surprise - EPS Surprise2 
EPS Surprise2 is calculated as the number of years where 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑘 is positive over 
CEOs’ tenure (maximum ten years) divided by the corresponding total number of years, N. 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒2𝑡,𝑘 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑘  
𝑁
    (7) 
 
Measurement of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
I use the standard market model proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) to calculate the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). The benchmark against which I test the main 
sample’s returns is calculated from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). In 
detail, CARs are calculated over the (-1, +1) event window using CRSP value-weighted 
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index. The market model parameters are estimated over the period from the day -250 to day -
15 before the acquisition announcement day. The securities included in the index are traded 
in the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, and have available shares outstanding and valid stock 
prices in the current and previous periods. The return that each security contributes to the 
index is based on its relative market capitalisation at the end of the previous period.  
CARs are calculated by subtracting the market model cumulative returns from the cumulative 
returns of the firm as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑[𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚,𝑡)]
𝑡+1
𝑡−1
                                                 (8) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i over the 3-day period, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the 
return of the bidder over the same period, 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂? are the OLS predicted values from the 
estimation period, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the value-weighted return of the CRSP index. The short-run 
cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the excess returns of the 3-days (t−1 to t+1) 
surrounding the day of the announcement of the acquisition, t, which is day 0. The 3 days 
event windows is one of the most widely used for merger and acquisition studies, including 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, 2005). 
 
Measure of investment performance-M&A CARs 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of CARs of all deals made by the CEO predecessor (or successor) in 
firm i, if any, over CEO’s tenure (maximum ten years). 𝑀&𝐴 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖,𝑡 over the CEOs’ tenure 
from date became CEO, s, to date stepped down as CEO, s+T, are calculated as follows: 
 
𝑀&𝐴 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡                                                                                 (9)
𝑠+𝑇
𝑡=𝑠
 
     
Measure of investment performance-M&A CARs2 
M&A CARs2 is calculated as the number of deals made by predecessors (successors) over 
their tenure (maximum ten years) which have positive CARs divided by the corresponding 
total number of deals, N. 
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𝑀&𝐴 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑀&𝐴 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
𝑁
         (10) 
 
3.3.2.2 Multiple regression cross-sectional analysis 
I further examine the impact of championship succession on firm performance using multiple 
regression analysis, where the effects of other factors are analysed simultaneously. These 
factors include firm growth, size, age, and cyclicality. The AROA(2) is regressed against a 
set of explanatory variables, Champion І(II) dummy, Champion І(II)'s successor dummy, 
successor dummy, Log (Firm Age), Log (Firm Assets), GSALES, MTB, industry and year 
fixed effects. 
The estimable models are: 
𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴(2)𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖                            𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁                       (11) 
Where: 𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴(2)𝑖  denotes average of median industry-adjusted ROA over CEO tenure 
(maximum ten years), as estimated in Equations. (1) or (2): 𝛼 measures the long-run excess 
operating returns after controlling for the effects of all the covariates entering the matrix of 
explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑗, that have been used in previous literature, in addition to the ones 
that are specific to this study, the impact of which is recorded in the vector of estimated 
parameters 𝛽𝑗. 
The EPS Surprise(2) is regressed against the same set of explanatory variables, Champion І(II) 
dummy, Champion І(II)'s successor dummy, successor dummy, Log (Firm Age), Log (Firm 
Assets), GSALES, MTB, industry and year fixed effects. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒(2)𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖                       𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁                       (12) 
Where 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖 and 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖2  are defined and estimated in Equations (6) and 
(7): 𝛼 measures the long-run excess 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 after controlling for the effects of all the 
covariates entering the matrix of explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 the impact of which is recorded in 
the vector of estimated parameters, 𝛽𝑗. 
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To assess the effect of predecessors’ legacy (PRE) and effective replacement on successors’ 
performance (POST) after controlling for the effects of other factors, I estimate equation (13). 
In particular, equation (13) is estimated in a nested regression form with various 
combinations of explanatory variables. In equation (13) the dependent variable, POST is the 
post-turnover successors’ Measures Index One z-scores. The intercept (𝛼 ) measures the 
excess performance after accounting for the effects of a set of explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑗). 𝛽𝑗 
is a vector of the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑗). The variables that 
represent the variables of interest are: PRE, the pre-turnover predecessor's Measures Index 
One z-scores, SIZE, the total number of directors sitting on the board, INDEP, the percentage 
of independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors, BUSY, is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more 
boards, GINDEX, the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003), EINDEX, the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2005), SERVEYEAR, the number of years that insider successors hold 
other managerial positions in the firms, INSIDER dummy, SAMEDATE dummy, 
REMAIN_BOARD dummy, FOUNDER dummy, interaction variables, industry and year 
fixed effects. 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖                       𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁                          (13) 
 
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports statistics on predecessors, successors’ characteristics and their firms’ 
characteristics for both voluntary and forced turnover sample. Panel A provides statistics 
comparisons between predecessors and successors. Newly appointed CEOs in the full sample 
tend to be younger than departed CEOs and they have shorter estimated tenure than their 
predecessors, which are both statistically significant26. When it comes to compensation, on 
average, successors are paid with the lower salary, bonus, but slightly higher total 
compensation. After scaled by firm’s total assets, new CEOs earned significantly higher 
relative total compensation. The vast majority CEOs are male before and after turnover, with 
female percentage considerably higher for successors. Most departed CEOs have been 
                                                          
26
 Successors’ tenure is estimated from the date they became CEO to 2012.12.31 for those who have not left 
office yet until the sample end since my sample only covers CEO information until 2012. 
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chairman/chairwoman of board simultaneously, whereas the percentage is significantly lower 
for their successors during their tenure. This mainly results from that most predecessors tend 
to be retained on the board (64.78%) as chairman (43.23%) after turnovers. Regarding the 
background of the successors, the vast majority of them are promoted internally (70.8%) with 
around ten years average service in the firms, which is consistent with Karlsson et al. (2008) 
and Sala’s (2010) findings.  
Panel B compares firm characteristics at the beginning and over predecessors’ tenure, at 
turnover, and at the beginning, the end and over successors’ tenure. In detail, column (1) 
reports characteristics for the fiscal year one year before predecessors took office (Maximal 
10 years). Column (2) shows those over predecessors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Column 
(3) shows the results one fiscal year prior to predecessors stepped down (maximum ten 
years). Column (4) is the fiscal year one year before successors take office. Column (5) 
presents characteristics over successors' tenure (maximum ten years). Column (6) shows 
characteristics of successors one fiscal year before (estimated) tenure ends. There are material 
differences in firm size and growth opportunities over predecessors’ and their successors’ 
tenure. Regarding assets, sales and market capitalization, the size of firms have increased 
substantially during both predecessors and successors tenure (difference tests (3)-(1) and (6)-
(3)). As can be seen from the difference tests in column (4)-(1), predecessors tend to manage 
firms at the earlier stages in their firms’ life cycles, with significantly smaller size. Managing 
firms in the earlier stage also involved with more growth opportunities. In line with the size 
difference, firms have significantly higher growth rate (higher Market-to-Book ratio and 
Tobin’s Q) when predecessors were in charge (difference tests (3)-(1)). However, in the 
difference test (6)-(3), both measures decline dramatically during successors’ tenure, which 
even drop back to initial level when successors leave (or estimated tenure ends), as shown in 
the difference tests (4)-(1) and (6)-(1).  
More evidence is provided in the five annual average growth measures in assets, sales, 
market capitalization, Market-to-Book ratio and Tobin’s Q. For all five growth opportunity 
measures, firms are growing more rapidly during predecessors’ tenure than their successors’ 
(difference tests (5)-(2)). GASSETS surges at the beginning of predecessors’ tenure and 
drops before the turnover, suggesting that predecessors took office at the earlier stage in 
firms’ lifecycle. Compared with their predecessors, successors took offices with significantly 
lower GASSETS and GSALES (difference tests (4)-(1)). The relative lower GSALES and 
GMARKETCAP do not change much during successors’ tenure, indicating that firms in 
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successors’ hands tend to be mature firms with fewer growth opportunities. When it comes to 
the GMARKET-TO-BOOK and GQ, they start quite high at 4.92% and 5.19% (see column 
(1)) and decrease to 1.77% and 1.16% before turnover events (see column (3)). The growth 
rates in these two measures significantly increase after successors came, but not as high as 
over their predecessors’ tenure. In sum, on average, firms are managed in the earlier stage of 
lifecycles over predecessors’ tenure and grow more rapidly in the predecessors’ hands. Thus, 
I cannot simply compare firms’ performance over predecessors and successors tenure since 
firms have changed substantially in terms of age (maturity), size and growth opportunities. 
To solve the growth cyclical issue, I construct and compare the rankings of predecessors with 
that of successors. Also, I control for firm growth in the multivariate analysis.  
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           Table 3.1: Comparisons of CEO and Firm Characteristics around the Turnovers 
This table presents CEO, firm characteristics for predecessors and their successors for the full turnover sample. 
Panel A compares predecessor and successors characteristics at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). 
AGE (YEARS) is the age of the CEO in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). TENURE 
(YEARS) is the tenure of the CEO served as CEO in the firm
27
. SALARY and BONUS are items from 
ExecuComp. TOTAL COMPENSATION is the TDC1 item from ExecuComp, which comprises of salary, 
bonus, other annual compensation, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of stock options 
granted (using black-scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total compensation. 
COMPENSATION (%) is the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their 
departure (appointment). FEMALE (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and zero if is 
male. CHAIRMAN DUALITY (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the Board 
and zero otherwise. FOUNDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the (co-) founder of 
the firm and zero otherwise. REMAIN_BOARD (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still 
served on the board after departure. REMAIN_CHAIR (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor 
still served as chairman after departure. INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds 
other managerial position(s) in the firm for no less than one years before becoming CEO. SERVEYEAR is the 
number of years that insider successors hold other managerial positions in the firms before becoming CEOs. In 
Panel B, ASSET and SALES are total assets and sales (in millions) from Compustat. MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (in millions) is the common shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end stock price. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market value of equity over book value of equity. Q is calculated as the market 
value of equity plus book value of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by book value of equity plus 
book value of current liabilities and long-term debt. The market-to-book ratio and Q have been winsorized at 
1% and 99% level. The five growth items are annual average growth in assets, sales, market capitalization, 
market-to-book, and Q. Firm characteristics at the beginning of predecessors’ tenure First1) 28 , over 
predecessors’ tenure (Tenure1), at turnover events (Turnover), at the beginning of successors’ tenure (First2), 
over successors’ tenure (Tenure2) and at the end of successors’ tenure (Last) are presented, respectively. 
Difference tests are based on t-tests for means and Wilcoxon-tests for medians. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 TENURE (YEAR) for successors is estimated from the date they became CEO until the last day in the dataset 
for those who have not left office until 2012.12.31. 
28
 First1 is one year prior to the first fiscal year when predecessors take office (maximum 10 years before 
turnover). Tenure1 is over predecessors’ tenure (maximum 10 years). Turnover is one year prior to the last fiscal 
year before predecessors stepped down. First2 is one year prior to the first fiscal year when successors take 
office (maximal 10 years before turnover). Tenure2 is over successors' tenure (maximum 10 years). Last is one 
year prior to successors' (estimated) tenure end year (maximal 10 years after turnover). 
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    (1) (2) (2) - (1) 
    Predecessor Successor Difference 
Panel A: CEO characteristics         
AGE (YEARS) mean 60.74 51.86 -8.88 *** 
  median 62.00 52.00 -10.00 *** 
  n 1638 1757     
TENURE (YEARS) mean 12.62 5.50 -7.11 *** 
  median 10.01 4.84 -5.17 *** 
  n 1786 1786     
SALARY  mean 699.27 611.51 -87.76 *** 
  median 625.50 562.45 -63.05 *** 
  n 1786 1786     
BONUS  mean 648.72 562.86 -85.86 * 
  median 194.49 248.68 54.19 * 
  n 1786 1786     
TOTAL COMPENSATION mean 4652.02 5074.94 422.92   
  median 2129.16 2721.82 592.66 *** 
  n 1777 1773     
COMPENSATION (%)  mean 2.65 3.21 0.57 ** 
median 1.14 1.30 0.16 *** 
n 1777 1773     
FEMALE (%) mean 0.78 2.63 1.85 *** 
  n 1786 1786     
CHAIRMAN DUALITY (%) mean 85.44 61.03 -24.41 *** 
  n 1786 1786     
FOUNDER (%) mean 16.29 —— ——   
  n 1786       
REMAIN_BOARD (%) mean 64.78 —— ——   
n 1786       
REMAIN_CHAIR (%) mean 43.23 —— ——   
  n 1786       
INSIDER (%) mean —— 70.80 ——   
  n   1767     
SERVEYEAR mean —— 10.08 ——   
median   6.25     
  n   1767     
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     Panel B: Firm characteristics and growth ten years before, after turnover and during CEO's tenure 
    Predecessor       Successor   Difference 
    (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (3)-(1)   (4)-(1)   (6)-(3)   (6)-(1)   (5)-(2)   
    
First1  Tenure1   Turnover   First2 Tenure2 Last   Turnover-First1  First2-First1  Last-Turnover Last-First1  
 
Tenure2-tenure1 
  
ASSETS  mean 6690.90 10310.91   13621.33   16295.69 19372.06 21454.50   6930.43 *** 9604.79 *** 7833.17 *** 14763.60 *** 9061.15 *** 
  median 888.60 1367.75   1838.52   2043.23 2464.57 2621.19   949.92 *** 1154.63 *** 782.67 *** 1732.59 *** 1096.82 *** 
  n 1568 1786   1786   1786 1786 1772                       
SALES  mean 3352.40 4495.56   5575.71   6239.74 7137.95 7760.48   2223.31 *** 2887.34 *** 2184.77 *** 4408.08 *** 2642.39 *** 
  median 803.17 1163.80   1461.25   1573.40 1856.37 1958.05   658.08 *** 770.23 *** 496.80 *** 1154.88 *** 692.57 *** 
  n 1562 1786   1786   1786 1786 1772                       
MARKET    mean 4019.54 6172.91   7937.50   8328.74 9045.20 9566.12   3917.96 *** 4309.20 *** 1628.62 * 5546.58 *** 2872.29 *** 
CAPITALIZATION median 739.65 1328.91   1644.85   1646.86 1916.35 2050.80   905.20 *** 907.21 *** 405.95 *** 1311.15 *** 587.44 *** 
  n 1434 1786   1782   1778 1781 1763                       
MARKET-TO-BOOK mean 2.75 3.15   3.07   2.84 2.74 2.70   0.32 *** 0.09   -0.37 *** -0.05   -0.41 *** 
  median 1.94 2.42   2.20   2.04 2.05 1.98   0.26 *** 0.10   -0.22 *** 0.04   -0.37 *** 
  n 1430 1786   1782   1778 1781 1763                       
Q mean 2.23 2.53   2.47   2.26 2.15 2.10   0.24 *** 0.03   -0.36 *** -0.12 ** -0.39 *** 
  median 1.58 1.89   1.72   1.65 1.66 1.60   0.14 *** 0.07   -0.11 *** 0.03   -0.23 *** 
  n 1424 1786   1773   1772 1778 1757                       
GASSETS mean 26.89% 25.23%   17.51%   7.59% 7.56% 8.74%   -9.38% ** -19.30% *** -8.76% *** -18.15% *** -17.67% *** 
  median 7.70% 12.91%   7.35%   4.26% 6.05% 4.70%   -0.35%   -3.43% *** -2.65% *** -3.00% *** -6.86% *** 
  n 1477 1786   1786   1786 1786 1772                       
GSALES mean 17.71% 26.16%   14.71%   7.75% 9.61% 15.50%   -3.00%   -9.97% *** 0.78%   -2.22%   -16.55% *** 
  median 8.67% 11.45%   8.50%   5.54% 5.92% 6.10%   -0.18%   -3.13% *** -2.40% *** -2.57% *** -5.53% *** 
  n 1471 1786   1785   1783 1783 1769                       
GMARKETCAP mean 20.60% 26.78%   17.32%   18.66% 18.57% 22.56%   -3.28%   -1.94%   5.24%   1.96%   -8.21% *** 
  median 9.78% 19.23%   5.63%   4.53% 9.21% 9.84%   -4.15% ** -5.25% *** 4.21% * 0.06%   -10.02% *** 
  n 1379 1786   1780   1778 1780 1763                       
GMARKET-TO-BOOK mean 4.92% 6.29%   1.77%   4.72% 3.42% 7.32%   -3.15% * -0.21%   5.55% *** 2.40%   -2.87% *** 
  median 0.10% 5.33%   -2.89%   -0.27% 1.83% 1.11%   -2.99% *** -0.37%   4.00% *** 1.01%   -3.50% *** 
  n 1375 1786   1780   1778 1780 1763                       
GQ mean 5.19% 5.25%   1.16%   4.81% 3.73% 5.52%   -4.03% *** -0.38%   4.36% *** 0.33%   -1.52% ** 
  median 0.00% 3.17%   -1.37%   0.37% 1.11% 1.78%   -1.37% *** 0.37%   3.15% *** 1.78% ** -2.06% *** 
  n 1366 1784   1766   1769 1777 1752                       
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3.3.4 Vertical Analysis 
To examine the performance trends over time, I carry out vertical analysis based on CEOs’  
four performance measures ten years prior and ten years after turnover. Figure 3.2-3.5 plot 
median industry-adjusted ROA, median industry-adjusted BHAR, EPS surprise and M&A 
sum CARs changes around CEO turnover events. I do not distinguish between forced and 
voluntary turnovers as previous literature did. This tends to avoid biases due to 
misclassifications. Moreover, CEOs can be forced out for reasons unrelated to their 
performance, such as conflicts with firm culture or policy, and departures can result from bad 
performance without being forced out, such as poorly-performed CEOs might voluntarily 
retire earlier. Figure 3.2 presents sample median industry-adjusted ROA over the period from 
ten years before to ten years after the top management turnover. Separate plots are shown for 
the 145 forced and 1641 voluntary turnover cases, and for the combined sample. The patterns 
suggest that CEO turnover follows a period (3 years) of deteriorating operating performance 
and the operating performance tends to improve subsequently post turnover, which is 
consistent with Huson et al. (2004) 's findings. This pattern is most apparent for the forced 
turnover sample.  
Figure 3.2: Median industry-adjusted Return on Assets around CEO turnover events 
 
Figure 3.3 presents the plots of median industry adjusted BHAR changes around CEO 
turnovers. There is a general downward trend before and after the top management turnover 
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events. Firms in the sample tend to have higher growth rates and superior stock performance 
in the earlier stage during predecessors' tenure. As firms become mature, the superior stock 
performance cannot be sustained even five years before the top management turnover. The 
plot of industry-adjusted BHAR display the similar pattern as operating performance, with 
performance deterioration five years before and performance improvement after turnover 
events. However, the performance improvement will not last long given the firms are mature. 
As soon as incoming CEOs take offices, the stock performance continues to deteriorate. The 
performance deteriorations and improvements are more distinct for forced turnover events.  
Figure 3.3: Median industry-adjusted buy-and-hold Abnormal Return around turnover 
 
 
In contrast, the EPS surprise changes around turnover events in figure 3.4 show different 
picture from stock performance. The EPS surprise for the full sample fluctuates around an 
overall upward trend for post turnover events, suggesting that firms tend to beat analyst 
forecast more after successors took offices. Surprisingly, EPS surprises increase before 
turnover for the voluntary and full sample, and the pattern seems not affected by the 
managerial changes. For forced turnover, EPS surprise followings the same pattern as 
operating and stock performance which deteriorates before the turnover and tends to improve 
thereafter. It fluctuates across years and does not follow any patterns for forced turnovers.   
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Figure 3.4: Earnings Per Share Surprise change around CEO turnover events 
 
In figure 3.5, the M&A sum CARs of voluntary turnover sample witnesses a slight decrease 
during predecessors' tenure and it starts to level off around turnover events. Similarly, for the 
forced turnover sample, investment performance is enhanced after new CEOs taking offices. 
As seen from the pattern of performance changes, the forced turnover sample is disturbing 
but does not affect the full sample. I find similar results after excluding forced turnover 
events. I rule out the forced turnover events when defining champion CEOs, and perform the 
remaining univariate and multivariate tests using the voluntary turnover sample only.          
Figure 3.5: M&A Sum CARs around CEO turnover events 
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3.4 Univariate Analysis-Difference Tests  
In this section, I further compare predecessors and successors' performance in terciles based 
on the voluntary turnover sample. While the forced turnover sample displays different pattern 
from the voluntary turnover sample (as shown in figure 3.2-3.5), it only stands for less than 
10% of the whole sample and does not affect the entire sample pattern much. Also, the CEO 
Champions' definition is based on the voluntary turnover sample. Moreover, existing 
literature has documented that firm performance tends to decrease before and increase after 
forced turnover events; whereas voluntary turnover has opposite pattern. By including forced 
turnover in the analysis may offset the performance trends for voluntary cases. Thus, forced 
turnover sample are excluded from the following analyses. 
To compare the performance of top-tercile, bottom-terciles performed predecessors and their 
corresponding successors, I use four performance measures. In Table 3.2, AROA is the 
annualised median industry-adjusted ROA over CEO tenure (maximum ten years
29
), 
following Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010). ABHAR is the average of median industry-
adjusted BHAR calculated over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) to mitigate possible luck 
involved with CEO performance within the short term
30
. EPS Surprise is also regarded as an 
essential measure in this study since the board of directors put more emphasis on deviations 
from earnings performance expectations (analyst forecasts) rather than the performance itself 
when making CEO turnover decisions (Farrell and Whidbee, 2003). Also, EPS Surprise is 
the only indirect firm performance measurement that represents how CEOs beat market 
expectations, which evaluates CEO Championship from an innovative dimension. I follow 
the similar methodology in Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014)'s study and use the 
consensus analyst forecast error and the number of quarterly earnings surprise relative to 
median consensus analysts’ forecast to measure CEO performance. Different from their study 
where measures are constructed over the preceding four quarters before the turnover, I 
measure CEOs over their tenure (maximum ten years). To enhance the power of tests, they 
also allowed for asymmetric effects and employed separate measurements of positive and 
negative components of stock returns and return on assets. I adopt the similar methodology 
and apply the positive or negative components method (beat %) to the four measures 
(AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) and present the test results in Table 
                                                          
29
 I also calculate the performance measures over 5 years prior to CEO turnover and over CEOs’ whole tenure, 
and get similar results. I select 10 years to avoid CEO luck in short term and CEO hubris over too long period. 
30
 In Chang, et al (2010)'s study, they used three-year industry-adjusted buy-and-hold stock return (BHAR) prior 
to turnover. 
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3.3. I finally include M&A sum CARs over CEOs' tenure (maximum ten years) before and 
after turnover events.  
Table 3.2 compares the top and bottom tercile performed predecessors and their 
corresponding successors using the four measures (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A 
CARs).  In columns 1 to 4, all predecessors in the voluntary turnover sample are ranked 
based on each of the four measures mutually exclusively and grouped by tercile. Column 5 to 
8 show tercile performance of their corresponding successors’. The top tercile performed 
CEOs perform exceptionally well in terms of the four measures, respectively. They deliver an 
industry-adjusted return on assets (AROA) of 19.79% in the past ten years (or during their 
tenures) before departure. They produce 126.36% industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(ABHAR) and generate the average actual EPS which is 14.32% beyond analyst forecasted 
EPS, respectively. For all the deals made by the top tercile performed CEOs during their 
tenure (maximum past ten years), they contribute total Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) of 13.22%. The contrast between their achievements and performance of the bottom 
terciles performed predecessors is striking. On average, the lower tercile CEOs produce 
average AROA at 1.7% and average ABHAR at 11.35% over their tenures. They deliver the 
average actual EPS 3.66% below analyst forecasted and a total M&A sum CARs at-5.17%. 
For each measure (as seen from the difference tests between successors and predecessors (5)-
(1), (6)-(2), (7)-(3), (8)-(4)), top tercile performed predecessors significantly outperform their 
corresponding successors. Luck reversion, growth cyclicality, and diverted priorities of 
management (as discussed in section 3.3.2) after turnover make predecessors and successors' 
performance incomparable. This issue is also apparent when testing the differences of the 
Top-Bottom differentials between successors and predecessors. On average, top predecessors 
beat bottom predecessors' AROA by 18.09%, while successors of top predecessors beat their 
peers by 15.31%. The difference between the degrees of beaten is significant at 2.78%, 
suggesting that top successors cannot outperform as much as their predecessors in the 
univariate framework. I find similar results for all the measures across Table 3.2, Table 3.3 
and Table B.1. To avoid this issue, I compare the top tercile performed predecessors' 
successors with other successors of bottom tercile performed predecessors'. From the 
difference tests between successors of the top and bottom predecessors (see Top-Bottom 
difference tests for successors), champions' successors generate average AROA at 16.71%; 
whereas successors of bottom predecessors provide significantly lower average AROA at 
1.4%. Similar results are identified for EPS Surprise and M&A sum CARs, with the only 
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exception for ABHAR. This may due to the over (under) valuation involved with stock 
returns, or the uncorrelated noise contained. Notably, for M&A sum CARs, I find the similar 
result that successors of top-performed predecessors are more likely to make better 
acquisitions than successors of bottom-performed predecessors, which is consistent with 
Golubov, Yawson, and Zhang (2015)'s findings that acquirer returns are persistent among 
top-performed acquirers. Specifically, top-performed acquirers are more likely to make better 
M&A deals than bottom-performed acquirers. 
In sum, although successors of top tercile-performed CEOs’ underperform their predecessors 
due to luck reversion, growth cyclicality and diverted priorities, they outperform other bottom 
CEO' successors, with only ABHAR insignificant
31
. Corporate boards seem to be doing a 
good job in replacing CEO Champions. Thus, hypothesis one that corporate boards can 
successfully replace Champion CEOs by hiring better successors available, i.e., corporate 
boards can hire new successors who can outperform other non-Champion CEOs’ successors 
is supported.  
In Table 3.3, top and bottom tercile performed predecessors, and their corresponding 
successors' four beat percentage performance measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 
and M&A CARs2) are shown. Similar to Table 3.2, top tercile performed predecessors 
significantly outperform their successors for each measure. On average, at 97.29% during 
their tenures, they deliver positive AROAs. Among 8.7 out of 10 years, they generate positive 
ABHARs. They beat analyst forecast EPS 7.5 years out of 10 years on average. For all the 
deals made during their tenures, at 94.71% they produce positive sum CARs for that year. 
The contrast between top and bottom predecessors is also substantial. On average, bottom 
predecessors produce positive AROA and positive ABHAR around half of the time (51.03% 
and 59.73%, respectively) over their tenure. They are more likely to deliver negative M&A 
CARs (68%) and less apt to beat analyst forecasted EPS (48.44%). Notably, compared with 
the previous finding in Table 3.2, I find even more distinct and consistent pattern, especially 
for ABHAR2, where successors of top predecessors significantly outperform those of bottom 
predecessors. Thus, hypothesis one that corporate boards can successfully replace Champion 
CEOs by hiring better successors available is further supported. 
                                                          
31
 In an unreported table, I also compare the top vs. bottom tercile performed successors irrespective of their 
predecessors’ performance based on the 4 performance measures i.e. I rank successors based on their respective 
performance measures. For AROA, 71.3% of top tercile performed champion predecessor’s corresponding 
successors are actually top tercile performed champion successors themselves based on Successors’ CEO 
ranking. For the rest measures, around 50% of champions’ successors are actually the champion successors. 
This also suggests that the majority of champion’s successors are actually among the best successors. 
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Table 3.2: Performance Comparisons for Top and Bottom Terciles performed CEOs 
This table compares the performance of predecessors in 1641 voluntary turnover cases with that of their corresponding successors using four distinct 
measurements, i.e., AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs. All predecessors are ranked based on these four performance measures mutually 
exclusively. Top tercile and bottom terciles performed CEOs are compared accordingly. AROA is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten 
years or the tenure if CEO tenure is less than ten years. ABHAR is the Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return. The requirement 
that at least five continuous years’ stock return before the turnover and at least 1 year’s stock return after the turnover is imposed to ensure continuity and the 
final stock performance sample is 1399 cases. Earnings Per Share Surprise (EPS Surprise) = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. I imposed the requirement that at least 
five continuous years’ EPS Surprise before the turnover and at least 1 year’s EPS Surprise after the turnover, to ensure continuity and the final EPS Surprise 
sample is 1373 cases. M&A CARs are the SUM CARs of all deals made by predecessors (successors) over their tenure or 10 years before (after) the turnover 
if their tenure exceeds ten years. I report results where AROA and EPS Surprise are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. Mean difference tests are based on 
t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
    Predecessor   Successor   Successor-Predecessor 
    AROA ABHAR 
EPS 
Surprise  
M&A 
CARs 
  AROA ABHAR 
EPS 
Surprise  
M&A 
CARs 
  AROA ABHAR 
EPS 
Surprise  
M&A CARs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Top mean 19.79% 126.36% 14.32% 13.22%   16.71% 12.33% 7.23% 0.94%   -3.08%*** -114.03%*** -7.09%*** -12.28%*** 
Tercile median 16.62% 55.01% 10.99% 8.77%   13.03% 7.16% 7.32% 1.36%   -3.59%*** -47.85%*** -3.67%*** -7.41%*** 
  n 547 466 458 319   547 466 458 206           
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)   (13)-(9) (14)-(10) (15)-(11) (16)-(12) 
Bottom mean 1.70% 11.35% -3.66% -5.17%   1.40% 10.61% 1.84% -0.77%   -0.30% -0.74% 5.51%*** 4.40%*** 
Terciles median 1.81% 11.60% 0.17% -1.95%   1.01% 6.39% 2.63% -0.01%   -0.80%*** -5.22%*** 2.47%*** 1.94%*** 
  n 1094 933 915 637   1094 933 915 424           
                                
    (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)   (21)-(17) (22)-(18) (23)-(19) (24)-(20) 
All mean 7.73% 49.66% 2.33% 0.97%   6.50% 11.18% 3.64% -0.21%   -1.23%*** -38.47%*** 1.31%* -1.18%* 
Terciles median 5.13% 20.07% 2.32% 0.27%   3.61% 6.59% 3.69% 0.38%   -1.53%*** -13.48%*** 1.37%*** 0.11% 
  n 1641 1399 1373 956   1641 1399 1373 630           
Top-
Bottom 
mean 18.09%*** 115.01%*** 17.98%*** 18.39%***   15.31%*** 1.72% 5.38%*** 1.70%**   -2.78%*** -113.29%*** -12.60%*** -16.69%*** 
median 14.82%*** 43.41%*** 10.83%*** 10.73%***   12.02%*** 0.78%* 4.69%*** 1.37%***   -2.80%*** -42.63%*** -6.14%*** -9.36%*** 
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Table 3.3: Beat Performance Comparisons for Top and Bottom Terciles performed CEOs 
This table compares the performance of predecessors in 1641 voluntary turnover cases with that of their corresponding successors using another four beat 
performance measurements related to table 2, i.e., AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2. Measurements in Table 3.2 capture the extent to 
which predecessors and successors performed while measurements in this table value how many times the returns or surprises are positive. All predecessors 
are ranked based on these four performance measures mutually exclusively. Top tercile and bottom terciles performed CEOs are compared accordingly. 
AROA Beat% (AROA2) is the number of years where AROA is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. ABHAR Beat% (ABHAR2) is 
the number of years where ABHAR is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. EPS Surprise Beat% (EPS Surprise2) is the number of 
years where EPS Surprise is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. M&A CARs Beat% (M&A CARs2) is the number of deals made by 
predecessors (successors) over their tenure or 10 years before (after) the turnover if their tenure exceeds ten years which have positive CARs divided by the 
corresponding total number of deals. Mean difference tests are based on t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
    Predecessor   Successor   Successor-Predecessor 
    
AROA2 ABHAR2 
 EPS 
Surprise2  
 M&A 
CARs2 
  
AROA2 ABHAR2 
 EPS 
Surprise2  
 M&A 
CARs2   AROA2 ABHAR2 
 EPS 
Surprise2   M&A CARs2 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Top mean 97.29% 86.57% 75.84% 94.71%   50.40% 64.19% 65.80% 57.67%   -46.89%*** -22.38%*** -10.05%*** -37.04%*** 
Tercile median 100.00% 85.71% 74.36% 100.00%   50.00% 66.67% 67.87% 50.00%   -50.00%*** -19.05%*** -6.49%*** -50.00%*** 
  n 553 465 456 290   553 465 456 173           
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)   (13)-(9) (14)-(10) (15)-(11) (16)-(12) 
Bottom mean 51.03% 59.73% 48.44% 32.17%   34.34% 56.55% 57.59% 50.47%   -16.69%*** -3.18%*** 9.15%*** 18.30%*** 
Terciles median 60.00% 60.00% 50.00% 33.33%   30.00% 60.00% 59.09% 50.00%   -30.00%*** 0.00%*** 9.09%*** 16.67%*** 
  n 1088 934 917 666   1088 934 917 457           
    (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)   (21)-(17) (22)-(18) (23)-(19) (24)-(20) 
All mean 66.62% 68.65% 57.54% 51.14%   39.75% 59.09% 60.32% 52.45%   -26.87%*** -9.56%*** 2.77%*** 1.31% 
Terciles median 70.00% 70.00% 58.33% 50.00%   30.00% 60.00% 62.50% 50.00%   -40.00%*** -10.00%*** 4.17%*** 0.00% 
  n 1641 1399 1373 956   1641 1399 1373 630           
Top-
Bottom 
mean 46.26%*** 26.84%*** 27.40%*** 62.54%***   16.06%*** 7.64%*** 8.21%*** 7.20%**   -30.20%*** -19.20%*** -19.19%*** -55.34%*** 
median 40.00%*** 25.71%*** 24.36%*** 66.67%***   20.00%*** 6.67%*** 8.78%*** 0.00%**   -20.00%*** -19.05%*** -15.58%*** -66.67%*** 
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In Table B.1, I construct two Measure Indices for Champion CEOs, and bottom terciles 
performed CEOs. All predecessors in the voluntary turnover sample are first ranked based on 
the eight performance measures mutually exclusively. I require that each CEO should have 
data for at least any three of the four measures. By doing this, I do not limit champion CEOs 
to those who have to initiate M&A deals during their tenure, and this leaves 1371 turnover 
cases. Top-tercile champion CEOs are then compared with bottom-terciles performed CEOs 
and their successors.  
Column (1) shows the average rankings of the first four (three if any is missing) measures 
(AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) and grouped by terciles. I re-rank the 
AVG RANKING1 to create Champion CEOs Measures Index One, which is shown in (2). 
The top tercile performed CEOs in column (1) and (2) are defined as champion CEOs in 
Champion League І. In column (3), all predecessors in the voluntary turnover sample are 
ranked based on the average ranking (AVG RANKING2) of the four (three if any is missing) 
beat percentage measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) and 
grouped by terciles. Champion CEOs Measure Index Two is shown in column (4). The top 
tercile performed CEOs in column (3) and (4) are CEOs in Champion League ІІ. Column (5) 
to (8) show tercile performance of their corresponding successors’.  
Consistent with the findings in Table 3.2 and 3.3, CEOs in both champion leagues have 
superior average rankings than bottom CEOs. On average, CEOs in champion league І (ІІ)’s 
average rankings is 392 (378) ahead of bottom performed CEOs’. I employ average rankings 
to try to control for cyclicality and growth rates difference between predecessors and 
successors; and thus predecessors' average rankings for the whole sample are not 
significantly different from those of their successors, as seen in (17)-(21) and (19)-(23). 
However, I find similar results as in Table 3.2 and 3.3 that champions significantly 
outperform their successors (as seen in (1)-(5) and (3)-(7)) and champions' successors cannot 
beat their peers as much as their predecessors (as seen in top-bottom difference tests between 
predecessors-successors). Champions' successors outperform non-champions' successors (as 
seen in top-bottom difference tests between successors). Apart from providing evidence 
supporting hypothesis one, I also conclude growth cyclicality is not the sole reason behind 
Champions superior performance, suggesting that luck reversion and diverted priority also 
play a vital role in explaining performance deterioration after turnovers in general. 
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3.5 CEO and Firm Characteristics 
3.5.1 Characteristics of CEOs in Champion League І 
As seen from Table 3.4 and 3.5, compared with bottom performed CEOs, CEOs in both 
champion leagues have certain distinct CEO and firm characteristics. Table 3.4 Panel A 
presents characteristics of Champion CEOs' (their successors'), and those of bottom terciles 
performed CEOs' from Measures Index One at the fiscal years of their departure 
(appointment). In general, successors are nine years younger and have significantly shorter 
estimated tenure (around seven years) than their predecessors for both champion and bottom 
tercile performed CEOs. Despite less experience, successors earned higher median total 
compensation scaled by firm’s total assets after the turnover events. The probability that 
successors sit on the board as chairman and act as CEO simultaneously is substantially lower 
than that of their predecessors', both for champions' (at 29%) and bottom performed CEOs' 
successors (at 20%). Compared with bottom performed CEOs, champion CEOs are more 
likely to be (co)founders, earn higher compensation during their tenure and still serve on the 
board after they stepped down as CEOs. Although there is no significant difference between 
champion CEOs and poorly performed CEOs in terms of chairman duality, the difference in 
their corresponding successors is substantial. In specific, successors of champion CEOs are 
less likely to be chairman of the board at the same time because champion CEOs tend to 
remain on the board as chairman after their successors took offices. Despite less experience 
regarding age, Champion CEO's successors normally earn higher compensation than bottom 
performed CEOs' successors. When it comes to service years in the firms before becoming 
CEOs, there is no distinct difference between top and bottom performed CEOs' successors.  
The differences in the Top-Bottom CEO characteristics differentials between predecessors 
and successors are significant only for chairman duality, suggesting that the characteristics 
differentials between champion and bottom performed CEOs before and after turnover are 
similar. The only exception is that champion’s successors are less likely to be chairman 
simultaneously.  
3.5.2 Characteristics of CEOs in Champion League ІІ 
Table 3.4 Panel B presents CEO characteristics of champions and bottom CEOs' from 
champion league ІІ and their successors' at the fiscal years of departure or appointment. 
Similarly, successors from Measures Index Two tend to be (around nine years) younger and 
have significantly shorter estimated tenure for both champion and bottom CEOs samples.
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Champion CEOs' successors have similar compensation level as their predecessors on 
average whereas bottom performed CEOs' successors tend to earn substantially higher 
compensation scaled by firm’s total assets. The probability that successors sit on the board as 
chairman and act as CEO simultaneously is considerably lower than that of their 
predecessors', 24% lower for champion CEOs’ successors and 22% lower for bottom 
performed CEOs’ successors, respectively.  
Champion CEOs from Measures Index Two are more likely to serve as chairman than bottom 
performed CEOs during their tenure, but there is no significant difference for their successors 
after stepping down. Similar to champions from Measures Index One, champion CEOs 
defined in Measure Index Two are more likely to be (co) founders of the firms, earned higher 
median compensation during their tenure and are highly possible to be retained on the board 
after stepping down. In contrast, they tend to have more experience in terms of age and tenure 
compared to bottom performed CEOs. Also, champion CEOs are more likely to be replaced 
by insiders, which suggest these firms tend to have better succession plan beforehand. For 
champion CEOs' successors, they are more liable to have more years work experience in the 
same firms before becoming CEOs and tend to have longer tenures after taking offices. The 
differences of the Top-Bottom CEO characteristics differentials between predecessors and 
successors are significant for tenure and chairman duality, suggesting that champions’ 
successors do not have much longer tenure than other successors as their predecessors did 
before the turnover. Regarding compensation, champion’s successors fail to beat their peers 
as their champion predecessors did before turnover since the differentials in champions and 
bottom performed CEOs' compensation differentials are significantly negative. Successors of 
champions from champion league two have worked longer within the firms before promoting 
to CEOs.   
In sum, CEO Champions are more likely to be (co) founders, earned higher compensation 
and still served on the board after they stepped down as CEOs. In line with this, successors of 
champion CEOs are less likely to be chairman of the board simultaneously because champion 
CEOs tend to remain on the board as chair after their successors took offices. Apart from 
CHAIRMAN_DUALITY, CEO characteristics differentials between champion and bottom 
CEOs before and after turnover are similar for champion league one. On the other hand, 
successors in champion league two cannot beat their peers as much as their predecessors did 
for tenure and compensation. 
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Table 3.4: CEO Characteristics Comparisons for Champions and Bottom-performed CEOs 
This table compares CEO characteristics at the fiscal years of departure (appointment) for Champion CEOs (successors) from Measures Index One (in Panel A) and  Measures 
Index Two (in Panel B), and corresponding bottom-terciles performed CEOs (successors). TENURE is CEO tenure calculated based on date become CEO and date left firm in 
Execucomp and hand-collected turnover date. Tenure for current successors still in office is estimated from the date they became CEO until the last day in the dataset for those who 
have not left office until 2012.12.31. AGE is the age of the CEO in the year of hiring (for successors) or leaving (for predecessor). COMPENSATION is the ratio of Total 
Compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). CHAIRMAN DUALITY (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also 
chairman of the BoD and zero otherwise. REMAIN_BOARD (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after departure. FOUNDER (%) is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is (co-) founders of the firm and zero otherwise. SERVEYEAR is the number of years that insider successors hold other managerial 
positions in the firms before becoming CEOs. INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position(s) in the company for no less than 
one years before becoming CEOs. Mean difference tests are based on t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A   Predecessor   Successor       Successor-Predecessor 
    TENURE AGE 
COMPEN
SATION 
CHAIRMAN 
DUALITY  
REMAIN_
BOARD  FOUNDER   TENURE AGE 
COMPENSA
TION 
CHAIRMA
N 
DUALITY  
SERVE
YEAR INSIDER   TENURE AGE 
COMPENS
ATION 
CHAIRMAN 
DUALITY  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)   (7)-(1) (8)-(2) (9)-(3) (10)-(4) 
Champion 
mean 13.40 60.49 3.33 85% 75% 21%   5.70 51.26 3.48 56% 11.10 77%   -7.70*** -9.23*** 0.15 -29.04%*** 
median 11.14 62.00 1.74 -- -- --   5.00 52.00 1.96 -- 8.14 --   -6.14*** -10.00*** 0.22** -- 
  n 458 425 457 458 458 458   458 451 455 458 456 456           
                                        
    (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)   (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)   (19)-(13) (20)-(14) (21)-(15) (22)-(16) 
Bottom 
mean 12.81 61.56 2.06 87% 66% 13%   5.60 52.27 2.60 67% 10.94 74%   -7.21*** -9.29*** 0.54* -19.61%*** 
median 10.09 62.00 0.87 -- -- --   4.89 52.00 0.95 -- 7.27 --   -5.20*** -10.00*** 0.07** -- 
  n 913 849 908 913 913 913   913 902 908 913 900 900           
    (25) (26)   (27) (28)   (29) (30)   (31)  (32) (33)  (34) (35) (36)   (31)-(25) (32)-(26) (33)-(27) (34)-(28) 
All 
mean 13.01 61.20 2.49 86% 69% 16%   5.63 51.93 2.90 63% 10.99 75%   -7.37*** -9.27*** 0.41 -22.76%*** 
median 10.35 62.00 1.11 -- -- --   4.93 52.00 1.27 -- 7.55 --   -5.42*** -10.00*** 0.16*** -- 
  n 1371 1274 1365 1371 1371 1371   1371 1353 1363 1371 1356 1356           
                                        
Champion-
Bottom 
mean 0.59 -1.06** 1.27*** -1% 9%*** 8%***   0.10 -1.01*** 0.88*** -11%*** 0.16 4%   -0.49 0.05 -0.39 -10%*** 
median 1.05*** 0.00* 0.87*** -- -- --   0.11 0.00** 1.02*** -- 0.87 --   -0.94* 0 0.15 -- 
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  Panel B 
  Predecessor   Successor       Successor-Predecessor 
    TENURE AGE 
COMPEN
SATION 
CHAIRMAN 
DUALITY  
REMAIN 
_BOARD FOUNDER   TENURE AGE 
COMPEN
SATION 
CHAIRMAN 
DUALITY  
SERVE 
YEAR INSIDER   TENURE AGE 
COMPEN
SATION 
CHAIRMAN 
DUALITY  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)   (7)-(1) (8)-(2) (9)-(3) (10)-(4) 
Champion 
mean 14.72 61.86 2.68 89% 76% 18%   5.89 52.06 2.51 65% 13.10 81%   -8.83*** -9.81*** -0.17 -24.24%*** 
median 12.16 63.00 1.31 100% -- 0%   5.07 52.00 1.35 100% 11.09 --   -7.09*** -11.00*** 0.04 -- 
  
n 458 441 457 458 458 458   458 452 454 458 454 454           
    (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)   (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)   (19)-(13) (20)-(14) (21)-(15) (22)-(16) 
Bottom 
mean 12.15 60.85 2.39 85% 65% 14%   5.51 51.87 3.09 63% 9.93 72%   -6.64*** -8.98*** 0.70** -22.02%*** 
median 9.22 62.00 1.03 100% -- 0%   4.84 52.00 1.13 100% 6.21 --   -4.38*** -10.00*** 0.09** -- 
  n 913 833 908 913 913 913   913 901 909 913 902 902           
  
  (25) (26)   (27) (28)   (29) (30)   (31)  (32) (33)  (34) (35) (36)   (31)-(25) (32)-(26) (33)-(27) (34)-(28) 
All mean 
13.01 61.20 2.49 86% 69% 16%   5.63 51.93 2.90 63% 10.99 75%   -7.37*** -9.27*** 0.41 -22.76%*** 
median 10.35 62.00 1.11 -- -- --   4.93 52.00 1.27 -- 7.55 --   -5.42*** -10.00*** 0.16*** -- 
  n 1371 1274 1365 1371 1371 1371   1371 1353 1363 1371 1356 1356           
                                        
Champion-
Bottom 
mean 2.57*** 1.01** 0.30 4%** 11%*** 4%* 
 
0.38** 0.18 -0.57* 2% 3.17*** 9%*** 
 
-2.19*** -0.83 -0.87*** -2% 
median 2.94*** 1.00*** 0.28*** -- -- -- 
 
0.23*** 0.00 0.22*** -- 4.88*** -- 
 
-2.71*** -1* -0.06** -- 
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3.5.3 Firm Characteristics of CEOs in Champion League І 
Table 3.5 Panel A compares firm characteristics over the tenure (maximal 10 years) of 
champion CEOs', bottom performed CEOs' and their successors' from Measures Index One. 
Firms tend to have the larger size (in terms of total assets), and the lower growth rate (in 
terms of Market to Book ratio, Q, and growth in sales) during successors’ tenure for both 
champion CEOs and bottom performed CEOs' sample. In specific, total assets of champion 
CEOs’ firms on average grow 3,585 million in successors’ hands, whereas those of bottom 
performed CEOs’ firms on average grow 12,891 million in successors’ hands. Compared 
with firms of bottom performed CEOs', champion CEOs’ firms on average are substantially 
smaller in size in terms of total assets (10,973 million less for champion predecessors and 
20,279 less for their successors). On the other hand, they have significantly higher growth 
rate (1.59 higher for champion predecessors and 1.05 higher for their successors in Market to 
Book ratio) and significantly greater firm value (1.44 higher for champion predecessors and 
0.94 higher for their successors in terms of Q), especially during champion CEOs' tenure, 
both of which decline after their successors take offices. Although champions’ firms were 
growing slower in successors' hand, the average growth rate of champions' firms is always 
significantly higher than that of bottom CEOs' firms (as seen from champion-bottom 
difference tests for both predecessors and successors). The difference tests of champion 
minus bottom for successor minus predecessor are all significant (the only exception is 
average Growth in sales). Compared with their predecessors’ tenure, firm size (in terms of 
total assets) in champion successors’ hands are smaller than their peers’. Champions’ 
successors do not have as much higher growth rate than other successors as their predecessors 
beat their peers before the turnover. 
Previous M&A literature document that one of the critical determinants of negative bidder 
return is the size effect of the acquirer
32
 (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000; Moeller, Schlingenman and Stulz 2004, 2005). The size effect can be 
explained by Roll
33
 (1986)’s hubris hypothesis since larger firms tend to suffer more from 
                                                          
32
 Size effect is the abnormal returns differences between small acquirers and large acquirers. Accounting to 
Moeller, Schlingenman and Stulz (2004), acquirers’ returns are negatively correlated with their sizes and this 
negative size effect exists irrespective of the targets’ organizational forms and the form of financing. Also it is 
robust to deal and firm characteristics, which is not reversed in the long run. 
33
 By assuming strong-form market efficiency, Roll (1986) developed managerial hubris hypothesis to explain 
the effect of winner’s curse. He supposed that, indeed, managers are willing to overpay for the targets since they 
believe that they can create better synergy gains than market expectations rather than the intense competitions. 
When it comes to the wealth effect, he predicted that the value of bidders’ would probably fall and that of 
targets’ would definitely increase, while the combined value of them might fall slightly. 
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managerial hubris and are more likely to overpay to their targets. Alternatively, they suggest 
that the adverse size effect might also be attributed to arbitrageur hypothesis proposed by 
Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) since merger arbitrageurs’ short selling can put 
pressure on the stock price of the bidders paid with equity. Another possible explanation for 
size effect is that large firms tend to acquire public firms, the target status that typically 
generates negative returns for acquirers (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002). In line with 
Roll (1986)’s hubris hypothesis, I find firms of top performed CEOs, who are less likely to 
suffer from managerial hubris and have generated better acquirer returns, tend to be 
significantly smaller in size, as seen from the difference tests in Assets of champion-bottom 
predecessors. 
3.5.4 Firm Characteristics of CEOs in Champion League ІІ 
I find similar results for firms from Measures Index Two in Table 3.5 Panel B. In detail, firms 
are larger in size and grow slower in terms of Market to Book ratio, Q and growth in sales in 
successors' hand. Firms under champion predecessors' management tend to be smaller in size 
and grow faster, except for average growth in sales. Compared with bottom performed CEOs' 
successors, champion CEOs' successors manage smaller firms with higher growth rate. The 
differences in the Top-Bottom firm characteristics differentials between predecessors and 
successors only significant for total assets and mean growth in sales, suggesting that 
champions’ successors have as higher growth rate (in terms of Market to Book ratio, Q and 
median growth in sales) than other successors as their predecessors beat their peers before 
turnover. Also, compared with that during their predecessors’ tenure, firm size (in terms of 
total assets) in champion successors’ hands are smaller than their peers.  
These findings further prove that predecessors tend to manage firms at the earlier stages in 
their firms’ life cycles, which involve more growth opportunities. Furthermore, the high 
growth rate tends to inevitably manifest stock returns, which reflect the growth expectations 
more than other measures, i.e., predecessors, in general, tend to outperform owing to the 
higher growth rate during predecessors’ tenure. Champions and their successors have smaller 
size and higher growth rate than their peers before and after turnover, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Firm Characteristics Comparisons for Champions and bottom-performed CEOs 
This table compares firm characteristics over the tenure (maximal ten years) of CEO Champions from Measures Index One (Panel A) and Measures Index Two (Panel B), 
and bottom two terciles performed CEOs and their successors. ASSETS is total assets (in millions) from Compustat. Market capitalization (in millions) is the common shares 
outstanding multiplied by fiscal year-end stock price. The market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity over book value of equity. Q is calculated as the market value of 
equity plus book value of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by book value of equity plus book value of current liabilities and long-term debt. The market-to-book 
ratio and Q have been winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Growth in sales is the annual average growth in sales over CEOs' tenure. Difference tests are based on t-tests for 
means and Wilcoxon-tests for medians. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Panel A   Predecessor   Successor   Successor-Predecessor 
    
ASSETS 
MARKET 
TO BOOK Q GSALES 
  
ASSETS 
MARKET 
TO 
BOOK Q GSALES 
  
ASSETS 
MARKET 
TO 
BOOK Q GSALES 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Champion 
mean 3192.23 4.22 3.49 21.77%   6777.24 3.50 2.78 11.73%   3585.01*** -0.72*** -0.71*** -10.04%*** 
median 817.55 3.51 2.80 16.49%   1869.46 2.74 2.18 7.97%   1051.91*** -0.77*** -0.62*** -8.52%*** 
  n 458 458 458 458   458 458 458 458           
                                
  
  (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)   (13)-(9) 
(14)-
(10) 
(15)-
(11) 
(16)-(12) 
Bottom 
mean 14165.14 2.63 2.04 20.36%   27055.84 2.45 1.84 7.38%   12890.70*** -0.18* -0.20*** -12.98%*** 
median 1977.97 2.01 1.59 8.91%   3111.00 1.88 1.49 5.19%   1133.03*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -3.72%*** 
  n 913 913 913 913   913 912 911 913           
                                
    (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)   (21)-(17) 
(22)-
(18) 
(23)-
(19) 
(24)-(20) 
all 
mean 10499.50 3.16 2.52 20.83%   20281.51 2.80 2.16 8.83%   9782.01*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.12*** 
median 1358.81 2.45 1.92 11.25%   2566.02 2.09 1.68 6.28%   1207.21*** -0.36*** -0.24*** -0.05*** 
  n 1371 1371 1371 1371   1371 1370 1369 1371           
                                
Champion-
Bottom 
mean -10972.91*** 1.59*** 1.44*** 1.40%   -20278.60*** 1.05*** 0.94*** 4.34%   -9305.69*** -0.54*** -0.5*** 2.94% 
median -1160.42*** 1.51*** 1.21*** 7.58%***   -1241.54*** 0.86*** 0.69*** 2.78%***   -81.12* -0.65*** -0.52*** -4.80%*** 
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   Panel B   Predecessor   Successor   Successor-Predecessor 
    
ASSETS 
MARKET 
TO BOOK Q GSALES 
  
ASSETS 
MARKET 
TO BOOK Q GSALES 
  
ASSETS 
MARKET TO 
BOOK Q GSALES 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Champion 
mean 5084.60 3.75 3.03 17.22%   10747.18 3.43 2.66 10.89%   5662.58*** -0.32* -0.37*** -6.33%** 
median 1234.34 2.95 2.38 12.97%   2909.58 2.64 2.08 7.05%   1675.24*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -5.92%*** 
  n 458 458 458 458   458 458 458 458           
  
                              
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)   (13)-(9) (14)-(10) (15)-(11) (16)-(12) 
Bottom 
mean 
13215.85 2.87 2.27 22.64% 
  
25064.35 2.49 1.91 7.80% 
  
11848.50** -0.38*** -0.37*** 
-
14.84%*** 
median 1516.15 2.21 1.69 10.25%   2325.35 1.89 1.51 5.48%   809.20*** -0.32*** -0.18*** -4.77%*** 
  n 913 913 913 913   913 912 911 913           
                                
    (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)   (21)-(17) (22)-(18) (23)-(19) (24)-(20) 
all 
mean 10499.50 3.16 2.52 20.83%   20281.51 2.80 2.16 8.83%   9782.01*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.12*** 
median 1358.81 2.45 1.92 11.25%   2566.02 2.09 1.68 6.28%   1207.21*** -0.36*** -0.24*** -0.05*** 
  n 1371 1371 1371 1371   1371 1370 1369 1371           
                                
Champion-
Bottom 
mean -8131.25*** 0.88*** 0.75*** -5.42%*   -14317.17*** 0.94*** 0.75*** 3.09%   -6185.92* 0.06 0 8.51%* 
median -281.81 0.74*** 0.69*** 2.73%***   584.23*** 0.75*** 0.58*** 1.57%***   866.04*** 0.01 -0.11 -1.16% 
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3.6 Multivariate Analysis 
3.6.1 Cross-sectional regressions of Operating Performance on Champions and Successors 
In section 4, hypothesis one is tested in the univariate framework. In this section, the relation 
between firm performance and championship succession is further analysed in a multivariate 
framework to control for growth and cyclicality. To test hypothesis one, i.e., do successors 
underperform champion predecessors, and whether CEO Champions' successors generally 
outperform their peers, cross-sectional regressions are performed on operating performance 
and EPS surprise over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) around turnovers. 
The tests involve four firm performance dependent variables: AROA, AROA2, EPS Surprise 
and EPS Surprise2. Table 3.6 reports estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent 
variable is AROA, and the primary explanatory variables are Champion League І dummy, 
successor dummy, and champion І's successor dummy. Champion League І is the 458 top 
tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measures Index One. Firm characteristics that have been 
shown in the prior literature to impact firm performance are included. The annual average 
natural log of inflation-adjusted 
34  
total assets (Log (Firm Assets)) over CEOs' tenure 
(maximum ten years) are added to control for the size effect (Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz, 2004). The natural log of years firms in operations (Log (Firm Age)), the annual 
average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over tenure (GSALES) and the annual average 
Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) are included to control for growth and cyclicality. Industry and 
year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Both predecessors and successors around turnover are included in the specification (1), which 
is taken to the next step by adding four additional specifications. In detail, in regression (2) 
all predecessors before turnovers are included; whereas in regression (3), all successors after 
turnovers are included. CEO Champions’ successors and top successors, who are defined in 
the same way as champion predecessors, are further included in the specification (4). Finally, 
champion CEOs and their corresponding successors are included in the specification (5). The 
dummy variables of interest are Champions and their successors in the specification (1), CEO 
Champions in the specification (2) and CEO Champions’ successors in specifications (1) and 
                                                          
34
 In specific, proportionate increase in total assets between 1980 and 2012 is calculated as CPI 2012/CPI 1980. 
Real Total Assets in 2012 million dollar equal to nominal total assets in 1980 multiple by CPI 2012/CPI 1980. 
The annual CPI Data are from Bob Shiller’s Web site (www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm). Across all 
specifications, control variables reported in dollars have been adjusted for inflation. 1982-2011 dollars were 
rebased to 2012 dollars to ensure they reflect the same value. There is no need to adjust for market to book ratio 
since the denominator's and nominator's dollar value can cancel off. 
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(3), and successors in specifications (1), (4) and (5), respectively. Firm characteristics are 
included in all specifications. All specifications of the regression model include the year and 
industry dummies to control for associated fixed effects on championship and succession 
related to the industry- and time-clustering firm performance. All CEOs in the voluntary 
turnover sample are included in the specification (1). It reports that successor dummy is 
significantly and negatively related to AROA, which indicates that successors, in general, 
underperform predecessors after controlling for firm cyclical and growth. This result shows 
that growth cyclicality is not the only reason for declining successor performance after 
voluntary turnover. Luck reversion and priority diversion may also contribute to the 
deterioration.  
In the univariate framework, successors are not successful in beating their peers, compared to 
their predecessors. In contrast, I find strong results supporting successful replacement in the 
regression frame. In specific, after controlling for firm cyclicality and growth (Firm Age, 
Growth in Sales and MTB), the coefficient for champions in the specification (2) and the 
coefficient for champions' successors in the specification (3) in explaining the AROA over 
their tenure are very close. Champions' successors outperform the rest of the post-turnover 
CEOs (as seen from the 0.0602 coefficient in specification 3) by almost as much CEO 
Champions outperform the rest of the pre-turnover CEOs (as seen from the 0.0688 coefficient 
in specification 3). In that sense, champions’ successors tend to be as successful as their 
predecessors and CEO replacements seem to be to some extent at least successful. Thus 
hypothesis 1 is supported. Top 458 performed successors outperformed top 458 performed 
predecessor in the specification (4), which may result from luck reversion of the bottom 
performed predecessors; whereas successors underperform predecessors in general, 
suggesting that successors’ performance distribution has heavy tails and frequent deviations. 
In specification (5), champions did not significantly outperform their corresponding 
successors in terms of operating performance. Thus, hypothesis 1 is further supported.    
Table 3.7 includes the same variables and test the same hypothesis for CEOs in Champion 
League ІІ. Specification (1) shows similar results that successors tend to underperform in 
general as the coefficient estimate is statistically negative, but top successors outperform 
champion CEOs in the specification (4). As shown from the specification (5), there is no 
significant performance difference between champions and their successors after controlling 
for firm growth and cycle, suggesting that champions' successors from Champion League ІІ 
are as successful in terms of operating performance. Champions' successors in Champion 
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League ІІ outperform the rest of the post-turnover CEOs (as seen from the 0.0437 coefficient 
in specification 2) by almost as much Champions outperform the rest of the pre-turnover 
CEOs (as seen from the 0.0397 coefficient in specification 3). Thus hypothesis 1 is further 
supported for CEO sample in Champion League ІІ. The hypothesis is further tested using 
AROA2 for Champion League І, and ІІ and results are presented in Table 3.8. The main 
explanatory variables in specifications (1)-(5) are Successor dummy, Champion League І and 
their successors' dummy; whereas specifications (6)-(10) employed the same main 
explanatory variables for Champion League ІІ. The corresponding coefficient estimates in 
specifications (2) and (3), (7) and (8) are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that champions and their successors outperform their peers in general. 
Consistent with the results from the difference tests, champions' successors seem not as 
successful as their champion predecessors in beating their peers because the coefficient 
estimates in (3) and (8) are lower than those in (2) and (7). Besides, the coefficient estimates 
of successor dummy in specifications (5) and (10) are negative and statistically significant, 
which also indicates champions' successors are not as high as champion predecessors. 
Furthermore, champions significantly outperform top successors after controlling for firm 
cyclical variables, year and industry fixed effects as the coefficients in specifications (4) and 
(9) are negative and significant at 1% level. The multivariate test results for AROA2 is 
consistent with its univariate test results. AROA2 measures how many times CEOs generate 
positive returns over their tenure thus is uncorrelated to growth cyclicality. Although 
champions' successors cannot beat their peers as much as their predecessors, they still 
outperform other successors. Hypothesis one is thus partially supported. 
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Table 3.6: Regressions of AROA on Champions and Successors for Champion League І 
This table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of AROA on Champion League І dummy, successor dummy, and champion І's successor dummy. AROA is 
the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten years or tenure if CEO tenure is less than ten years. Champion League І is the 458 top tercile performed CEOs ranked 
by Measures Index One. Champion І dummy in the specification (1) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is one of the Champions or their successors ranked by 
Measures Index One, 0 otherwise. Champion І in the specification (2) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is one of the top-tercile performed CEOs ranked by 
Measures Index One, 0 otherwise. Champion І's successor is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion CEO’s successor, 0 otherwise. Successor 
dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 otherwise. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of year’s firms in 
operations from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) 
around turnover from Compustat. GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover 
from Compustat. MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from 
Compustat. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below 
regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Y=AROA (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)           
  All CEOs   Pre   Post    Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & Their 
successors 
All CEOs Pre+Post 
  Pre+Post           min mean median max 
Intercept -0.0341   0.0238   -0.1246 *** 0.1144 *** 0.0628 *         
  0.1700   0.2770   0.0010   0.0010   0.0780           
Successor=1 -0.0087 **         0.0144 *** -0.0011   0 0.5 0.5 1 
  0.0160           0.0050   0.8410           
Champion І=1 0.0687 *** 0.0688 ***             0 0.33 0 1 
  0.0000   0.0000                       
Champion І's Successor -0.0070       0.0602 ***         0 0.17 0 1 
  0.2140       0.0000                   
Log (Firm Age) 0.0072   0.0073   0.0092   0.0037   0.0193 ** 2.08 3.52 3.61 4.16 
  0.1800   0.2050   0.1650   0.6470   0.0220           
Log (Firm Assets) 0.0051 ** -0.0014   0.0108 *** -0.0049 * -0.0082 *** 1.52 7.89 7.76 14.53 
  0.0500   0.4960   0.0060   0.0810   0.0050           
GSALES -0.0224 *** -0.0256 *** -0.0197   -0.0428 ** -0.0064 * -0.94 0.12 0.06 18.71 
  0.0000   0.0000   0.2380   0.0420   0.0550           
MTB 0.0150 *** 0.0153 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0161 *** 0.0189 *** 0.00 2.99 2.28 17.36 
  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000           
Industry &Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y           
N 2741   1371   1370   916   916           
Adj R
2
 49%   55%   48%   51%   52%           
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Table 3.7: Regressions of AROA on Champions and Successors for Champion League ІІ 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of AROA on Champion League ІІ dummy, successor dummy and champion ІІ's successor dummy. AROA 
is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten years or the tenure if CEO tenure is less than ten years. Champion League ІІ is the 458 top tercile performed CEOs 
ranked by Measure Index Two. Champion ІI dummy in the specification (1) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is one of the Champions or their successors ranked by 
Measures Index Two, 0 otherwise. Champion ІI in the specification (2) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is one of the top-tercile performed CEOs ranked by 
Measures Index Two, 0 otherwise. Champion ІІ's successor is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion CEO’s successor, 0 otherwise. Successor 
dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 otherwise. Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of year’s firms in operations from Compustat. 
Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from 
Compustat. GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. 
MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression 
estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Y=AROA (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)    (5)           
  All CEOs   Pre   Post    Champions & 
Top successors 
Champions & 
Their successors 
All CEOs Pre+Post 
  Pre+Post           min mean median max 
Intercept 0.0175   0.0731 *** -0.0755 ** 0.1491 *** 0.1297 ***         
  0.4700   0.0010   0.0280   0.0000   0.0000           
Successor=1 -0.0092 **         0.0136 *** 0.0014   0 0.5 0.5 1 
  0.0160           0.0030   0.7710           
Champion ІІ=1 0.0423 *** 0.0437 ***             0 0.33 0 1 
  0.0000   0.0000                       
Champion ІІ's Successor -0.0004       0.0397 ***         0 0.17 0 1 
  0.9440       0.0000                   
Log (Firm Age) -0.0007   0.0008   0.0008   0.0013   0.0134 * 2.08 3.52 3.61 4.16 
  0.9000   0.8930   0.9120   0.8550   0.0770           
Log (Firm Assets) 0.0036   -0.0036 * 0.0100 ** -0.0086 *** -0.0111 *** 1.52 7.89 7.76 14.53 
  0.1790   0.0990   0.0130   0.0010   0.0000           
GSALES -0.0241 *** -0.0279 *** -0.0196   -0.0161   -0.0052 ** -0.94 0.12 0.06 18.71 
  0.0000   0.0000   0.2720   0.5570   0.0360           
MTB 0.0164 *** 0.0174 *** 0.0149 *** 0.0188 *** 0.0189 *** 0.00 2.99 2.28 17.36 
  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000           
Industry &Year FE Y   Y   Y   Y   Y           
N 2741   1371   1370   915   916           
Adj R
2
 46%   51%   46%   61%   59%           
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                                     Table 3.8: Regressions of AROA2 on Champions and Successors for Champion League І and ІІ 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of operating performance (AROA2) on Champion League І & ІІ dummy, successor dummy and champion І 
& ІІ's successor dummy. AROA2 is the number of years where AROA is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. Champion League І (ІІ) is the 458 top 
tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measure Index (One) Two. Champion І (ІІ) dummy in specification 1 and 6 (2 and 7) is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is one of 
the Champions or their successors (champion predecessors) ranked by Measure Index (One) Two, 0 otherwise. Champion І (ІІ)'s successor is a dummy variable equals to 1 if 
the incoming CEO is champion CEO’s successor, 0 otherwise. Successor dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 otherwise. Log (Firm Age) is 
the natural log of the number of year’s firms in operations from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over 
predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over predecessors’ 
and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over predecessors’ and 
successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations and Adj. 
R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Y=AROA2 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Y=AROA2 
(6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
All CEOs Pre Post 
 Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & Their 
successors 
All CEOs Pre Post 
 Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & Their 
successors Pre+Post     Pre+Post     
Intercept 0.2569*** 0.4302*** -0.154* 0.485*** 0.4089*** Intercept 0.359*** 0.5537*** -0.0671 0.8035*** 0.6838*** 
 
0.001 0 0.077 0 0 
 
0 0 0.448 0 0 
Successor=1 -0.2395*** 
  
-0.2452*** -0.3254*** Successor=1 -0.2032*** 
  
-0.2521*** -0.3812*** 
 
0 
  
0 0 
 
0 
  
0 0 
Champion І=1 0.1813*** 0.1721*** 
   
Champion ІІ=1 0.2771*** 0.2777*** 
   
 
0 0 
    
0 0 
   
Champion І's Successor -0.0795*** 
 
0.1062*** 
  
Champion ІІ's Successor -0.1746*** 
 
0.0948*** 
  
 
0 
 
0 
   
0 
 
0 
  
Log (Firm Age) 0.0891*** 0.0815*** 0.1047*** 0.086*** 0.0872*** Log (Firm Age) 0.0708*** 0.0593*** 0.0903*** 0.0571*** 0.0739*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0.001 0 0.001 0 
Log (Firm Assets) -0.0025 -0.0225*** 0.0138** 0.0006 0.005 Log (Firm Assets) -0.0071 -0.0284*** 0.0114** -0.0041 0.0041 
 
0.612 0 0.01 0.932 0.491 
 
0.129 0 0.035 0.43 0.505 
GSALES -0.0173** -0.0331*** 0.0149 -0.0079 -0.0013 Growth in Sales -0.0173** -0.0327*** 0.0138 -0.0011 0.0011 
 
0.023 0.002 0.454 0.836 0.923 
 
0.026 0.002 0.475 0.984 0.935 
MTB 0.0169*** 0.0163*** 0.0148*** -0.0012 0.0072** MTB 0.0173*** 0.016*** 0.0156*** 0.0026 0.0097*** 
 
0 0 0 0.705 0.043 
 
0 0 0 0.353 0.005 
Industry &Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Industry &Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2741 1371 1370 916 916 N 2741 1371 1370 915 916 
Adj R2 33% 20% 21% 37% 41% Adj R2 38% 33% 21% 43% 50% 
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3.6.2 Cross-sectional regressions of EPS Surprise on Champions and Successors 
Table B.2 and B.3 further test the first hypothesis and report estimates from OLS regressions 
of the EPS Surprise (EPS Surprise2) on the championship, CEO succession, and firm 
characteristics. Champion І (ІІ) dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is 
one of the top tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measures Index One (Two). Champion І 
(ІІ)'s successor is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion CEOs' 
successor of champion league one (two). Successor dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 
if the CEO is a successor. After controlling for firm cyclicality, year and industry fixed 
effects, the coefficients of Champion І dummy are positive, and both statistically and 
economically significant at 1% level for specifications (1), (2), (6) and (7). Consistent with 
the results of the difference tests, champion CEOs have significantly superior performance 
than bottom performed predecessors as seen from the specifications (2) and (7). 
Successors’ dummy is introduced to investigate whether successors underperform their 
predecessors. Successors, in general, have better EPS surprise after controlling for growth 
and cyclicality, as seen from the coefficient estimates from specifications (1) and (6) in Table 
B.2 and B.3. In specific, the coefficient estimates of successor dummies are positively and 
significantly associated with EPS Surprise (0.0287 and 0.0207) and EPS Surprise2 (0.0423 
and 0.0426) for both champion leagues, suggesting that successors tend to beat analyst 
forecasts to a greater degree than their predecessors. Contrary to Favaro, Karlsson and 
Neilson's (2015) argument that predecessors outperform their successors in general since 
CEO turnover tend to divert corporate priorities, I find significantly positive and significant 
relations of successor dummy and EPS Surprise (EPS Surprise2). This finding is valuable 
since EPS Surprise is the best performance measure that not directly related to firm cycles, 
sizes and other factors containing noises. The positive relation between EPS Surprise and 
successor dummy suggest that successors, in general, outperform their predecessors in terms 
of EPS surprise after controlling for firm cyclical. However, champions have significantly 
superior performance than their successors (in the specification (1), (5) and (6), (10)), 
indicating that champions' successors are not as successful as champions. Thus, hypothesis 
one is not supported in terms of EPS Surprise. However, I find similar results in Table B.3 
that champions and their successors outperform their peers from the significant coefficient 
estimates in specifications (2), (7) and (3), (8). Although the estimates for successors (0.0250 
and 0.0220) are not as high as champion predecessors (0.1294 and 0.1201), they significantly 
outperform their peers, suggesting hypothesis I is partially supported for EPS Surprise 2.  
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In sum, the findings from the multivariate analysis combined further support hypothesis one 
that although champions’ successors underperform their predecessors, they outperform their 
peers. Champion's successor dummies are significantly and positively related to AROA, 
AROA2 and EPS Surprise2, as seen in specifications (3), (8), with the only exception of EPS 
Surprise. Thus, hypothesis one that champion’s successors outperform other successors is 
partially supported. 
 
3.6.3 Cross-sectional regressions of Successors' Z-Scores on Predecessor Legacy 
To test hypothesis 2 (predecessors legacy hypothesis), in this section, I examine the 
relationship between the successors' and predecessors' performance using cross-sectional 
regressions. In specific, regressions analysis of successors' Z-score against predecessors’ 
legacy, effective replacement and predecessors influence proxies for Measures Index One, 
and Two are presented in Table 3.9 and 3.10. The dependent variables are successors' 
measures indices’ z-scores, where Measures Index One (Two) is the ranks of the four 
performance measures' (the four beat percentage performance measures') average rankings. 
Measures indices are transferred into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After transferring 
into normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to interpret the test results35. 
The main independent variables are predecessors’ legacy, where pre-turnover predecessors 
Measure Index One/Two z-scores are employed to proxy for predecessors’ legacy. In the 
multivariate regression framework, the potential determinants of successors' performance, 
i.e., effective replacement, including corporate governance variables and succession plan 
proxies, predecessors influence proxies, and industry, year fixed effects dummies are 
controlled. The interaction variables PRE*REMAIN_BOARD and PRE*SAMEDATE are 
also included. Results from the cross-sectional regressions of the successor Measure Index 
One (Two) z-scores, and their predecessors’ legacy are presented in Table 3.9 and 3.10. 
                                                          
35
 Ranks are not normally distributed, which are ordinal and usually form a rectangular (uniform) distribution. 
One of the solution is to transform the ranks into z-scores (standard normal scores) using an inverse normal 
function. The z-scores will be normally distributed continuous data with mean equal to zero and a standard 
deviation of one. In SAS, I tried both transfer ranks to z-scores and NCE (normal curve equivalence) scores, 
which is the standardized score with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 21.06. I then run regressions using 
both z-scores and NCE and get the same results. ZscoreSuccessors=probit (Successors' rankings/No. of CEOs); 
ZscorePredecessors= probit (Predecessors' rankings/ No. of CEOs) 
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that predecessors’ legacy significantly affects successors’ performance 
for voluntary turnover events, i.e., successors’ performance relies heavily on their 
predecessors’ performance in general. The coefficient estimates of Predecessor Legacy are 
statistically and economically positive and significant at 1% level after controlling for other 
determinants across all specifications, with the only exception in the specification (7) of 
Table 3.9, which significant at 10% level. In regression (1) of Table 3.9 (3.10), after 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects, predecessors’ legacy alone can explain 21.36% 
(12.97%) of successors’ performance ranking z-scores. Predecessors’ legacy significantly 
affects successors’ performance across all specifications, after controlling for corporate 
governance, succession plan, and predecessor influence. Thus, the results are consistent with 
the conjecture that successors’ performance ranks are mainly driven by predecessors’; and 
thus, predecessor legacy hypothesis is supported. In line with the view of Khurana’s (2002) 
that CEO selection is amongst the most important tasks of the board of directors, I find 
predecessors’ legacy and succession plan together have an enormous impact on successors’ 
performance after the voluntary turnover events. This can be seen from the coefficient 
estimates for the interaction variable PRE*SAMEDATE, which is statistically significant at 
5% and 10% level for CEOs in Champion League І and ІІ, respectively. This finding 
indicates that predecessors’ legacy can significantly influence successors’ performance, 
through sound succession plan in place by the board of directors before the turnover, and 
adds to existing literature that succession plan plays a critical role in CEO replacement. When 
it comes to predecessors’ influence, successors tend to outperform if their predecessor still 
served on the board after stepping down as CEOs since the coefficients of 
REMAIN_BOARD are both statistically and economically significant across all 
specifications in Table 3.9 and 3.10. Interestingly, predecessors' legacy does not come from 
their retentions on the board. Predecessors influence and their legacy affect successors' 
performance separately. Succession plan before turnover combined with the champion CEOs' 
legacy together strongly contributes to successors’ superior performance.  
As can be seen from the statistically and positively significant coefficient estimates of insider 
dummy in Table 3.10 and SERVEYEAR in both tables, the longer insider successors served 
in the firms before promoting to CEOs, the better the successors’ performance after becoming 
CEOs. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that “busy boards” are less likely to dismiss poorly-
performed CEOs. Interestingly, within the voluntary turnover framework, “busy boards” 
seems to play a crucial role in the successful succession (see coefficient estimates of the 
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BUSY dummy in specifications (5) and (6)). Unlike Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) who 
report that firms with better corporate governance tend to have better firm performance, there 
is no apparent link between other corporate governance variables and successors’ 
performance for my voluntary turnover sample. Successors seem not benefit from 
predecessors’ founder status much. 
To sum up, there is continuous superior performance and no distinct reversion when 
successors take offices from their predecessors. Besides, predecessors’ ranking is the most 
significant element in explaining successors’ performance ranking, which is in line with my 
conjectures. Consequently, hypothesis 2 that predecessors’ legacy significantly affects 
successors’ performance in voluntary turnover events, in other words, successors' 
performance depends on their predecessors' performance is supported. 
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Table 3.9: Regressions of Successor Measures Index One Z-score on Predecessor Legacy 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the post-turnover successors 
Measures Index One z-scores (POST) on predecessors’ legacy (PRE), effective replacement, 
including corporate board quality variables, governance indices, and succession plan proxies, and 
predecessors influence proxies. PRE is the pre-turnover predecessor's Measures Index One z-scores. 
SIZE is the total number of directors sitting on the board. INDEP is the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. BUSY is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. GINDEX is the GIM 
index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). INSIDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor 
holds other managerial position(s) in the firm for more than one year. SAMEDATE is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the turnover announcement dates and successors’ hire announcement dates are 
the same, which proxies for the succession plan. SERVEYEAR is the number of years that insider 
successors hold other managerial positions in the firms. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step down. FOUNDER is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. PRE*REMAIN_BOARD and 
PRE*SAMEDATE are Interaction variables. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are 
reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-
consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Z-scores POST POST POST POST POST POST POST 
INTERCEPT 0.0703 0.0530 0.0022 0.0554 -0.0174 -0.0298 -0.0826 
  0.7370 0.8100 0.9930 0.8140 0.95 0.906 0.743 
Predecessor legacy               
PRE 0.2724*** 0.2670*** 0.2451*** 0.2456*** 0.2310*** 0.2248*** 0.1232* 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0660 
Effective replacement               
Corporate Governance               
SIZE         -0.0022     
          0.817     
INDEP         -0.0042     
          0.98     
BUSY         0.1348** 0.1469**   
          0.02 0.011   
GINDEX           0.0076 0.0076 
            0.445 0.426 
EINDEX     -0.0122 -0.0103       
      0.5230 0.5900       
Succession Plan               
INSIDER     0.0561         
      0.3860         
SAMEDATE   -0.0969   -0.0879       
    0.1930   0.2630       
SERVEYEAR       0.0047**       
        0.0360       
Predecessor influence               
REMAIN_BOARD   0.1252** 0.1002* 0.1137** 0.1233**   0.1152** 
    0.025 0.081 0.047 0.031   0.042 
FOUNDER           0.1481* 0.1238 
            0.0690 0.104 
PRE*REMAIN_BOARD           0.0158   
            0.793   
PRE*SAMEDATE             0.1515** 
              0.033 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1371 1371 1237 1237 1167 1133 1251 
Adj. R2 21.36% 21.59% 22.25% 22.44% 23.08% 23.37% 22.95% 
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Table 3.10: Regressions of Successor Measure Index Two Zscore on Predecessor Legacy 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the post-turnover successors 
Measure Index Two z-scores (POST) on predecessors legacy (PRE), effective replacement, including 
corporate board quality variables, governance indices, and succession plan proxies, and predecessors 
influence proxies. PRE is the pre-turnover predecessor's Measures Index Two z-scores. SIZE is the 
total number of directors sitting on the board. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. GINDEX is the GIM index, 
equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). INSIDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor 
holds other managerial position(s) in the firm for more than one year. SAMEDATE is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the turnover announcement dates and successors’ hire announcement dates are 
the same. SERVEYEAR is the number of years that insider successors hold other managerial 
positions in the firms. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still 
served on the board after step down. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor 
is the founder of the firm. PRE*REMAIN_BOARD and PRE*SAMEDATE are Interaction variables. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. N is the number of observations and 
Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated 
using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Z-scores POST POST POST POST POST POST POST 
INTERCEPT 0.1554 0.0704 0.0897 0.1260 -0.0611 0.1032 0.0516 
  0.5170 0.7810 0.7380 0.6400 0.851 0.715 0.851 
Predecessor legacy               
PRE 0.2725*** 0.2631*** 0.2477*** 0.2438*** 0.2421*** 0.2335*** 0.1908*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Effective replacement               
Corporate Governance               
SIZE         0.0101     
          0.313     
INDEP         0.0590     
          0.747     
BUSY         0.2263***   0.2160*** 
          0.001   0.001 
GINDEX           0.0047   
            0.666   
EINDEX     -0.0241 -0.0214       
      0.2440 0.3040       
Succession Plan               
INSIDER     0.1253*         
      0.0630         
SAMEDATE   -0.0608   -0.0416       
    0.4280   0.6040       
SERVEYEAR       0.0071***   0.0078*** 0.0055** 
        0.0050   0.0010 0.0320 
Predecessor influence               
REMAIN_BOARD   0.1702*** 0.1316** 0.1407** 0.1625***   0.1309** 
    0.004 0.028 0.02 0.008   0.032 
FOUNDER           0.0353   
            0.6490   
PRE*REMAIN_BOARD         0.0412   
            0.339   
PRE*SAMEDATE             0.0744* 
              0.088 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1371 1371 1237 1237 1167 1237 1153 
Adj. R2 12.97% 13.41% 13.45% 13.67% 13.83% 13.28% 14.04% 
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3.7 Analysis of the Performance Measurements Distribution  
To further test the legacy hypothesis, I divide the full turnover sample into ten categories and 
aim at examining the performance pattern between predecessors and their corresponding 
successors for various performance categories. In this performance distribution difference 
tests, I did not distinguish between forced and voluntary turnovers as previous literature did. 
This tends to avoid biases due to misclassifications. Moreover, CEOs can be forced out for 
reasons unrelated to their performance, such as conflicts with firm culture or policy, and 
departures can result from bad performance without being forced out, such as poorly-
performed CEOs might voluntarily retire earlier. Also, excluding forced turnovers would 
introduce a bias towards more successful CEOs and distort the CEO performance 
distribution, based on which CEOs are ranked before the turnover. 
Table B.4 reports the decile performance distributions of the four measures (AROA
36
, 
ABHAR
37
, EPS Surprise
38 and M&A CARs
39
) for predecessors and successors. In column 1 
to 4, all predecessors in the full sample are ranked based on each of the four measures 
mutually exclusively. Column 5 to 8 show distributions of their corresponding successors’ 
performance. Notably, successors follow the similar performance distribution (AROA, EPS 
Surprise, and M&A CARs) as their predecessors, that is, top performed predecessors tend to 
be replaced by top performed successors and bottom performed predecessors tend to be 
replaced by worst performed successors. These performances deteriorate trends are distinct 
for successors as move down gradually from the top decile to the bottom deciles. The only 
exception is the trend for ABHAR, which might result from the overvaluation or 
undervaluation issue involved with stock returns. Also, Stock returns tend to capture many 
factors and contain noises which are not related to current CEO’s performance. Figures of 
their differences in each decile are reported in the last four columns.  
                                                          
36
 In an unreported test I also examined the difference in industry-adjusted ROA based on FF49 as the 
alternative measures of AROA based on 2-digit SIC code, and get similar results. 
37
 In an unreported test I also examined the difference in BHAR based on Fama-French 25 firm size and book to 
market portfolios as the alternative measures for industry-adjusted BHAR based on 2-digit SIC code, and get 
similar results. I also calculated and compared out-of-sample universal control firm abnormal return and 
calendar time abnormal return method before choosing industry-adjusted BHAR as stock performance measure. 
38
 In an unreported test I also examined the difference in EPS Surprise measures based on (actual EPS-
forecasted EPS)/Price and industry-adjusted (actual EPS-forecasted EPS)/(absolute actual EPS), respectively, as 
the alternative measures of unadjusted EPS Surprise, and get similar results. EPS could be negative, so I take the 
absolute value of EPS as denominators. I also tried to exclude all the negative EPS and performed the test, 
which also gives similar results. 
39
 In an unreported test I also examined the difference in investment performance based on control firm M&A 
CARs as the alternative measure of M&A Sum CARs, and get similar results. 
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Average AROA and ABHAR of all predecessors tend to be better than that of their 
successors. The possible reason is that CEO turnover events tend to divert corporate priorities 
and result in an inward focus (Favaro, Karlsson and Neilson, 2015). Top-performed 
predecessors significantly outperform their successors, whereas bottom-performed 
predecessors significantly underperform their successors. Luck reversion and growth cycle 
are also possible reasons leading to declining in successors' performance. Although 
successors underperform their champion predecessors due to luck reversion, growth cycle 
and divert priorities, the board are expected to find best successors available. More 
importantly, successors' performance depends heavily on their predecessors' performance in 
each decile. Thus, the legacy hypothesis is further supported.   
Similar results and more distinct patterns are presented in Table B.5, where four beat 
percentage performance measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) 
decile tables for predecessors and successors are shown. Similar to Table B.4, successors 
follow the similar performance distribution (for all four measures) as their predecessors. 
Better performed predecessors are more likely to be replaced by better-performed successors 
and vice versa. As move down gradually from the top decile to the bottom deciles, the 
likelihood of achieving positive performance for successors decreases accordingly. For all 
measures, top-performed predecessors significantly outperform their successors, and firm 
performance tends to be better after poorly performed CEOs leave. On average, the 
possibility of beating industry (AROA2 and ABHAR2) for predecessors is significantly 
higher than that for their successors; whereas, successors are more likely to beat analyst 
forecasts (EPS Surprise2) than their predecessors. Thus, hypothesis two is further supported.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the CEO literature in the following aspects. This is the first to 
examine the performance of successful CEOs’ successors using sample both include and 
exclude forced turnover events. In the univariate framework, results are consistent for each 
performance measure, beat performance measure and average rankings that top-performed 
predecessors outperform their successors on average. On the other hand, champions’ 
successors are demonstrated to outperform non-champions’ successors. The possible reasons 
are fourfold. Firstly, either forced or voluntary CEO turnovers could lead to shifts in top 
management teams, which tends to divert corporate priorities and result in an inward focus 
(Favaro, Karlsson and Neilson, 2015). Secondly, CEOs’ luck reversion and firm growth 
cyclicality may also explain the performance differences. The third possible explanation for 
champions' superior performance is that founders make better leaders given the higher 
percentage of founders in CEO Champions’ sample. Last but not the least, I impose no less 
than five years tenure for predecessors, which tends to reduce performance-induced turnovers 
marginally from my sample, and consequently slightly increase predecessors’ performance 
relative to their successors’.  
However, after controlling for firm growth and cyclicality in the multivariate framework, 
successors are demonstrated to perform as well as their champion predecessors for AROA. 
Thus, firm growth and cyclicality are demonstrated to be the main reason behind the 
deteriorating performance of champions’ successors. Champions are more likely to be 
retained on the board and firms have sound succession plan beforehand contributes to their 
superior performance. The combined results suggest that Champions’ successors can perform 
as well as their predecessors. Although champions’ successors cannot sustain their 
predecessors’ performance in the univariate framework, they tend to beat their peers as much 
as their champion predecessors did after controlling for growth cyclicality in the multivariate 
framework. Thus, CEO Champions can be successfully replaced on average since corporate 
board can appoint better successors available, and hypothesis one is supported. 
The predecessor legacy hypothesis is tested in both univariate and multivariate frame. The 
predecessor’s performance ranking is found to be the most significant element in explaining 
successor’s ranking in voluntary turnover events. There are continuous superior performance 
and no significant performance reversion when successors take offices from champions. Thus 
hypothesis two is supported. The result reinforces the CEO Champion Legacy Conjecture 
that successors’ performance is mainly driven by their predecessors’ performance. 
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Furthermore, predecessors’ legacy and succession plan together have an enormous impact on 
successors’ performance after the voluntary turnover events from the cross-sectional 
regressions. I also find implications supporting CEO Champions Remaining Influence 
Conjecture in the multivariate analysis that predecessors’ retention on the board positively 
and significantly contributes to their successors’ performance. For CEO Champions Effective 
Replacement Conjecture, the only evidence from this chapter is that busy boards tend to play 
a key role in effective replacement in the voluntary turnover events. This is contrary to 
previous findings in the forced turnover studies that busy boards are less likely to dismiss 
underperformed CEOs. Thus, the CEO Champion Legacy Conjecture and CEO Champions 
Remaining Influence Conjecture may mainly explain the effective replacements. 
The results from this chapter provide CEO succession literature with several implications. 
First, well-governed firms tend to hire better-performed CEOs and will continue to do so 
when they have to replace their champions. Second, champion CEOs built better firms and 
boards can replace them more successfully either through a good succession plan or through 
paving the way for internal successors. Inspired by the above findings, I am interested in 
whether better corporate governance, better succession plan or champion CEO’s remaining 
power after stepping down could mitigate the performance deteriorate trend from CEO 
turnover events, and which factors play vital roles in determining corporate board’s better 
replacement decisions. In the next chapter, I aim at investigating the reasons behind the 
results for CEO Champion sample more extensively. Hypotheses are further developed, and 
regression models are built to capture the essential variables in explaining the better 
replacement decisions. 
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Insiders VS. Outsiders: "Well performed firms tend to promote from within 
because that creates a sense of passion and engagement among the staff. If 
the company is fundamentally challenged, then you might need new 
capabilities, and the board might want to look outside for someone to 
transform the company." 
        The Best-Performing CEOs in the World 2016, Harvard Business Review 
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4. When do corporate board successfully replace Champion CEOs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Succession planning is considered to be associated with the continuous development of 
internal talent. To select the right successors, the board of directors needs to understand the 
company's strengths, weaknesses and the main factors for success (Petrovic, 2008); and 
accordingly, identify the appropriate candidate with the skill sets and capability to manage 
the firm’s resources. Ideally, the board of directors should maintain a list of candidates and 
prepare them for both scheduled and unexpected CEO transitions. Besides, the outgoing CEO 
is responsible for coaching, mentoring potential successors and assigning challenging 
projects to develop candidates' new skills, in hoping that internal successors can push their 
predecessor’s vision and continue to lead the brand in a favourable direction. Given the size 
limitation of the CEO labour market and certain un-transferable executive skill sets among 
various industries, cultural fit, most companies prefer to train and promote talents within. 
Familiar with their companies', insiders tend to be the first choices of boards
40
. Having 
witnessed and evaluated insiders' performance, leadership style, and cultural fit over time, the 
board of directors is more confident that insiders may perform to their expectations.  
Considerable evidence has shown that internal CEOs outperform outside CEOs41, which may 
partially because outsider CEOs are preferable when boards are dissatisfied with firm 
performance and intend to change operational strategy (Brickley, 2003). However, Favaro, 
Karlsson, and Neilson (2013) show that the percentage of outside CEO succession among 
the world's largest international firms has increased from 14% in 2007 to 29% in 2012. The 
growing tendency of hiring outsiders is partially driven by the external knowledge demands 
and increasing information processing required by large firms (Hermann and Datta, 2002; 
Menon and Pfeffer, 2003; Magnusson and Boggs, 2006). Furthermore, being more 
objective and beholden to fewer internal stakes, outsiders are more capable of instilling 
change and improving results, especially for underperforming firms. In 1999, John Thompson 
left his job at IBM to become the CEO of Symantec, a company experiencing lacklustre 
performance and transformed it into a standout during his 10-year tenure. On the other hand, 
successful companies may prefer insiders, who can bring continuity and smooth transition. 
                                                          
40
 Karlsson, Neilson and Webster (2007) reported that almost 80 percent successions involve internal promotion.    
Similarly, the sample of Sala's (2010) includes 79.1% insiders, and is used as a proxy for succession plan. 
41 
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) find positive relation between abnormal returns and internal CEO replacements; 
whereas Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) find the negative relation 
between stock returns and outside succession.  
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However, there has been much controversy regarding the association between 
insider/outsider CEO succession origin and firm performance; and thus, the expected sign of 
the coefficient of the insider/outsider replacement choice is ambiguous, especially for 
champion CEOs' voluntary turnover. While some scholars highlight the benefits of outside 
succession, others consider outsider CEO succession as a disruptive and disadvantageous 
event for the firm
42
. Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017)
 43
 reconcile the two opposing 
theoretical perspectives, i.e., organisational adaptation view and organisational disruption 
view of succession. They document that outside CEO succession outweigh the costs when the 
new CEOs socio-demographically resembles incumbent executives, or possesses rich 
experience, or is hired by a well-performing firm operating in a munificent industry. On the 
other hand, replacement by insiders can either suggest good succession programs or increased 
managerial entrenchment. Michael C. Hawley, Gillette's president, and the chief operating 
officer, took office from CEO Champion Alfred M. Zeien, who was the long-term CEO of 
Gillette and has built the company into consumer product giant. Unfortunately, Hawley did 
not bring continuity to the company's success but bring disruption to company's operation. He 
resigned after Gillette's stock has fallen more than fifty percent during his one-and-half years' 
tenure. Directors of Gillette's then hire the outsider James M. Kilts, who turn around the 
once-great company that had lost its edge and guide Gillette re-joining the top ranks of 
consumer products companies. Given the conflicting predictions regarding the association 
between the effect of insider/outsider choice and firm performance after turnover, the 
successor origin decision on a successful replacement is investigated thoroughly in this 
chapter. I provide new evidence to management succession literature that consistent with 
Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017)'s conclusion, i.e., outsiders tend to be the better choices 
for the board of directors when replacing well-performing CEOs.  
In Chapter Three, I find evidence that champion successors' performance relies on their 
predecessors. Either CEO Champions' firms have sound governance and succession plans, or 
                                                          
42
 Helmich and Brown's (1972) organizational adaptation view of succession implies that outsider CEOs possess 
more external knowledge and information compared to insiders. Thus, Menon and Pfeffer (2003) advocate that 
outsiders are better equipped to expand the resource base of the firm and promote innovation, learning, and high 
performance. Vancil's (1987) organizational disruption view of succession regards outside succession as a 
disruptive event related to costs for the firm. Scholars supporting this view argue that outsiders lack firm 
familiarity which, in combination with the difficulty of integrating in the incumbent top management team and 
organization, causes disruption to internal processes and leads to low performance (Friedman and Saul, 1991; 
Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). 
43
 They develop an integrated multilevel framework and study 109 CEO succession events in large international 
firms headquartered in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK over the period 2005–09. They 
examine the performance advantages of outside succession and conclude that successor origin should not be 
considered in isolation, but in interaction with multilevel characteristics.  
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champions' legacies or remaining influence will be the foundation of these companies they 
left behind, these champions can be successfully replaced on average by hiring better 
successors available. Inspired by the findings, this chapter aims at examining the underlying 
reasons for the successful replacements of these CEO Champions. Among the 295 out of 458 
CEOs in both Champion Leagues, John P. Morgridge of CISCO Systems Inc. earned the top 
place in CEO Champion League I (No. 182 on League II). John Chamber, the successor of 
John P. Morgridge, is also on both lists. Similarly, he won the 2nd place on 2015 Harvard 
Business Review's best-performing CEOs in the world. Altera Corporations' long-term CEO 
Rodney Smith comes out as No.1 on champion league II (No. 21 of the League I). In last ten 
years during his tenure, Rodney Smith delivered positive AROA, M&A CARs (if available) 
each year, positive ABHAR for nine years, and beat analyst forecast EPS 8 out of 10 years. 
His successor still remains on both lists after the turnover
44
. To identify the key factors drive 
their superior performance, I employ the two CEO Champion leagues constructed based on 
Measures Index One and Two. Aiming at investigating the main factors that affect corporate 
board’s better replacement decisions, in this chapter, I further study the implications of the 
results in chapter one extensively. Regression models are built to capture the variation in 
performance deterioration and key variables in better replacement decisions. I am interested 
in whether better corporate governance, champion CEO’s remaining power after stepping 
down, and successor origin could mitigate the performance deterioration results from CEO 
turnover. The same methodology is employed to calculate the eight distinct measures and 
construct the two champion leagues.  
Previous studies examining CEO succession events did not focus particularly on successful 
predecessors, which might present incomplete results. For underperformed companies, better 
successors who successfully replaced their predecessors may not as good as other successors 
who took office from top-performed predecessors. These successors outperform their poorly-
performed predecessors might because it was easier to exceed relatively low-performance 
starting point. On the other hand, it not necessary meant these successors are unsuccessful if 
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 More cases with both successful predecessors and successors include Louis V. Gerstner, Jr of International 
Business Machine, Ralph S. Larsen of Johnson & Johnson, Andrew S. Grove of Intel Corp, the founder of Nike 
Inc. Philip H. Knight and their corresponding successors, etc. On the other hand, some CEO Champions are not 
successfully replaced by their successors, including Jeffrey L. Bleustein of Harley Davidson Inc. and Margaret 
C. Whitman of EBay Inc., etc.; whereas some boards successfully replace CEO Champions by better successors, 
such as boards of Fossil Inc. (and Polaris Industries Inc.) who managed to find better insider (and outsider) 
successors than their champion predecessors. In line with Harvard Business Review's female CEO rankings, the 
only female CEO on their top 100 list is Margaret C. Whitman of EBay Inc., who also comes as the top female 
CEO in champion league I (No.38). The other two female CEOs on both champion leagues are Katherine M. 
Hudson of Brady Corp and Carol A. Bartz of Autodesk Inc. 
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they could not perform better given the firms were in a miserable financial situation, and 
there might be higher risk involved which make them harder to turn around. This explains 
why outsider executives usually require higher compensation, which is regarded as risk 
premium mitigating the higher chance of failure when the companies were in financial 
troubles. In existing literature, there is criticism of outsiders who did not perform well when 
the firms were in trouble while outsiders tend to require higher compensations. Interestingly, 
the results of this study show a negative relation between insider/outsider dummy and 
successful replacement around turnover events, indicating that CEO Champions are more 
likely to be successfully replaced by outsiders, rather than insiders. I provide new evidence in 
this chapter that outsiders tend to perform better than insiders when the firm performance is 
above average, which provides new evidence to succession literature and substantially 
contributes to existing literature on CEO turnover.  
With regards to the relation between corporate governance and firm performance, Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006)
45
 argue that busy board is 
harmful to firm performance. In contrast, my findings suggest that busy board tend to have 
better capability to replace CEO Champions successfully. In line with the reputational capital 
view of directorships, directors serving on multiple boards are more likely to provide 
executives with broader experience, more visibility and commercial contacts rather than 
overpaying CEOs or under-monitoring. This probably results from that they tend to have 
more valuable experience and information while sitting on different boards simultaneously. 
Firms under management by champion CEOs may require less monitoring, but broader 
visions and strategic guide; thus, successful champions’ replacement might attribute to busy 
boards. No statistically significant results for other corporate governance variables are 
identified in determining the successful replacement for my sample. Regarding predecessors' 
influence variables, this study finds that successful former CEOs are more likely to be 
reappointed to the board after stepping down and successors tend to sustain success, which is 
in line with Fahlenbrach, Minton and Pan's (2011). For champions' founder status in 
affecting successful replacement, successors of champion founders' are demonstrated to have 
greater performance improvement than non-founders' successors, which suggests that 
champion founders are less likely to be entrenched as Schwert (1985) document. 
                                                          
45 “Busy boards” are boards with a majority of independent directors serve on three or more boards. Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) document that busy independent directors award CEOs with excessive 
compensations, but in exchange for poor firm performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argued that busy board 
is harmful to corporate governance since they spent less time monitoring and are less likely to dismiss 
underperformed CEOs. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the hypotheses 
development. Section 3 presents the data and methodologies and documents the results of 
univariate tests. Section 4 offers multivariate analysis results while Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Research Design and Hypotheses Development 
Under the assumption of Huson et al. 's (2004) that manager quality varies across CEOs, this 
chapter aims at examining the determinants of turnover-related performance changes and 
circumstances under which the replacements are efficient. I first consider corporate 
governance, i.e., the impact of monitoring mechanisms on the successful replacement.  I then 
examine whether the new CEO promoted from within the firm or hired from outside would 
play a vital role in the successful replacement. I further discuss predecessors' retention and 
founder status in determining the successful replacement. Four hypotheses are developed 
accordingly and tested by the POST-PRE regressions and logistic regressions. This chapter 
aims at solving the following questions: 
1. Will board with sound corporate governance replace CEO Champions more successfully? 
2. Are CEO Champions more likely to be successfully replaced when their successors are 
insiders or outsiders?  
3. Will newly appointed CEOs to perform better if CEO Champions were retained on the 
board after stepping down? 
4. Are champion founders more likely to be successfully replaced? 
To test the above research questions, I develop the four corresponding hypotheses as follows. 
Prior literature suggests that firms with better corporate governance tend to terminate poorly-
performed CEOs. The sensitivity of turnover to performance increases with higher quality 
boards
46
. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that “busy boards47” are less likely to dismiss 
poorly-performed CEOs. Thus, to examine whether the higher quality board can more 
successfully replace champion CEOs, the percentage of independent directors, directors’ 
stock ownership, and “busy boards” are tested in this chapter. Also, the market for corporate 
control play a key role in discouraging corporate empire-building, and there is a negative 
relation between ATPs (Anti-Takeover Provisions) and firm value, long-term stock 
                                                          
46
 Jenter and Lewellen (2010) defined higher quality boards as smaller boards with more independent directors 
and higher directors’ stock ownership. 
47
 “Busy boards” are defined as boards on which a majority of independent directors serve on three or more 
boards and they assume these directors will not effectively monitor. 
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performance, and acquisitions bidder returns
48
. Accordingly, GIM Index and E-Index are also 
examined in the contribution to successful replacement of CEO Champions in hypothesis 
one.  
Hypothesis 1: boards with better corporate governance are more likely to replace 
Champion CEOs successfully 
Support: Δ (change in rankings) is associated with measures of board quality or corporate 
governance 
Reject: Δ (change in rankings) is not associated with measures of board quality or corporate 
governance (where measures of board quality include GIM Index, E-Index, BUSY, INDEP, 
and OWNER.) 
Whether insiders or outsiders make better CEOs is a topic of heated debate. Some researchers
 
find evidence in supporting internal CEO replacements. Some criticise that outsiders tend to 
request higher compensations but fail to achieve better performance than insiders
49
. CEOs 
promoted from inside tend to have stronger performance than those brought in from the 
outside. When it comes to generating long-term growth for firms, industry- and firm-specific 
knowledge is critical, suggesting that tapping insider talent for the CEO’s office is a better 
option. On the other hand, outsiders are more capable of instilling change and improving 
results, especially for underperforming firms. In Harvard Business Review 2010 Top 100 
CEO study, they provide evidence that troubled companies were more likely to tap outsiders 
as CEOs. 37% of the companies with returns at -46% or worse two years before turnover 
chose outsider CEOs, whereas 21% of all companies in the sample did. However, they did 
not find evidence of outsiders outperforming insiders when comparing the results of CEOs 
who took over underperforming companies. Hence, the expected sign of the coefficient of the 
insider/outsider replacement choice is ambiguous, especially for CEOs in outperforming 
firms. Replacement by insiders can either suggest good succession programs or increased 
managerial entrenchment. Moreover, a recent report by Strategy &
50 
indicate that even an 
internal promotion can deteriorate shareholder values and successors tend to underperform 
predecessors.  
                                                          
48
 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). 
49
 Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Huson et al. (2004); Khurana (2002). 
50
 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary Neilson, “2014 study of CEOs, governance, and success: The value 
of getting CEO succession right”, Strategy &, April 14, 2015 
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Most prior research studies forced turnover sample, suggesting that outsiders are more likely 
to take office when companies are experiencing or suffering from some financial or 
operational difficulties, whereas insiders are more likely to succeed when firms are in good 
positions. The results thus would bias towards poor performance for outsiders. Given HBR 
study did not compare the results of insider and outsider CEOs who took over outperforming 
companies, this chapter aims at providing evidence of insiders versus outsiders for successful 
companies. For the champion CEOs sample in this chapter, firms involved are all superior-
performed, and successors’ origins are comparable accordingly. CEO Champions have 
already built their firms into above-average performing ones and left their legacy within the 
firms. Insiders have always been guided by champions, and their outlook could have been 
constrained to a certain extent. In this case, outsiders with broader visions and experience 
might bring new expertise to the successful management team and achieve superior 
performance (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003). To test this conjecture, I explore the influence of 
insider or outsider replacement decision on firm performance and intend to provide new 
evidence to succession literature. Hypothesis two is developed as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Champion CEOs are more likely to be successfully replaced when the 
incoming CEOs are insiders 
Support: Δ (change in performance) is positively associated with insider dummy  
Reject: Δ (change in performance) is negatively or not associated with insider dummy  
Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan (2011) suggest that successful and powerful 
former CEOs tend to be reappointed to the board after stepping down and their firms tend to 
outperform. The former CEO’s retention on the board is considered to be good news, and 
stock market reaction to succession announcements is greater, which suggests that firms 
should retain predecessors and not grant successors too much power to improve long-run 
performance (Perry, Yao and Chandler, 2011). Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer (2010) 
document that the likelihood of retention is higher when the CEO voluntarily left, is a 
founder or member of founding family or succeeded by an insider. The above findings imply 
that champions retained on the board after stepping down are more likely to be successfully 
replaced and this leads to the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Boards that retained Champion CEOs after they stepping down are more 
likely to replace them successfully 
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Support: Δ (change in rankings) is positively associated with Champion CEOs’ retention 
Reject:  Δ (change in rankings) is not or negatively associated with Champions’ retention  
Founders are more likely to have specific knowledge which is valuable to the firms, and they 
tend to perform well (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Palia and Ravid, 2008; Adam, Almeida 
and Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). Some founders are uniquely talented and hard to 
replace; however, others might also become entrenched and are reluctant to step down once 
their performance deteriorates (Schwert, 1985). Inspired by the opposing arguments on firm 
founders, I further build the last hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Champion CEOs are more likely to be successfully replaced when they are 
founders  
Support: Δ (change in rankings) positively or not associated with founder dummy 
Reject:  Δ (change in rankings) negatively or not associated with founder dummy 
4.3 Data, Methodology and Sample Statistics 
4.3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample of CEO Champions is from ExecuComp and includes CEO turnover events 
between 1992 and 2009, with the firm performance from 1982 to 2012. ExecuComp is used 
to identify turnover events, CEO characteristics, and compensation information. I hand-
collect turnover reasons, announcement date and CEO characteristics from LexisNexis, Proxy 
Statement, and Businessweek. Annual industry and firm financial data, and monthly stock 
market data are from Compustat and CRSP. Quarterly actual EPS and the corresponding 
consensus median analysts’ forecasted EPS immediately preceding the quarterly earnings 
announcement date was collected from the IBES unadjusted detail history database.  Board of 
directors’ related information is achieved from ISS Governance Services RiskMetrics 
database. M&A announcements and deal characteristics are derived from Thomson Financial 
SDC and deals are announced between 1980 and 2012. Acquirers are U.S. public firms and 
targets are either U.S. or non-U.S. public, private or subsidiary firms. Deal transaction value 
is set to no less than 1 million dollars and including only completed deals
51
. Acquirer's 
ownership of the target is required to be less than 10% before acquisition announcement and 
more than 50% following the deal completion. Target-to-acquirer relative size should be no 
less than 1%, and the targets and the bidders are different companies.  
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 Spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining 
interest, exchange offers and privatizations are excluded. 
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4.3.2 Measures of CEO Champions and CEO Ranking Z-scores 
Champion CEOs are defined as strong performers, regarding long-term performance 
measures AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs, or AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS 
Surprise2 and M&A CARs2. For AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise, at least five years data 
should be available prior turnover to ensure continuity. CEOs with data available for at least 
any three of the four measures are ranked based on these eight performance measures 
mutually exclusively to ensure champion CEOs are not limited to those who have to initiate 
M&A deals during their tenure. In specific, each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) 
for each metric and averaged the first four (three if anyone is missing) performance 
measures’ (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) rankings to obtain the CEO’s 
overall ranking One, which defined as Measures Index One. Champion League І consists 
the top tercile performed CEOs from Measures Index One. Measure Index Two is generated 
in the same way, by which I re-rank the average ranking of the four (three if anyone is 
missing) beat percentage performance measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and 
M&A CARs2). Champion League ІІ consists the top tercile performed CEOs from Measure 
Index Two. Incorporating two sets of four metrics is a balanced and robust approach: While 
Measures Index One's risk is skewed toward smaller companies, measure index two takes 
into account only how many times CEO beat their peers and thus free from firm size 
skewness bias. Finally, Measures Index One and Two are transferred into z-scores since 
ranks are discrete data. After transferring into normally distributed continuous data, t 
statistics can be used to interpret the results. The opposite number of z-scores are employed 
to ensure that larger z-scores indicate better CEOs' performance. 
4.3.3 Methods 
4.3.3.1 Multiple regression cross-sectional analysis 
To further investigate which factors lead to superior quality replacement, successor origin, 
predecessor influence, and corporate governance variables are examined in the multivariate 
framework. The dependent variables, ∆Z-score52  are the changes in z-scores of measure 
indices between the newly appointed CEOs and their champion predecessors, which proxy 
for the post-turnover ranking surprise and the degree of successful replacement. I employ 
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 Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone 
is missing) performance metrics’ rankings (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) are averaged and 
re-ranked to obtain the Measures Index One. Measures Index One is transferred into z-scores since ranks are 
discrete data. After transferring into normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to interpret the 
results. 
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equation (14) estimated in a nested regression form with various combinations of explanatory 
variables including INSIDER dummy, FOUNDER dummy, REMAIN_BOARD dummy, 
REMAIN_CHAIR dummy, GINDEX, EINDEX, BUSY dummy, INDEP, OWNER, ∆AGE, 
∆TENURE, ∆DUALITY, ∆COMPENSATION, ∆ASSETS, ∆GSALES, and ∆MTB. The 
year and industry fixed effects are controlled by including the year and industry dummies in 
the regression analysis.  
∆𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝐸 − 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖       𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁              (14) 
4.3.3.2 Ordinal Logistic Regressions analysis 
To access the ranks directly, I modify the binary logistic regression model to incorporate the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variables, the changes in predecessors' and successors' 
Measures Index One (Two), by defining the probabilities differently. Instead of considering 
the probability of an individual event, I consider the probability of that event and all events 
that are ordered before it. In ordinal logistic regression, the event of interest is observing a 
particular score or less. For the rating of judges, I model the following odds:  
𝜃𝑗=prob (score ≤ j) / prob (score > j) 
Or, 𝜃𝑗= prob (score ≤ j) / (1 – prob (score ≤ j))                               (15) 
The ordinal logistic model for the independent variable, changes in predecessors' and 
successors' Measures Index One (Two) is as below. 
ln(𝜃𝑗) = 𝛼𝑗 − ∑ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑘−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖    𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁                                                (16) 
Where j represents the number of turnover events, which goes from 1 to the number of 
categories k minus 1. There is a minus sign before the coefficients for the predictor variables 
so that larger coefficients indicate an association with higher scores, i.e., a positive 
coefficient for a dichotomous factor indicates higher scores for the first category. Each logit 
has its term 𝛼𝑗  but the same coefficient β, indicating that the effect of the independent 
variable is the same for different logit functions. The vector of explanatory variables 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 includes a set of explanatory variables: INSIDER, FOUNDER, REMAIN_BOARD, 
REMAIN_CHAIR, GINDEX, EINDEX, BUSY, INDEP, OWNER, ∆AGE, ∆TENURE, 
100 
 
∆DUALITY, ∆COMPENSATION, ∆ASSETS, ∆GSALES and ∆MTB. The year and industry 
fixed effects are also controlled in the regression analysis.  
4.3.3.3 Logistic Regressions analysis 
To estimate the probability of successors’ relative rankings to their predecessors, I formulate 
the estimated logistic regression equation as below. The coefficients α and 𝛽𝑘 are determined 
according to a maximum likelihood approach, and it allows me to estimate the probability of 
the dependent variable, REPLACE (or BEAT) taking on the value 1 for given values of 𝑥𝑘. 
Estimate of P (y=1|𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … 𝑥𝑝) =1/ (1+𝑒
−(𝛼+∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)
𝑘 )     k = 1... p        (17) 
REPLACE is coded to take the value of one if successors are also ranked among the top 458 
CEOs following the same ranking methodology as their champion predecessors, suggesting 
that successors have successfully replaced their predecessors by inheriting the championship 
among their peers. BEAT is coded to take the value of one if the successor who ranked 
among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking methodology as champions beat 
predecessor' rank, suggesting that the successor has successfully replaced the champion 
predecessor by achieving a higher rank among the peers. Similar combinations of explanatory 
variables as above are included and tested.  
 
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.3.4.1 Difference Tests between Champions and Bottom-Performed CEOs 
In this section, the CEO turnover sample is partitioned into two sets of subsamples, 
Champion League І (top tercile performed CEOs) and corresponding bottom (terciles) 
performed CEOs, and Champion League ІІ (top tercile performed CEOs) and corresponding 
bottom (terciles) performed CEOs. Table 4.1 compares one-year prior turnover corporate 
governance characteristics, succession plan and predecessor remaining influence proxies for 
these Champion CEOs and bottom performed CEOs. Whether successful replacements are 
related to the governance structure of the firm is tested using the governance index of 
Gompers, Iishi, and Metrick (2003) and the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2005). Higher levels of the governance index and the entrenchment index are 
indicative of firms that favour management, rather than shareholders. Statistics for Measures 
Index One reflect that champion CEOs’ firms tend to have significantly lower GIM Index and 
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E-index. Compared to the considerably higher GIM and Entrench Indices of firms supervised 
by the bottomed performed CEOs, the typical firms managed by CEOs in Champion League І 
have mean governance index at 8.9 and entrenchment index at 2.29, indicating Champion 
CEOs’ firms are more favour their shareholders rather than management. Neither apparent 
differences are identified in governance nor entrenchment indices between top and bottom 
performed CEOs for champion league ІІ. 
Comparisons between board quality of top and bottom performed CEOs are carried out on 
board size, the board members comprised of outsiders, and shares held by board members. 
Champions’ firms tend to have smaller board size, fewer independent directors serve on three 
or more boards simultaneously and higher board of directors ownership. The median board in 
champion league І has nine members, with 65% outsiders, and holds approximately 1% of the 
shares on average. Strikingly, these firms tend to have the significantly lower proportion of 
independent directors, indicating that champion CEOs are not necessarily monitored by more 
independent board members. The lower percentage of independent directors for boards of 
champion CEOs is in conflict with prior research conjectures
53
. Similar but less significant 
results are presented for Champion League ІІ with the only exception that firms managed by 
champion CEOs tend to be supervised by a busier board with directors serve on three or more 
boards simultaneously. This result implies that board quality is not the reason that champions 
outperform their peers and these champions are not necessarily monitored by firms with 
better governance to deliver superior performance.  
When it comes to succession plan proxies, there is no significant difference between 
champion CEOs and bottom performed CEOs in champion league І. In contrast, 81% 
successors of champion league ІІ are insiders, which is significantly higher than successors of 
bottom performed CEOs (71.7%). 87% predecessors stepped down on the same day as 
successors’ hire announcement day, suggesting that there is a sound succession plan in place 
before CEO turnovers for Champion League ІІ. With regards to predecessors’ remaining 
influence proxy, champions CEOs are more likely to be founders in both champion leagues. 
For both Leagues, Champions are more likely to be retained on the board, mainly as 
chairman, than the bottom performing CEOs.  
                                                          
53
 The literature on board independence and its relation to firm value and managerial actions is extensive. For 
example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004). 
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Table 4.1: Governance, Succession Plans, and Predecessors’ Remaining Influence 
This table compares corporate governance characteristics one year before turnover, succession plans, and 
predecessors’ remaining influence proxies for the two Champion CEO samples and bottom terciles performed 
CEOs sample, respectively. In Panel A, GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover 
provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the 
sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). SIZE is the total number of 
directors sitting on the board. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board relative to 
the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board. BUSY is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. In Panel 
B, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position(s) in the 
firm for no less than one years. SAMEDATE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover announcement 
dates and successors’ hire announcement dates are the same. In Panel C, FOUNDER is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the predecessor still served on the board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the predecessor still served on the board as chairman after step down. N is the number of observations. Mean 
difference tests are based on t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
    Champion League І    Champion League ІІ 
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
    
Champion 
CEO 
Bottom-
performed 
CEO 
Difference   
Champion 
CEO 
Bottom-
performed 
CEO 
Difference 
Panel A: Corporate Governance Characteristics   
    
GINDEX mean 8.90 9.47 -0.57***     9.28 9.27 0.00   
  median 9.00 10.00 -1.00***     9.00 9.00 0.00   
  N 422 829       426 825     
EINDEX mean 2.29 2.45 -0.16**     2.37 2.41 -0.04   
  median 2.00 2.00 0.00**     2.00 2.00 0.00   
  N 422 829       426 825     
SIZE mean 9.17 10.51 -1.34***     9.86 10.15 -0.29   
  median 9.00 10.00 -1.00***     9.00 10.00 -1.00*   
  N 406 761       415 752     
INDEP mean 65.47 68.32 -2.86***     66.08 68.02 -1.94*   
  median 66.67 71.43 -4.76***     66.67 71.43 -4.76**   
  N 406 761       415 752     
OWNER mean 1.08 0.74 0.34***     0.96 0.80 0.16*   
  median 0.49 0.23 0.26***     0.35 0.28 0.06***   
  N 406 761       415 752     
BUSY mean 23.15 25.23 -2.08     28.19 22.47 5.72**   
  N 406 761       415 752     
Panel B: Succession plan proxy  
    
INSIDER mean 77.41 73.56 3.86     81.06 71.73 9.33***   
  N 456 900       454 902   
SAMEDATE mean 86.03 83.02 3     87.12 82.48 4.64**   
  N 458 913       458 913   
Panel C: Predecessors’ remaining influence proxy  
    
FOUNDER Mean 
 
20.96  13.14  7.82***          
7.82  
  
18.34  14.46  3.88*              
3.88  
 
 
N 458 913       458 913 
  
REMAIN_BOARD mean 74.89 65.72 9.17***     76.2 65.06 11.14***   
  N 458 913       458 913   
REMAIN_CHAIR mean 51.09 43.37 7.72***   52.84 42.5 10.34***   
  N 458 913       458 913   
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4.3.4.2 Difference Tests of CEO Rankings between CEO Champions and their Successors 
In this section, champions and their successors' average ranks are compared in Table 4.2, in 
particular for successors who succeed champions’ superior performance and also ranked as 
top performed successors.  
Panel A compares average ranks of CEOs in Champion League І and their successors 
grouped by various CEO and board characteristics dummies. Among the 458 champions' 
successors, 223 are successful successors who ranked as top successors when following the 
same ranking method as champion predecessors. Out of the 223 successful successors, 116 
beat their predecessors’ ranks. In Column (1) and (2), 458 predecessors from Champion 
League І are partitioned into two sets of subsamples grouped by variables characteristics 
dummies, respectively. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) are the sub-sample of champions who 
are replaced by insiders, who are the founders, who still serve on the board after stepping 
down, and who are monitored by the busy board, respectively. On the other hand, columns 
(2), (4), (6) and (8) are the sub-sample of champion CEOs who are replaced by outsiders, 
who are not the founders, who leave their firms after stepping down, and who are monitored 
by the non-busy board, respectively. 
Outsiders' champion predecessors (as shown in column (2)) have significantly higher mean 
and median ranks than insiders’ predecessors (in column (1)). Similarly, CEOs appointed 
from the external labour market in the top successor sample (in column (4)) also have 
significantly higher average ranks than CEOs who are promoted from within their firms (in 
column (3)). The results suggest that champions are more likely to be successfully replaced 
by outsiders rather than insiders. Similar results are found for top successors who beat their 
predecessors’ performance in the difference test (7)-(8), which further suggests that 
champions are more likely to be beaten by outsiders. These results combined suggest that 
CEO Champions are more likely to be successfully replaced by outsiders rather than insiders. 
In contrary to prior findings in successor origin studies for the forced turnover sample, 
hypothesis two that champions are more likely to be successfully replaced when the incoming 
CEOs are insiders is rejected. In line with Helmich and Brown's (1972) and Menon and 
Pfeffer's (2003) organisational adaptation view of succession, this novel finding provides 
valuable implication consistent with Georgakakis and Ruigrok's (2017) that outsiders tend 
to be better options for the board of directors when replacing successful CEOs.   
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When it comes to predecessors’ founder status, the average ranks of founder predecessors are 
significantly higher, whereas neither significant results are identified for top successors nor 
successors who beat champions. I find similar results for champions who stay on the board 
that their average ranks are significantly higher, but not for their top-performed successors. 
Neither significant results are found for champions and their top successors with regards to 
busy board dummy. The above univariate test results suggest that founders and those CEOs 
who retained on the board after stepping down tend to have better performance among 
champions, but their successors do not show superior performance compared with their peers. 
Thus, the univariate test results do not provide evidence supporting hypotheses three and four 
that boards that retained champions are more likely to replace them successfully, and 
champion predecessors are more likely to be successfully replaced when they are founders. 
Thus, hypotheses three and four are rejected in the univariate framework.  
In panel B, CEO average ranks of predecessors in Champion League ІІ and their successors 
in terms of CEO and board characteristics dummies are compared. Out of the 458 champions' 
successors, 205 are successful successors, and 96 beat their predecessors' rank. For top 
successors' insider/ outsider status in successful replacement, no significant results from the 
univariate test are identified for Champion League ІІ sample. Similarly, champions' founder 
status and their destination after stepping down both lose significance level for Champion 
League ІІ sample and their successors do not rank significantly higher than their peers. In 
contrast, I find significant results in busy board dummy for top successors in Champion 
League ІІ sample, suggesting that successors monitored by busy boards are more likely to be 
successful in replacing their champions. In contrary to Fich and Shivdasani (2006)'s finding 
that busy boards are less likely to dismiss poorly-performed CEOs, the findings for successful 
predecessors provide evidence in supporting busy boards are more likely to hire or support 
successors with superior performance when replacing champions. Thus, hypothesis 1 that 
boards with better corporate governance are more likely to replace champions successfully is 
partially supported. Hypotheses two, three and four are rejected in the univariate framework 
for Champion League ІІ sample since there is no statistically significant difference in 
successors' average rankings for successor origin, predecessors founder status, and 
destination subgroups. In sum, hypothesis one is partially supported; whereas hypotheses 
two, three and four are rejected in the univariate framework. 
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Table 4.2: CEO Average Ranks Comparisons between Champions and their successors 
 
This table compares CEO average ranks of champions' and their successors' subsamples regarding CEO insider, founder, remain on the board and busy dummies. In Panel A, 
Column (1) is the sub-sample of CEOs in Champion League І who are replaced by insiders (who are the founders/ who still serve on the board after stepping down/ who are 
monitored by the busy board). On the other hand, column (2) is the sub-sample of champion CEOs who are replaced by outsiders/ who are not the founders/ who leave their 
firms after stepping down/ who are monitored by the non-busy board). Column (3) and (4) are the sub-sample of champions' successors who are also top performed 
successors while column (5) and (6) are the sub-sample of champions' successors who are not ranked as top successors. Column (7) and (8) are the sub-sample of champions' 
successors who beat their predecessors' ranks. The same variables are tested in panel B for champion league ІІ. N is the number of observations. Mean difference tests are 
based on t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: CEO Average Ranks for Champion League І     
       
Champion Predecessor (N=458) 
  Champion's Successor (N=458)   Top Successors beat 
PRE (N=116/223) 
 
      Top Successor (N=223)   Non-Top Successors (N=235)    
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   (3) (4) (3)-(4)   (5) (6) (5)-(6)   (7) (8) (7)-(8)  
    Y N Difference   Y N Difference   Y N Difference   Y N Difference  
INSIDER mean 235.83 207.83 28.00*   227.13 180.02 47.11**   798.06 846.04 -47.98   162.85 102.20 60.65***  
  median 239.00 189.00 50.00**   213.00 128.00 85.00***   769.00 758.50 10.50   146.00 93.00 53.00***  
  N 353.00 103.00     174.00 49.00     179.00 54.00     91.00 25.00    
FOUNDER mean 203.71 236.34 -32.63**   223.02 214.83 8.19   808.35 808.41 -0.06   157.43 148.08 9.34  
  median 180.50 240.50 -60.00**   205.00 197.00 8.00   752.00 771.00 -19.00   136.00 135.00 1.00  
  N 96.00 362.00     53.00 170.00     43.00 192.00     21.00 95.00    
REMAIN_BOARD mean 221.10 254.54 -33.43**   222.94 194.31 28.62   781.96 874.70 -92.74***   147.52 156.23 -8.71  
  median 217.00 265.00 -48.00***   212.00 166.50 45.50*   721.50 837.00 -115.50***   133.50 144.50 -11.00  
  N 343.00 115.00     175.00 48.00     168.00 67.00     86.00 30.00    
Busy mean 236.09 231.27 4.82   210.69 226.10 -15.41   723.57 824.58 -101.02**   152.04 153.19 -1.16  
  median 237.00 235.00 2.00   175.00 215.00 -40.00   679.00 786.00 -107.00***   144.00 135.50 8.50  
  N 94.00 312.00     48.00 145.00     46.00 167.00     28.00 72.00    
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Panel B: CEO Average Ranks for Champion League ІІ     
       
Champion Predecessor (N=458) 
  Champion's Successor (N=458)   Top Successors beat 
PRE (N=96/205) 
 
      Top Successor (N=205)   Non-Top Successors (N=253)    
    (1) (2) (1)-(2)   (3) (4) (3)-(4)   (5) (6) (5)-(6)   (7) (8) (7)-(8)  
    Y N Difference   Y N Difference   Y N Difference   Y N Difference 
 
INSIDER mean 226.83 241.86 -15.03   206.40 215.56 -9.16   828.60 925.43 -96.83**   131.53 119.25 12.28  
  median 224.50 261.50 -37.00   192.00 187.00 5.00   792.00 928.00 -136.00**   101.50 97.50 4.00  
  N 368.00 86.00     165.00 39.00     203.00 47.00     76.00 20.00    
FOUNDER mean 222.88 230.99 -8.11   236.35 201.16 35.19   847.93 849.22 -1.29   121.50 130.24 -8.74  
  median 236.50 229.50 7.00   268.50 181.00 87.50*   884.50 819.00 65.50   64.50 107.50 -43.00  
  N 84.00 374.00     40.00 165.00     44.00 209.00     14.00 82.00    
REMAIN_BOARD mean 229.38 229.89 -0.51   204.54 222.90 -18.36   837.27 879.67 -42.40   129.15 128.06 1.09  
  median 226.00 240.00 -14.00   184.50 230.00 -45.50   792.00 881.50 -89.50   101.50 98.00 3.50  
  N 349.00 109.00     166.00 39.00     183.00 70.00     80.00 16.00    
Busy mean 243.75 225.75 18.00   181.26 220.87 -39.60*   819.33 853.00 -33.67   101.74 138.15 -36.41  
  median 242.00 225.00 17.00   154.00 212.50 -58.50**   743.50 869.50 -126.00   83.00 94.00 -11.00*  
  N 117.00 298.00     57.00 128.00     60.00 170.00     27.00 61.00    
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4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
4.4.1 Regressions of the Changes in Measures Indices Z-scores  
To further investigate which factors lead to superior quality replacement, successor origin, 
predecessor influence, and corporate governance variables are examined in the multivariate 
framework in this section. CEO and firm characteristics are included as control variables. 
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Weisbach (1988) have documented a strong relation 
between CEO turnover and CEO age; thus, change in CEO age is included as a control 
variable. Change in CEO tenure is also included following Dikolli et al. (2014)’s findings 
that CEO tenure associated with superior past performance. The dependent variables are the 
changes in z-scores of measure indices between the newly appointed CEOs and their 
champion predecessors. Table 4.3 reports the regression results of the changes in Champion 
League І z-scores on successor origin, predecessors influence, and corporate governance 
proxies. CEOs in Champion League I and their successors are ranked from 1 to 458 with 
decreasing Z-scores. The dependent variable predecessor’s minus successor’s z-score proxies 
for the post-turnover ranking surprise and the degree of successful replacement
54
. The year 
and industry fixed effects are controlled by including the year and industry dummies in the 
regression analysis.  
Table 4.3 presents regression analysis of changes in Measures Index One Z-scores around 
turnover on Successor Origin, Predecessor influence, Corporate Governance and other 
control variables for Champion League I. Consistent with findings in the univariate analysis, 
successor origin insider dummy significantly and negatively contribute to the successful 
replacements. Unlike most prior studies on forced turnovers implied, the novel findings 
suggest that champion CEOs are more likely to be successfully replaced when hiring 
outsiders rather than insiders. In contrary to the conclusions in the univariate analysis, the 
significant and positive relations between FOUNDER dummy and ∆Z-scores across all 
specifications provide consistent evidence of predecessors' influence in determining better 
replacements. Founders have a substantially profound impact on firms’ performance, and 
their spirits are vital to firms' future superior performance. Champion founders are less likely 
to be entrenched founders, and successors of these champion founders are more likely to 
replace their predecessors successfully. 
                                                          
54
 For example, predecessors with 30
th
 ranking may have the z-score of -2, and his/her successors ranked 350
th
 
may have the z-score of 2, so the changes in z-scores is -4. Predecessors with 400
th
 ranking may have the z-
score of 2.5, and his/her successors ranked 100
th
 may have the z-score of -1.5, so the changes in z-scores is 4. 
Given all predecessors are CEO Champions, the higher the changes in Pre-Post Z-scores, the better the 
successors are, suggesting better replacements. 
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Besides, Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan (2011) provide evidence that firm performance is 
affected by successful former CEOs' retention on the board; thus, the indicator variable 
REMAIN_BOARD is added, which equals to one if the predecessor still served on the board 
after step down and zero otherwise. The coefficient of REMAIN_BOARD is significantly 
positive in the specification (2) but loses its significance in the specification (4), which 
partially support that successors are more likely to sustain champion' performance if the 
predecessors remain on the board. 
Regression estimates for the impact of corporate governance on the replacement, however, 
are mixed and inconclusive. Most variables are irrelevant to superior performed firms' 
successful replacements given the statistically insignificant coefficients across regressions, 
with the only exception that the coefficient (-0.0619) of E-index in the regression (3) is 
negative and significant. This is in line with Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) and 
provides partial support for hypothesis one that better corporate governance in explaining 
successful replacements. However, the coefficient estimate for INDEP and OWNER dummy 
is insignificant, which is in line with the implication of previous studies. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) propose that there is no systematic relation 
cross-sectionally between ownership structure and firm performance since the difference in 
the optimal structure across firms lead to various ownership structure. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) distinguish between agency control mechanisms decided internally, i.e., 
insider shareholdings and the proportion of outside directors on the board, and decided by 
outsiders, i.e., institutional shareholdings. They argue that firms choose the levels of 
internally decided mechanisms to equate their marginal costs and benefits to maximise firm 
value; consequently, cross-sectional variation in firm performance should not be related to 
the internally decided mechanisms. Thus, my finding is in support of their implication that 
performance improvements following CEO turnovers should be unrelated to internally 
decided control mechanisms, INDEP and OWNER dummy.  
The only significant corporate governance variable across specifications is the BUSY 
dummy, which positively associates with ∆Z-scores in all regressions. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) suggest that busy board is harmful to corporate governance since they are less likely 
to dismiss underperformed CEOs. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) also find 
evidence that busy independent directors tend to overpay CEOs and result in weaker firm 
performance. In contrast, my findings provide supporting evidence for the reputational capital 
view of directorships that independent directors serving on various boards simultaneously not 
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necessarily signals less monitoring and poor corporate governance. These directors may 
expose to broader areas and gain more valuable and professional experience when they are 
sitting on different boards, which can, in turn, guide each board’s management. Thus, a busy 
board with more independent directors sitting on various boards simultaneously tend to have 
better capability to replace champion CEOs successfully.  
To my knowledge, there is no firm performance related literature used firms’ average 
performance rankings or rankings’ z-scores as dependent variables in regression analysis. 
Thus, several main variables proven to drive firm performance are controlled, and results are 
consistent with the prior literature (Malmendier and Tate
55
, 2009).  In specific, I control for 
the changes in CEO experience characteristics age and tenure, which have been extensively 
shown in past literature to influence firm performance. Additionally, I control for the changes 
in CEO duality, which is a dummy variable equals to 1 if CEO also served as chairman of a 
firm’s board of directors and 0 otherwise, so as to account for the additional authority 
afforded those CEOs who control both the firm's officers and directors (Core et al., 1999). 
Changes in CEO compensation, which is the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total 
assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment), is also controlled. Changes in firm 
characteristics that have been shown in the prior literature to impact firm performance are 
also added to the regression model, namely, size, which is the annual average ln (total assets), 
annual average growth in sales and annual average market-to-book over predecessors' or 
successors' tenure. Evidence from regression models documented in the table show support 
for the positive and significant relation between ∆DUALITY, ∆COMPENSATION, ∆MTB 
and improvement in subsequent firm performance.  
To summarise, the results show that champion CEO’s remaining influence and successor 
origin play critical roles in the successful replacement. Predecessors’ legacy and spirit would 
guide firms' future performance, which is in line with univariate test results in chapter three. 
Also, outsiders tend to bring fresh management and sights to firms. Consequently, hypothesis 
one is partially supported by busy board and EINDEX. Hypothesis two is rejected; indicating 
champions are more likely to be successfully replaced by outside successors; whereas 
hypotheses three and four are supported.  
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 Malmendier and Tate (2009) use firm characteristics (market capitalizations, B/M ratio, past return), CEO 
characteristics (CEO age, gender and tenure) and past performance to predict CEO awards. 
110 
 
Table 4.3: Regressions of Changes in Measures Index One Z-scores-Champion League І 
This table reports the coefficients from the cross-sectional regressions of the predecessors’ minus successors’ 
Measures Index One z-scores around turnover on Successor Origin, Predecessor influence, Corporate 
Governance and other control variables for Champion League I. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 
(worst) for each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) performance metrics’ rankings 
(AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures Index 
One. Measures Index One is transferred into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After transferring into 
normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to interpret the results. Champion League І consists 
of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index One. For Successor Origin variable, INSIDER 
(%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in the firm for no less 
than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. 
REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step 
down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board as 
chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover 
provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 
50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors 
sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age in the year of hiring 
(successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. 
∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the 
ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). For the 
firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ 
and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual average growth in sales 
around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual 
average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ 
tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in regressions (1) (2) (3) (6) and 
industry fixed effects are included in (4) (5). N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-
square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and 
clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Z-score1 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT -0.5185* -0.3210*** -1.0562 -0.6245** -0.3196 -0.2648 
  0.0600 0.0033 0.1780 0.0380 0.3750 0.5160 
Successor Origin           
INSIDER       -0.2546* -0.2535* -0.1971 
  
Predecessor Influence 
      0.0960 0.0970 0.2180 
FOUNDER 0.3221** 0.3110** 0.2444**     0.3264** 
  0.0140 0.0170 0.0500     0.0290 
REMAIN_BOARD   0.3681**   0.0284     
    0.0470   0.8640     
REMAIN_CHAIR   -0.1627         
    0.1520         
Corporate Governance           
GINDEX       0.0210 0.0256   
        0.3410 0.2340   
EINDEX     -0.0619*     0.0330 
 
    0.0680     0.4590 
BUSY       0.2306** 0.2182* 0.2507** 
        0.0490 0.0710 0.0500 
INDEP         -0.4352 -0.4658 
          0.1790 0.1960 
OWNER         -0.5558   
          0.8880   
Control Variables             
CEO characteristics 
          
∆AGE    0.0092 0.0093   0.0064 0.0061 0.0097 
  0.1690 0.1710   0.3920 0.4120 0.2140 
∆TENURE -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0077 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0012 
  0.8550 0.8360 0.1810 0.9940 0.8830 0.8800 
∆DUALITY 0.3087*** 0.3218*** 0.1492     0.1875 
  0.0070 0.0040 0.1030     0.1640 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0258** 0.0261** 0.0370*** 0.0240* 0.0227* 0.0177 
  0.0270 0.0240 0.0000 0.0690 0.0900 0.1830 
Firm characteristics 
          
∆ASSETS -0.0296 -0.0449 0.0891     -0.1157 
  0.7780 0.6680 0.3760     0.3290 
∆GSALES 0.2773 0.3171 -0.0303   0.1178 0.1629 
  0.4460 0.3650 0.5910   0.7720 0.6630 
∆MTB 0.1054*** 0.1070*** 0.1007*** 0.1160*** 0.1143*** 0.1236*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
YEAR FE Y Y Y N N Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 321 321 420 265 265 265 
Adj R2 17.89% 18.71% 18.91% 19.49% 19.49% 22.77% 
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Table 4.4 documents the regression results of changes in Measures Index Two Z-scores of 
Champion League І on successor origin, predecessors influence and corporate governance 
proxies. The main explanatory variables are INSIDER, FOUNDER, REMAIN_BOARD, 
GINDEX, EINDEX, BUSY, INDEP, and OWNER, respectively. Changes in CEO and firm 
characteristics are also controlled. Similar results are identified across all specifications that 
INSIDER dummy is negatively and significantly associate with ∆Z-score2, suggesting the 
successors of CEOs in champion league І are more likely outperform their predecessors in 
terms of Measure Index Two (the average rankings of the four beat percentage 
measurements)
 
when they are outsiders. Founder and REMAIN_BOARD dummies have 
positive and statistically significant coefficients in specifications (1), (2) and (4), but are 
statistically insignificant in specifications (6) when further control for E-index in the analysis. 
There is no obvious link between corporate governance variables and performance changes. 
Greater differences between predecessors and successors in tenure, MTB, and percentage of 
CEOs served as chairmen simultaneously also lead to significantly better firm performance 
after successors take office. 
Table 4.5 reports estimates from OLS regression of the changes in Measures Index Two Z-
scores of Champion League ІІ on successor origin, predecessors influence and corporate 
governance proxies. Consistently, the coefficients of Insider dummy are negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications. With respect to predecessor influence, the binary 
variables FOUNDER and REMAIN_BOARD dummies account for predecessors' positive 
impact on successors' performance, and their coefficient estimates confirm this relation from 
the statistical perspective. Moreover, the coefficient of EINDEX dummy is significantly 
negative in the specification (3) but loses its significance in the specification (6), which 
weakly suggested that better governance is one of the main factors in improving firm 
performance. Similar to results in Table 4.4, the greater the differences between predecessors 
and successors in CEO tenure, MTB, and percentage of CEOs served as chairmen 
simultaneously the better the firm performance after successors take office. Additionally, the 
firm characteristics variables changes in ASSETS and GSALES also positively associated 
with the performance improvement/ retain after succession events. Thus, hypothesis one is 
partially supported, and hypothesis two is rejected; whereas hypotheses three and four are 
supported. The analysis in this section is based on the performance ranks’ z-scores. To further 
test the hypotheses, in the next section, I examine the performance ranks directly using 
ordinal logistic regression models.  
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Table 4.4: Regressions of changes in Measures Index Two Z-scores- Champion League І 
This table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the predecessors’ minus successors’ Measures 
Index Two z-scores around turnover on Successor Origin, Predecessor influence, Corporate Governance and 
other control variables for Champion League І sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for 
each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ 
rankings (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the 
Measures Index Two. Measures Index Two is transferred into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After 
transferring into normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to interpret the results. Champion 
League І consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index One. For Successor Origin 
variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in 
the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the 
founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the 
board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the 
board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions 
following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six 
anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock 
ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age 
in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served 
as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is 
post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure 
(appointment). For the firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln (Assets) around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual 
average growth in sales around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is 
the changes in the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over 
predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in 
regressions (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) and industry fixed effects are included in (4). N is the number of observations and 
Adj. R
2 
is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using 
heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Z-score2 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT 0.2856 0.0861 0.3522 0.0749 0.4037 0.1857 
 
0.3790 0.7990 0.2660 0.8010 0.2810 0.5600 
Successor Origin 
      
INSIDER 
  
-0.3265** -0.2883** -0.3028** -0.3166** 
   
0.0220 0.0410 0.0460 0.0350 
 
Predecessor influence       
FOUNDER 0.2799* 
  
0.3187** 
 
0.2625 
 
0.0910 
  
0.0420 
 
0.1310 
REMAIN_BOARD 
 
0.3224* 
 
0.4004** 
 
0.2894 
  
0.0870 
 
0.0410 
 
0.1440 
REMAIN_CHAIR 
   
-0.2374* 
 
-0.1933 
    
0.0780 
 
0.1680 
Corporate Governance 
      
GINDEX 
   
0.0091 
  
    
0.7070 
  
EINDEX 
     
0.0195 
      
0.6860 
BUSY 
    
0.1581 
 
     
0.2790 
 
INDEP 
    
-0.2661 
 
     
0.4960 
 
OWNER 
    
3.6258 
 
     
0.3510 
 
Control Variables 
      
CEO characteristics 
      
∆AGE 0.0046 0.0038 0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0032 
 
0.5180 0.6020 0.6810 0.9510 0.9840 0.6680 
∆TENURE 0.0363*** 0.0327*** 0.0290*** 0.0425*** 0.0394*** 0.0381*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆DUALITY 0.3074*** 0.3052*** 0.3147*** 0.2898** 
 
0.3163*** 
 
0.0080 0.0070 0.0070 0.0120 
 
0.0070 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0070 0.0097 0.0020 
  
0.0027 
 
0.5070 0.3430 0.8520 
  
0.8130 
Firm characteristics 
      
∆ASSETS 0.0747 0.1033 0.1220 
  
0.0349 
 
0.5150 0.3480 0.2660 
  
0.7630 
∆GSALES 0.1523 0.1585 0.1190 0.1793 
 
0.1142 
 
0.5500 0.5110 0.6410 0.4400 
 
0.6450 
∆MTB 0.0360 0.0328 0.0386* 0.0530*** 0.0598*** 0.0567** 
 
0.1080 0.1360 0.0780 0.0090 0.0080 0.0110 
YEAR FE Y Y Y N Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
N 321 321 319 293 282 291 
Adj R2 17.93% 18.00% 18.35% 16.13% 16.33% 21.36% 
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Table 4.5: Regression of changes in Measures Index Two Z-scores-Champion League ІІ 
This table reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the predecessors’ minus successors’ Measures 
Index Two z-scores around turnover on Successor Origin, Predecessor influence, Corporate Governance and 
other control variables for Champion League IІ sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for 
each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ 
rankings (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the 
Measures Index Two. Measures Index Two is transferred into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After 
transferring into normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to interpret the results. Champion 
League ІІ is the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measure Index Two. For Successor Origin variable, 
INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in the firm 
for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the 
firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step 
down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board as 
chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover 
provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 
50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors 
sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age in the year of hiring 
(successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. 
∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the 
ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). For the 
firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln (Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ 
and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual average growth in sales 
around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual 
average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ 
tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in all the specifications. N is the 
number of observations and Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates 
and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Champion League ІІ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆Z-score2 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT 0.3611 -0.1834 0.4224 0.5153 0.6659** 0.7906* 
 
0.1170 0.7090 0.4300 0.1380 0.0350 0.0580 
Successor Origin 
      
INSIDER 
   
-0.3331* -0.3369* -0.3284* 
    
0.0590 0.0630 0.0710 
 
Predecessor influence       
FOUNDER 0.3350** 
 
0.3877*** 0.3320* 
 
0.3861** 
 
0.0380 
 
0.0090 0.0620 
 
0.0240 
REMAIN_BOARD 
 
0.2318** 
    
  
0.0400 
    
REMAIN_CHAIR 
     
0.0774 
      
0.5270 
Corporate Governance 
      
GINDEX 
   
0.0150 
  
    
0.5240 
  
EINDEX 
  
-0.0672* 
 
0.0083 
 
   
0.0950 
 
0.8670 
 
BUSY 
   
0.2146* 0.2118 
 
    
0.0910 0.1040 
 
INDEP 
     
-0.3139 
      
0.4860 
OWNER 
     
2.1264 
      
0.5330 
Control Variables 
      
CEO characteristics 
      
∆AGE -0.0027 
  
-0.0088 -0.0083 -0.0113 
 
0.6770 
  
0.2210 0.2510 0.1120 
∆TENURE 0.0255*** 0.0201*** 0.0310*** 0.0318*** 0.0251*** 0.0332*** 
 
0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 
∆DUALITY 0.2785** 0.2461** 0.2507** 
 
0.1995* 0.2642** 
 
0.0130 0.0170 0.0300 
 
0.0980 0.0280 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0140 0.0184 0.0174 0.0153 0.0150 0.0207 
 
0.3000 0.1670 0.1600 0.2420 0.2520 0.1430 
Firm characteristics 
      
∆ASSETS 0.3498*** 0.4355*** 
 
0.4304*** 0.4590*** 0.3651*** 
 
0.0010 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 
∆GSALES 0.8133** -0.0756 -0.0699 1.0279*** 0.9017*** 1.0381*** 
 
0.0120 0.1940 0.1880 0.0040 0.0050 0.0030 
∆MTB 0.0458** 0.0775*** 0.0759*** 0.0654** 0.0617** 0.0461 
 
0.0500 0.0000 0.0010 0.0250 0.0400 0.1200 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       N 333 457 425 285 285 297 
Adj R2 14.27% 15.85% 13.43% 17.88% 17.27% 17.80% 
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4.4.2 Ordinal Logistic Regressions of the Changes in Measures Indices  
In this section, the relation between successor origin, predecessor influence, corporate 
governance and the changes in performance ranking is analysed in a multivariate framework 
using ordinal logistic regression model, to examine the ranks rather than Z-scores directly. 
Table 4.6 reports estimates from ordinal logistic regressions where the dependent variable is 
the change in predecessors' and successors' performance ranks. Successor origin is measured 
by INSIDER dummy; whereas FOUNDER and REMAIN_BOARD dummies proxy for 
predecessors influence as described previously. CEO experience characteristics and firm 
characteristics are included to control for the effects that have been demonstrated to affect 
firm performance (Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Ammann, Horsch and Oesch, 2016).  
Ordinal Logistic Regressions is used here since the dependent variable ∆Rank has more than 
two categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order.
56
 For 
ordinal categorical variables, ordinal logistic regressions overcome the drawback of the 
multinomial regression models that the ordering of the categories is ignored. The formula of 
the ordinal logistic model (a.k.a. the proportional odds model) for a single independent 
variable is ln (θj) = αj – βX, where j is from 1 to the number of categories minus 1. Each 
logit has one different term
57
 but the same coefficient, indicating that the independent 
variable has the same effect on different logit functions (Norusis, 2012). There is a minus 
sign before the coefficient so that larger coefficients indicate higher scores. In Table 4.6, the 
coefficients for INSIDER dummy are significantly negative in specifications (4) and (5), 
suggesting the lower scores (∆Rank) are more likely for insiders while predecessors are more 
likely to be successfully replaced when their successors are outsiders. However, it loses 
significance after including E-index and FOUNDER dummy. When it comes to predecessor 
influence variables, FOUNDER dummy is positively associated with ∆Rank, which indicates 
that higher scores (successful replacement) are more likely for the founder predecessors. 
Although the coefficient of the REMAIN_BOARD dummy is significantly positive in the 
specification (3), that of REMAIN_CHAIR is negatively related to ∆Rank. Thus, successors 
tend to outperform when champions remain on the board, but not as chairmen (women). 
                                                          
56
 Ordinal Logistic Regressions are applicable when the variables of interest are ordinal and can be ranked, but 
the real distance between categories is unknown. Ordinal Logistic Regression estimates a score as a linear 
function of the independent variables’ (Hamilton, 2006, p.279). 
57
 The terms, a.k.a. the threshold values, are of not much interest. Similar to the intercept in a linear regression 
but each logit has one, values of the terms do not depend on the values of the independent variable. The terms 
are usually used in the predicted values' calculations. 
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For corporate governance variables, GINDEX and EINDEX are introduced to account for the 
potential contribution of better governance in successful replacement. Estimates of GINDEX 
and EINDEX do not demonstrate a significant relation between governance and ∆Rank. The 
coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant in all regression specifications, except for 
significantly negative coefficient of EINDEX in the specification (2). The coefficient 
estimates of the BUSY dummy, which takes the value one if more than 50% independent 
directors serve on three or more boards and zero otherwise, are significantly positive across 
all specifications. In line with the findings in the previous section, the positive association 
between BUSY dummy and ∆Rank suggests that successful replacement is more likely when 
independent directors are sitting on several boards at the same time. Strikingly, as INDEP 
increases, the likelihood of larger scores decreases. This implies that better monitor from 
independent directors does not necessarily ensure performance improvement after 
successions.   
To sum up, the results from Ordinal Logistic Regressions further demonstrate that champion 
CEO’s remaining influence and the successor origin play key roles in the successful 
replacement. Test results are reinforced with hypothesis 2 rejected and hypotheses 4 
supported. Partial support is identified for corporate governance influence and predecessors 
retention; thus, hypotheses 1 and 3 are partially supported.   
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Table 4.6: Ordinal Logistic Regressions of changes in Measures Index One for 
Champion League І  
 
This table reports the coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the changes in predecessors' and 
successors' Measures Index One on Successor Origin, Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and other 
control variables for Champion League I sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each 
performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) performance metrics’ rankings (AROA, ABHAR, 
EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures Index One. Champion 
League І consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index One. For Successor Origin 
variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in 
the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the 
founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the 
board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the 
board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions 
following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six 
anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of 
independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock 
ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age 
in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served 
as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is 
post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure 
(appointment). For the firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln(Assets) around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual 
average growth in sales around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is 
the changes in the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over 
predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. N is the number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. INTERCEPT (CUT) N 
is the number of Ancillary parameters to define the changes among categories. P-values are reported below 
regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆RANK1 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT(CUT) N 286 365 392 242 242 242 
Successor Origin 
      
INSIDER 
   
-0.5647* -0.5820* -0.5178 
    
0.0880 0.0840 0.1150 
 
Predecessor influence       
FOUNDER 0.7576*** 0.5441** 0.4603* 
  
0.7864** 
 
0.0100 0.0390 0.0580 
  
0.0230 
REMAIN_BOARD 
  
0.6097** -0.0884 
  
   
0.0240 0.8250 
  
REMAIN_CHAIR 
  
-0.3598* 
   
   
0.0810 
   
Corporate Governance 
      
GINDEX 
   
-0.0018 0.0057 
 
    
0.9690 0.9070 
 
EINDEX 
 
-0.1474** 
   
0.0818 
  
0.0320 
   
0.4250 
BUSY 
   
0.6605** 0.6928** 0.5310* 
    
0.0160 0.0210 0.0680 
INDEP 
    
-1.7218** -1.2327* 
     
0.0200 0.0900 
OWNER 
    
-11.7372 
 
     
0.2740 
 
Control Variables 
      
CEO characteristics 
      
∆AGE 0.0191 
  
0.0229 0.0237 0.0235 
 
0.1400 
  
0.1560 0.1500 0.1490 
∆TENURE 0.0039 0.0215 0.0130 0.0042 0.0056 0.0102 
 
0.8010 0.0560 0.2170 0.7830 0.7260 0.5660 
∆DUALITY 0.7089*** 0.3828* 0.5485*** 
  
0.5530* 
 
0.0040 0.0540 0.0030 
  
0.0630 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0179 0.0483* 0.0419* 0.0098 0.0129 0.0036 
 
0.4140 0.0510 0.0540 0.7200 0.6350 0.8950 
Firm characteristics 
      
∆ASSETS 0.1857 0.3891** 0.4034** 
  
0.0362 
 
0.3240 0.0310 0.0190 
  
0.8740 
∆GSALES 0.9158 -0.0446 -0.0289 
 
0.1982 0.3504 
 
0.3110 0.6170 0.8170 
 
0.8500 0.7560 
∆MTB 0.2314*** 0.2294*** 0.2158*** 0.2875*** 0.2857*** 0.2969*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
N 321 420 456 265 265 265 
Pseudo R2 2.97% 2.70% 
 
2.39% 3.53% 3.72% 4.02% 
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In Table 4.7 and 4.8, similar Ordinal Logistic regression results of successor origin, 
predecessor influence and corporate governance on the changes in performance ranking are 
reported for measures index two, for Champion League І and Champion League ІІ, 
respectively.   
The consistent negative, both statistically and economically significant, coefficient estimates 
for INSIDER dummy are identified across all specifications in both tables. This further 
suggests that outsiders are more likely to replace champions successfully and the results are 
robust across champion sample and performance measures. The same finding applies to 
FOUNDER dummy. Champion founders are significantly more likely to be successfully 
replaced in all specifications. Contrary to Schwert (1985)’s finding that some founders might 
be entrenched and are reluctant to step down once their performance deteriorates, champion 
founders are less likely to be entrenched. This unique and robust finding contributes to 
existing founder literature by providing evidence of founders with superior performance 
specifically. A similar result is presented for predecessors’ retention on the board. The 
coefficient of the REMAIN_BOARD dummy is significantly positive in several 
specifications, which partially support REMAIN_BOARD dummy’s association with ∆Rank. 
Previous research by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2009) show that GINDEX and EINDEX negatively affect firm performance; 
therefore, the indices are examined. However, the coefficients are statistically insignificant in 
both tables, with the only exception of EINDEX in the specification (3) of Table 4.8. BUSY 
dummy loses its significance level across all specifications for measures index two in both 
samples. CEO and firm characteristics are controlled. Different from findings in Table 4.6, 
∆TENURE becomes significant across all specifications in both tables, demonstrating a 
significant relationship between changes in CEO tenure and ∆Rank. Furthermore, ∆GSALES 
also gain significance level in Table 4.8 suggesting that ∆GSALES affect ∆Rank of CEOs in 
Champion League ІІ for Measures Index Two. 
The robust test results in Table 4.7 and 4.8 further support hypotheses 4 and reject hypothesis 
2. Test results for hypothesis 2 suggest that champion CEOs are more likely to be 
successfully replaced when the incoming CEOs are outsiders. Little support is identified for 
corporate governance influence and predecessors retention; thus, hypotheses 1 and 3 are 
weakly supported.   
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Table 4.7: Ordinal Logistic Regressions of changes in Measures Index Two for 
Champion League І 
 
This table reports the coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the changes in predecessors' and 
successors' Measures Index Two on Successor Origin, Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and other 
control variables for Champion League І sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each 
performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ rankings 
(AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures 
Index Two. Champion League І consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index One. For 
Successor Origin variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other 
managerial position (s) in the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the predecessor is the founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
predecessor still served on the board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
predecessor still served on the board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 
24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, 
defined as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is 
the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the 
average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre 
turnover CEO age in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover 
years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. 
∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal 
years of their departure (appointment). For the firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average 
Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the 
changes in annual average growth in sales around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten 
years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all the specifications. N is the number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. 
INTERCEPT (CUT) N is the number of Ancillary parameters to define the changes among categories. P-values 
are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent 
standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆RANK2 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT(CUT) N 285 285 283 260 253 259 
Successor Origin 
     
INSIDER 
  
-0.5840** -0.5420** -0.5530** -0.5660** 
   
0.0280 0.0350 0.0440 0.0450 
 
Predecessor influence       
FOUNDER 0.5270* 
  
0.6478** 
 
0.5658* 
 
0.0900 
  
0.0190 
 
0.0910 
REMAIN_BOARD 
 
0.6010* 
 
0.6730* 
 
0.5665 
  
0.0890 
 
0.0620 
 
0.1310 
REMAIN_CHAIR 
   
-0.4787* 
 
-0.3931 
    
0.0660 
 
0.1810 
Corporate Governance 
     
GINDEX 
   
0.0021 
  
    
0.9610 
  
EINDEX 
     
-0.0049 
      
0.9550 
BUSY 
    
0.3187 
 
     
0.2320 
 
INDEP 
    
-0.3510 
 
     
0.6670 
 
OWNER 
    
3.6170 
 
     
0.6540 
 
Control Variables 
      
CEO characteristics 
      
∆AGE 0.0093 0.0083 0.0053 -0.0019 -0.0009 0.0049 
 
0.4640 0.5150 0.6830 0.8820 0.9480 0.7160 
∆TENURE 0.0698*** 0.0631*** 0.0571*** 0.0817*** 0.0799*** 0.0744*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆DUALITY 0.6252*** 0.5989*** 0.6373*** 0.5940*** 
 
0.6723*** 
 
0.0080 0.0090 0.0040 0.0100 
 
0.0060 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0130 0.0189 0.0053 
  
0.0009 
 
0.4460 0.2670 0.7730 
  
0.9660 
Firm characteristics 
      
∆ASSETS 0.2890 0.3562* 0.3719* 
  
0.1902 
 
0.1590 0.0720 0.0520 
  
0.3920 
∆GSALES 0.5868 0.5639 0.5607 0.3262 
 
0.4181 
 
0.4260 0.4040 0.4460 0.5360 
 
0.5400 
∆MTB 0.0554 0.0454 0.0581 0.0815** 0.0880** 0.0966** 
 
0.2120 0.3040 0.1740 0.0290 0.0340 0.0410 
YEAR FE Y Y Y N Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
N 321 321 319 293 282 291 
Pseudo R2 2.82% 2.83% 2.87% 2.40% 2.79% 3.42% 
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Table 4.8: Ordinal Logistic Regressions of changes in Measures Index Two for 
Champion League ІІ 
 
This table reports the coefficients from Ordinal Logistic Regression of the changes in predecessors' and 
successors' Measures Index Two on Successor Origin, Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and other 
control variables for Champion League IІ sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each 
performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ rankings 
(AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures 
Index Two. Champion League ІІ is the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measure Index Two. For 
Successor Origin variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other 
managerial position (s) in the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the predecessor is the founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
predecessor still served on the board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
predecessor still served on the board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 
24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, 
defined as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is 
the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the 
average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre 
turnover CEO age in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover 
years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. 
∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal 
years of their departure (appointment). For the firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average 
Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the 
changes in annual average growth in sales around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten 
years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all the specifications. N is the number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. 
INTERCEPT (CUT) N is the number of Ancillary parameters to define the changes among categories. P-values 
are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent 
standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Champion League ІІ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆RANK2 PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST PRE-POST 
INTERCEPT(CUT) N 289 289 362 250 250 260 
Successor Origin 
      
INSIDER 
   
-0.7581** -0.7549** -0.7648** 
    
0.0300 0.0300 0.0310 
 
Predecessor influence       
FOUNDER 0.6298* 
 
0.7835*** 
  
0.7982** 
 
0.0630 
 
0.0080 
  
0.0310 
REMAIN_BOARD 
 
0.6192** 
    
  
0.0450 
    
REMAIN_CHAIR 
     
0.3306 
      
0.2050 
Corporate Governance 
     
GINDEX 
    
-0.0016 
 
     
0.9750 
 
EINDEX 
  
-0.1452* -0.0080 
  
   
0.0570 0.9410 
  
BUSY 
   
0.4149 0.4160 0.3435 
    
0.1400 0.1370 0.2130 
INDEP 
     
-0.1244 
      
0.9040 
OWNER 
     
4.2210 
      
0.5810 
Control Variables 
      
CEO characteristics 
      
∆AGE -0.0038 -0.0051 
 
-0.0188 -0.0189 -0.0241 
 
0.7690 0.6900 
 
0.2310 0.2300 0.1060 
∆TENURE 0.0516*** 0.0429*** 0.0577*** 0.0554*** 0.0553*** 0.0705*** 
 
0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆DUALITY 0.5360** 0.5466** 0.4674** 0.2970 0.2971 0.5031* 
 
0.0190 0.0170 0.0220 0.2500 0.2500 0.0600 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0248 0.0277 0.0295* 0.0252 0.0254 0.0306* 
 
0.1640 0.1160 0.0890 0.1620 0.1640 0.0980 
Firm characteristics 
      
∆ASSETS 0.8372*** 0.8738*** 
 
1.0440*** 1.0443*** 0.9605*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆GSALES 1.8630** 1.7054** -0.1456* 1.9861*** 1.9873*** 2.4058*** 
 
0.0140 0.0220 0.0980 0.0060 0.0070 0.0070 
∆MTB 0.0821* 0.0742* 0.1276*** 0.1098* 0.1093* 0.0765 
 
0.0690 0.1000 0.0020 0.0610 0.0600 0.1740 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 333 333 425 285 285 297 
Pseudo R2 2.69% 2.69% 2.06% 3.38% 3.38% 3.47% 
 
126 
 
4.4.3 Logistic Regressions of Successful Replacements and Beat Replacements 
In this section, the relation between successor origin, predecessor influence, corporate 
governance and successful replacement is analysed in a multivariate framework using logistic 
regression models. To test under what situation does champion CEOs more likely to be 
successfully replaced, two sets of dependent variables successful replacement dummies and 
beat replacement dummies are employed to test top successors sample and successors who 
beat their predecessors’ sample, respectively.  
4.4.3.1 Logistic Regressions of Successful Replacements for Top Successors  
Table 4.9 and 4.10 report Logistic Regressions results of Measures Index One (Two) 
successful replacement for Champion League І (ІІ) sample, respectively. The dependent 
variable REPLACE takes the value of one if a successor can sustain or exceed performance 
and zero otherwise
58
. The same explanatory variables are examined in this section.  
INSIDER dummies are both economically and statistically significant across all 
specifications in both tables. The negative coefficient estimates of INSIDER indicate that 
insiders, versus outsider successors, decrease the log odds of successful REPLACE dummy 
(versus non-REPLACE) by 70% to 95% across different specifications. This, in turn, 
suggests that outsiders contribute to the higher probability of successful replacements. Given 
that pseudo R-square cannot be compared across datasets or interpreted independently, they 
are useful in evaluating multiple models predicting the same outcome on the same sample. 
The model with higher pseudo R
2
 is better in predicting successful replacement. Apparently, 
models with INSIDER dummy tend to have relatively higher pseudo R
2
, and thus further 
support successor origin in explaining successful replacement. The coefficient estimates of 
FOUNDER dummy are statistically significant for Measures Index One in Table 4.9, but lose 
significance level when using the average rankings of the four beat percentage performance 
measures for Champion League ІІ sample in Table 4.10, which is consistent with difference 
test results for founder status. 
For predecessors remaining influence variables, only REMAIN_CHAIR is negatively 
significant for Champion League І sample in Table 4.9; whereas REMAIN_BOARD is 
positively significant for Champion League ІІ sample in Table 4.10. The positive coefficient 
                                                          
58
 Logistic regression assumes that P (Y=1) is the probability of the event occurring; thus REPLACE is coded to 
take the value of one if successors are also ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking 
methodology as their champion predecessors, suggesting that successors have successfully replaced their 
predecessors by inhering the championship among their peers. 
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estimates suggest that predecessors' retention on the board after stepping down as CEO 
increase the log odds of successful replacement by 0.8412 and 0.7383, respectively. For 
corporate governance variables, no significant relations between governance and successors' 
performance improvement are identified across the different performance measures and CEO 
Champion sample, with the only exception of EINDEX in the specification (1) of Table 4.9 
and specification (3) of Table 4.10. For every one unit change in EINDEX, the log odds of 
REPLACE (versus non-REPLACE) decreases by 19.37% and 23.18%, respectively.  
Consistent with the findings of ordinal logistic regression, ∆TENURE is not significant for 
Measures Index One but becomes significant across all specifications in both tables for 
measure index two. For every one unit change in ∆TENURE, the log odds of REPLACE 
increase by around 4%, which indicates a significant relation between changes in CEO tenure 
and the probability of successors' performance improvement after turnover. The coefficient 
estimates of ∆MTB are both statistically and economically significant across most 
specifications in different champion CEO sample and performance measures. This finding 
reinforces the result in chapter three that firms' growth opportunities during successors’ 
tenure are highly associated with successful replacement after turnovers. Similarly, 
∆GSALES is only significant in the specification (1) for CEOs in Champion League ІІ 
sample.  
In sum, the logistic regression on successful replacements for top successors further support 
that champions are more likely to be successfully replaced when new incoming CEOs are 
outsiders; Thus, hypothesis 2 is rejected. Partial support is found for champion founders’ 
status and predecessors’ retention; thus hypothesis 3 and 4 are partially supported. Little 
support is identified for corporate governance influence; thus, hypotheses 1 is weakly 
supported.   
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Table 4.9: Logistic Regressions of the Measures Index One Successful Replacements-
Champion League І 
 
This table reports coefficients from the Logistic Regressions of the successful replacements on Successor 
Origin, Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and the control variables for Champion League I sample. 
Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is 
missing) performance metrics’ rankings (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) are averaged and re-
ranked to obtain the Measures Index One. Champion League І consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs 
from Measures Index One. REPLACE equals 1 if a successor can sustain or exceed predecessor’s performance, 
0 otherwise. In specific, REPLACE is coded to take the value of one if successors are also ranked among the top 
458 CEOs following the same ranking methodology as their champion predecessors, suggesting that successors 
have successfully replaced their predecessors by inheriting the championship among their peers. For Successor 
Origin variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial 
position (s) in the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
predecessor is the founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor 
still served on the board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor 
still served on the board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-
takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined 
as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the 
percentage of independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the 
average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre 
turnover CEO age in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover 
years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. 
∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal 
years of their departure (appointment). For the firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average 
Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the 
changes in annual average growth in sales around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten 
years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all the specifications. N is the number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-
values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-
consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 
INTERCEPT -0.4734 0.2770 -0.7924 0.0563 -0.1480 0.8066 
  0.8070 0.7800 0.5690 0.9580 0.8880 0.5540 
Successor Origin             
INSIDER       -0.9563** -0.9412** -0.8701** 
        0.0160 0.0180 0.0360 
Predecessor influence             
FOUNDER 0.7225** 0.8113** 0.9816*** 1.0423***   1.3416*** 
  0.0220 0.0240 0.0070 0.0100   0.0040 
REMAIN_BOARD     0.7079       
      0.1360       
REMAIN_CHAIR     -0.7519**       
      0.0430       
Corporate Governance             
GINDEX     0.0252       
      0.7020       
EINDEX -0.1937**     0.0437 0.0811 0.1143 
  0.0400     0.7240 0.5500 0.4530 
BUSY         0.5423 0.5438 
          0.1840 0.2250 
INDEP           -1.2320 
            0.2640 
OWNER           -20.5257 
            0.1330 
Control Variables             
CEO characteristics             
∆AGE      0.0160 0.0196 0.0098 0.0205 0.0212 
    0.2890 0.2000 0.5670 0.2060 0.2630 
∆TENURE 0.0210 0.0066   0.0262   0.0210 
  0.1830 0.7270   0.1930   0.4120 
∆DUALITY -0.0032 0.3547       0.0151 
  0.9890 0.2230       0.9690 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0351 0.0150       0.0101 
  0.2140 0.6470       0.8100 
 
Firm characteristics             
∆ASSETS 0.6615*** 0.3616   0.2666 0.4543 0.3148 
  0.0020 0.1630   0.3410 0.1060 0.3220 
∆GSALES 0.1227 0.5987       0.2367 
  0.2870 0.3470       0.7260 
∆MTB 0.2289*** 0.2923*** 0.3491*** 0.3540*** 0.3220*** 0.3402*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
            
N 418 319 292 290 263 262 
Pseudo R2 17.49% 17.76% 21.32% 21.83% 21.92% 25.64% 
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Table 4.10: Logistic Regressions of the Measures Index Two Successful Replacements- 
Champion League ІІ  
 
This table reports coefficients from the Logistic Regressions of the successful replacements on Successor 
Origin, Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and the control variables for Champion League II 
sample. Each CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each beat percentage performance metric, and the 
four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ rankings (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS 
Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures Index Two. Champion League 
ІI consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index Two. REPLACE equals 1 if a 
successor can sustain or exceed predecessor’s performance, 0 otherwise. In specific, REPLACE is coded to take 
the value of one if successors are also ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking 
methodology as their champion predecessors, suggesting that successors have successfully replaced their 
predecessors by inhering the championship among their peers. For Successor Origin variable, INSIDER (%) is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in the firm for no less than 
one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. 
REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step 
down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board as 
chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover 
provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 
50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors 
sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age in the year of hiring 
(successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. 
∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the 
ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). For the 
firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ 
and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual average growth in sales 
around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual 
average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ 
tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in all the specifications. N is the 
number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates 
and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Champion League ІІ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 REPLACE=1 
INTERCEPT -0.2193 -0.7740 0.6802 -1.1306 -0.2011 0.4920 
  0.7980 0.3750 0.5970 0.2660 0.8530 0.7260 
Successor Origin 
      INSIDER -0.7293* -0.7968* 
  
-0.6928* -0.7203* 
  0.0640 0.0550 
  
0.0920 0.0740 
Predecessor influence 
      FOUNDER 
   
0.5708 
  
  
   
0.2310 
  REMAIN_BOARD 
 
0.8412** 
 
0.7383* 
    
 
0.0410 
 
0.0810 
  REMAIN_CHAIR 
  
0.1587 
     
  
0.5130 
   
Corporate Governance 
      GINDEX 
  
0.0518 
     
  
0.4290 
   EINDEX 
  
-0.2318* -0.0331 -0.0779 -0.0291 
  
  
0.0750 0.8030 0.5440 0.8260 
BUSY 0.2202 0.2329 
  
0.3324 0.3103 
  0.4970 0.4790 
  
0.3210 0.3580 
INDEP 
     
-0.8103 
  
     
0.4500 
OWNER 
   
4.3152 
    
   
0.7600 
  
Control Variables 
      
 
CEO characteristics 
      ∆AGE    -0.0142 -0.0179 
 
-0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0048 
  0.3750 0.2740 
 
0.7320 0.7450 0.7620 
∆TENURE 0.0343* 0.0389** 0.0430*** 0.0477** 0.0348* 0.0352** 
  0.0560 0.0370 0.0030 0.0180 0.0530 0.0470 
∆DUALITY 0.7154** 0.8996*** 
 
0.9227*** 0.7630** 0.7900** 
  0.0270 0.0070 
 
0.0080 0.0300 0.0310 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0457 
  
0.0681 
 
0.0446 
  0.1860 
  
0.1080 
 
0.2060 
 
Firm characteristics 
      ∆ASSETS 1.5963*** 1.4623*** 1.5006*** 1.3874*** 1.5601*** 1.6275*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆GSALES 1.6157* 
    
1.4607 
  0.0920 
    
0.1260 
∆MTB 0.0955 0.1491* 0.1408** 0.1744** 0.2062** 0.1603** 
  0.2130 0.0560 0.0170 0.0380 0.0120 0.0470 
 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
N 288 289 416 280 278 277 
Pseudo R2 18.53% 18.33% 18.08% 20.64% 19.51% 20.61% 
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4.4.3.2 Logistic Regressions of Replacements for Successors Beaten Predecessors 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 report logistic regression results of beat replacement dummies for 
successors who exceed their predecessors' ranks for Champion League І and ІІ sample, 
respectively. The dependent variable BEAT takes the value of one if a successor can exceed 
predecessor’s rank and zero otherwise59. The same explanatory variables are examined in this 
section.  
Table 4.11 reports logistic regression results of Measures Index One beat replacements for 
Champion League І; whereas Table 4.12 reports results of Measures Index Two beat 
replacements for Champion League ІІ sample. INSIDER dummies are statistically significant 
across all specifications in the two tables. Consistent with the findings in previous successful 
replacement analysis, the coefficient estimates of INSIDER are both economically and 
significantly negative in Table 4.11 and 4.12, which further supports that outsiders contribute 
to the higher probability of beat replacements. Also, models with INSIDER dummy tend to 
have relatively higher pseudo R
2
, and thus further support that successors' outsider origin has 
explanatory power in beat replacements. The coefficient estimates of FOUNDER dummy are 
statistically significant for Measures Index One in Table 4.11, but lose significance level 
when using the average rankings of the four beat percentage performance measures for 
Champion League ІІ sample in Table 4.12. In contrast, I do not find any significant results for 
the two predecessor influence variables REMAIN_BOARD and REMAIN_CHAIR for 
Measures Index One in Table 4.11. However, significant results of REMAIN_BOARD 
dummies are identified in specifications (2) and (3) of Table 4.12. The positive coefficient 
estimates suggest that predecessors' retention on the board after stepping down as CEO 
increase the log odds of beat replacement by 0.6905 and 0.6214, respectively in Table 4.12. 
The only significant corporate governance variable is EINDEX in Table 4.11. For every one 
unit change in EINDEX, the log odds of BEAT decreases by 32.45%.  
To sum up, I find robust results for successor origins but inconsistent results for predecessors' 
influence when using different CEO performance measures in logistic regressions on 
successful and beat replacements. The only partial evidence is identified for corporate 
governance variable E-Index in explaining successors’ performance improvement.  
                                                          
59
 Logistic regression assumes that P (Y=1) is the probability of the event occurring; thus BEAT is coded to take 
the value of one if the successor who ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking methodology 
as champions beat predecessor' rank, suggesting that the successor has successfully replaced the champion 
predecessor by achieving higher rank among the peers. 
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Table 4.11: Logistic Regressions of the Measures Index One Beat Replacements-
Champion League І 
 
This table reports coefficients from the Logistic Regressions of the beat replacements on Successor Origin, 
Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and the control variables for Champion League I sample. Each 
CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each performance metric, and the four (three if anyone is 
missing) performance metrics’ rankings (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) are averaged and re-
ranked to obtain the Measures Index One. Champion League І consists of the top tercile (458) performed CEOs 
from Measures Index One. The dependent variable BEAT takes the value of one if a successor can exceed 
predecessor’s performance and zero otherwise. In specific, BEAT is coded to take the value of one if the 
successor who ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking methodology as champions beat 
predecessor' rank, suggesting that the successor has successfully replaced the champion predecessor by 
achieving a higher rank among the peers. For Successor Origin variable, INSIDER (%) is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in the firm for no less than one years. FOUNDER 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. REMAIN_BOARD is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board as chairman after step down. GINDEX is 
the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover provisions following Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 50% independent directors 
serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board relative to 
the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board. For the 
CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving 
(predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. ∆DUALITY is post-
pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the ratio of total 
compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). For the firm 
characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ and 
successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual average growth in sales around 
turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual average 
market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure 
(maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in all the specifications. N is the number of 
observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Champion League І (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 
INTERCEPT -0.2867 0.2268 0.5069 0.5398 0.5458 1.8351 
  0.8460 0.7800 0.6150 0.6010 0.5170 0.1870 
Successor Origin             
INSIDER     -0.6849*   -0.6847*   
   0.0930   0.0920  
 
Predecessor influence 
         
FOUNDER   0.7179*   0.9314* 0.9125* 0.6400 
    0.0930   0.0510 0.0550 0.2330 
REMAIN_BOARD       0.0519     
        0.9130     
REMAIN_CHAIR           -0.2742 
            0.4730 
Corporate Governance             
GINDEX       -0.0430   -0.0204 
        0.4890   0.7600 
EINDEX -0.3245***       -0.1010   
 
0.0010       0.4450   
BUSY     0.1981       
      0.6450       
INDEP           -2.0080 
            0.1020 
OWNER     8.5222       
      0.3630       
Control Variables             
CEO characteristics             
∆AGE      0.0182 0.0116 0.0242 0.0248 0.0275 
    0.3010 0.5660 0.2660 0.2510 0.2320 
∆TENURE 0.0237 0.0181 0.0227 0.0368 0.0325 0.0447 
  0.2530 0.4470 0.4280 0.1750 0.2540 0.1750 
∆DUALITY 0.4214* 1.0867*** 1.0171*** 1.0930*** 1.1237*** 1.0318** 
  0.0920 0.0020 0.0090 0.0080 0.0090 0.0130 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0550* 0.0675 0.0125 0.0538 0.0387 -0.0078 
  0.0560 0.1560 0.7660 0.2520 0.4230 0.8310 
Firm characteristics             
∆ASSETS 0.3393 -0.0193 -0.2605 -0.1261 -0.1022 -0.4250 
  0.1830 0.9500 0.4900 0.7350 0.7830 0.3150 
∆GSALES 0.2191 0.4753 0.2255 0.5837 0.5089 0.2677 
  0.1810 0.6350 0.8040 0.5640 0.6320 0.7570 
∆MTB 0.1866*** 0.2808*** 0.2465*** 0.3218*** 0.3363*** 0.3424*** 
  0.0010 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
              
N 415 317 277 289 287 254 
Pseudo R2 18.00% 20.43% 22.70% 24.90% 25.57% 25.72% 
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Table 4.12: Logistic Regressions of the Measures Index Two Beat Replacements-
Champion League ІІ 
 
This table reports coefficients from the Logistic Regressions of the beat replacements on Successor Origin, 
Predecessors Influence, Corporate Governance and the control variables for Champion League II sample. Each 
CEO is ranked from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst) for each beat percentage performance metric, and the four (three if 
anyone is missing) beat percentage performance metrics’ rankings (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and 
M&A CARs2) are averaged and re-ranked to obtain the Measures Index Two. Champion League ІI consists of 
the top tercile (458) performed CEOs from Measures Index Two. The dependent variable BEAT takes the value 
of one if a successor can exceed predecessor’s performance and zero otherwise. In specific, BEAT is coded to 
take the value of one if the successor who ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking 
methodology as champions beat predecessor' rank, suggesting that the successor has successfully replaced the 
champion predecessor by achieving a higher rank among the peers. For Successor Origin variable, INSIDER 
(%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other managerial position (s) in the firm for no less 
than one years. FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is the founder of the firm. 
REMAIN_BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board after step 
down. REMAIN_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on the board as 
chairman after step down. GINDEX is the GIM index, equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). EINDEX is the entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover 
provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if more than 
50% independent directors serve on three or more boards. INDEP is the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board relative to the firm’s total directors. OWNER is the average stock ownership of all directors 
sitting on the board. For the CEO characteristics, ∆AGE is post-pre turnover CEO age in the year of hiring 
(successors) or leaving (predecessor). ∆TENURE is post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. 
∆DUALITY is post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman. ∆COMPENSATION is post-pre turnover the 
ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment). For the 
firm characteristics, ∆ASSETS is the changes in annual average Ln(Assets) around turnover over predecessors’ 
and successors’ tenure (maximum ten years). ∆GSALES is the changes in annual average growth in sales 
around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years). ∆MTB is the changes in the annual 
average market value of equity over book value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ 
tenure (maximum ten years). Industry and year fixed effects are included in all the specifications. N is the 
number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates 
and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Champion League ІІ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 BEAT=1 
INTERCEPT -0.4404 0.5973 0.7010 -0.2323 -0.2397 0.9385 
  0.6440 0.6310 0.5780 0.8510 0.8600 0.5790 
Successor Origin             
INSIDER -0.8666**     -1.0694** -1.1314** -1.1021** 
 0.0480     0.0320 0.0290 0.0360 
 
Predecessor Influence  
      
FOUNDER         0.3160   
          0.6210   
REMAIN_BOARD   0.6905* 0.6214*       
    0.0530 0.0960       
REMAIN_CHAIR         0.3088   
          0.4270   
Corporate Governance           
GINDEX     -0.0177       
      0.7410       
EINDEX       -0.04534 0.010259   
 
      0.7530 0.9480   
BUSY         -0.0139 -0.0674 
          0.9720 0.8640 
INDEP           -1.0361 
            0.4790 
OWNER           21.7995* 
            0.0590 
Control Variables             
CEO characteristics             
∆AGE    -0.0329*     -0.0283 -0.0349 -0.0509** 
  0.0900     0.1410 0.1020 0.0190 
∆TENURE 0.0761*** 0.0694*** 0.0823*** 0.0900** 0.0952** 0.0974*** 
  0.0090 0.0090 0.0100 0.0120 0.0170 0.0050 
∆DUALITY 0.2555 0.4060 0.5142* 0.2431 0.1696 0.1452 
  0.4590 0.1580 0.0940 0.5160 0.6820 0.7200 
∆COMPENSATION 0.0956 0.1094* 0.1458** 0.1378* 0.1591* 0.1428* 
  0.2090 0.0540 0.0170 0.0890 0.0850 0.0990 
Firm characteristics             
∆ASSETS 0.7511*** 0.9410*** 1.0803*** 1.0258*** 1.0624*** 0.8555*** 
  0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0020 0.0080 
∆GSALES 1.9682* 0.0507 0.0486 2.6925** 3.9820*** 3.9848*** 
  0.0660 0.6410 0.6610 0.0360 0.0090 0.0050 
∆MTB 0.1324 0.1549** 0.1977*** 0.1851** 0.1628* 0.1673* 
  0.1020 0.0160 0.0050 0.0400 0.0880 0.0660 
YEAR FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IND FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
              
N 315 440 410 291 273 283 
Pseudo R2 20.58% 19.00% 21.44% 23.31% 24.23% 24.97% 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Inspired by the findings in Chapter Three that successors are as successful after controlling 
for firm growth, this chapter explores under what circumstances these successors tend to 
perform as well or outperform their champion predecessors. I examine corporate governance, 
successor origin, predecessor influence and control the changes in CEO characteristics to 
account for the level of discretion afforded a CEO (specifically CEO duality, age, tenure, and 
compensation) and the changes in firm characteristics (ASSETS, GSALES and MTB). 
Previous studies mainly examine forced CEO succession events, which might present 
incomplete results. Aiming at filling in the research gap and provide a whole picture of CEO 
turnover events, I investigates champion predecessors' voluntary leave this chapter. Although 
considerable evidence has shown that internal CEOs outperform outsiders, this chapter 
provides new evidence that outsiders are more likely to replace their champion predecessors 
successfully. My findings suggest that outsiders tend to outperform insiders when the firm 
performance is above average, which reinforces and extends organisational adaptation view 
and Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017)'s finding that outside CEO succession outweigh the 
costs when the new CEOs is hired by a well-performing firm operating in a munificent 
industry. The new evidence contributes to existing literature on CEO turnover and CEO 
succession.  
When it comes to corporate governance, the variables partially relevant to successors' 
performance improvement are BUSY dummy and EINDEX. In line with the reputational 
capital view of directorships, the busy board is found to have better capability to replace 
champion CEOs successfully. This probably results from that they tend to have more 
valuable experience and information while sitting on different boards simultaneously. Firms 
under management by champion CEOs may require less monitoring, but broader visions and 
strategic guidance. I also find evidence partially support that champion predecessors are more 
likely to be reappointed to the board and their successors tend to sustain success. Champion 
founders' successors are demonstrated to have better performance improvement, which 
suggests that champion founders are less likely to be entrenched.  
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"The CEO’s abilities to live the brand and capitalise on internal talents are 
among the biggest factors in determining future success".  
                                                                         Angela Ahrendts, Former CEO of Burberry  
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5. CEO Champions League: A new method to rank CEOs based on their 
long-term performance 
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5.1 Introduction 
Performance measures provide corporate boards with valuable indicators and benchmark, 
which can prompt board of directors to restore poor performance proactively by hiring new 
CEOs as well as reward CEO Champions; thus, selecting the appropriate measures is 
essential for performance evaluation. CEOs usually have the incentive to focus on short-term 
financial results at the expense of shareholders’ long-term interest given shareholders, 
analysts and boards of directors often judge them harshly if failed to meet the short-term 
goals. The short-term scope has been criticised widely and regarded as the prime culprit of 
the latest economic crisis. Increasingly, investors and directors are more interested in how 
CEOs handle the ups and downs of managing companies over the long term. Developing a 
rigorous approach to gauge CEOs' long-term performance is indispensable. Accordingly, 
Harvard Business Review introduced a scorecard to evaluate chief executives' leadership over 
their entire tenure in office. They ranked CEOs based on corporate performance during 
CEOs' tenure, which meant to be a measure of enduring success, and aims to identify the top 
100 best-performing CEOs in the world. Over each CEO’s tenure, they evaluated three long-
term financial performance metrics, i.e., the country-adjusted total shareholder return, the 
industry-adjusted total shareholder return and change in market capitalization. These CEOs 
are then ranked from best to worst for each financial metric. The three rankings are finally 
averaged to obtain the CEO's overall ranking. One downside of their methodology is that 
their rankings only take into account purely financial returns, which may accidentally include 
CEOs who have disappointed shareholders on other dimensions. Since 2015, HBR further 
includes another dimension, the ratings of companies’ environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) performance. One persistent criticism of ESG data is that it can be subjective and the 
same firm can be ranked significantly different by using ESG criteria.  
To improve their methodology, in this chapter, the novel CEO ranking (including voluntary, 
forced turnovers and no turnover cases) are constructed and compared with HBR rankings. 
Different from the two CEO Champion Leagues In Chapter Four, the Top 100 CEO lists in 
this chapter also includes present CEOs who have not left their firms during the sample 
period. Eight performance metrics are used. Two sets of Weighted INDEX Ranks I and II and 
two sets of Un-weighted INDEX Ranks I and II are created based on each of the four 
measures, with respects to firms' operating, stock, investment performance and Earnings per 
Share (EPS) surprise, to capture diverse dimensions of firms' performance. The performance 
is given more weights towards recent years over the past five years’ period for Weighted 
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INDEX Rank I and II. By introducing the long-term performance measures, this chapter aims 
at altering the traditional approach that investors, analysts, and directors assessing CEOs and 
provide a new judgemental standard for CEOs who have created long-term value for their 
shareholders.  
After taking a longer perspective into account, the new CEO lists do bring to light certain 
hidden gems. Most of the top CEOs who delivered outstanding results year in and year out 
are not superstars and away from the glare of the cover stories. These quiet CEOs' success 
makes a persuasive argument for a new approach to evaluate CEOs. Only by analysing 
performance from different dimensions, and over the long term can I begin to discover the 
nature of their great leadership. Admittedly, the lists do include some big names. Ranked as 
No.1 on 2010 Harvard Business Review's Top 100 CEO, Steven P. Jobs of Apple Inc. ranked 
26
th
 on the  Weighted INDEX RANK І.  
Apart from generating continuously growing shareholder returns, to be ranked as CEO 
Champions, they also have an essential task, which is to cultivate internal talent and pave the 
way for their successors. As Burberry's former CEO Angela Ahrendts mentioned, "the CEO’s 
abilities to live the brand and capitalise on internal talents are amongst the biggest factors in 
determining future success". Success seems hard to sustain in firms across CEOs
60
; thus, 
post-turnover performance is further included in Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ, i.e. the three 
years' post-tenure performance of these CEOs. Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ comprises CEOs 
whose companies performed well not only during their tenure but also after they step down. 
To construct such a ranking, I calculate the weighted performance of these CEOs by taking 
into account 70% of five years’ performance before the turnover and 30% of three years’ 
performance afterward. Achieved consistent superior performance prior to and post-turnover, 
William H. Gates III of Microsoft Corporation ranked 38
th
 and 11
th
 in Weighted INDEX 
RANK І and ІІ, respectively. Timothy Koogle of Yahoo Inc. was ranked 81 places in HBR's 
best 100 CEOs with high total shareholder returns. However, Timothy was not qualified for 
my top 100 CEOs in Weighted INDEX Rank І list due to his poor investment performance 
over tenure (-25% M&A sum CARs). In line with the Bloomberg news
61
, Timothy Koogle 
was forced out of Yahoo Inc. due to poor performance, suggesting that HBR's rank with only 
stock performance dimension provides limit insight for CEO's contribution to the firms. In 
                                                          
60
 Most measures of CEO performance do not look at whether a CEO leaves behind a strong or a weak 
company. In Harvard Business Review 2010 Top 100 CEOs study, they included performance measures go 
beyond CEOs’ time in office and generated the new list “Whose Companies Performed Well after They Left?” 
61
 Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2001-05-20/inside-yahoo 
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contrast, the two ranking measures constructed in this chapter capture more dimensions and 
CEOs finally listed generate value for shareholders from every respective.  
Apart from constructing CEO ranks, this chapter also tests CEO ranks in forecasting forced 
turnover events. Studies examining the relations between firm performance and CEO 
turnover have documented that internal and external control mechanisms assist in the 
replacement of poorly-performed CEOs
62
. The rate of top management dismissals is inversely 
related to prior stock price performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts, 
and Wruck, 1988) and prior operating performance (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson, 
Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004), suggesting that stock and operating performance play a vital 
role in forced turnover prediction. Also, CEOs are the key decision-makers in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, and they should be liable for their wrong choices in value-destroying 
investments (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). These CEOs could also be penalised and 
disciplined 63 , and thus are more likely to be replaced for reducing the value of their 
shareholders (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). Lehn and Zhao (2006) document that stock 
market performance deteriorates, following poor acquisition decisions, which in turn leads to 
CEOs being dismissed. This implies that investment performance, especially Mergers and 
Acquisitions CARs are also related to forced turnover events, and thus play a part in forced 
turnover prediction. Regarding analyst forecast expectations, a proprietary survey cited by 
Larcker and Tayan (2015) suggest that more than 90 percent executives and board members 
would terminate a CEO after failing to meet analyst forecasted quarterly earnings for eight 
quarters. Their survey results suggest that Analyst Forecast, in terms of EPS Surprise, is also 
associated with forced turnover events predictions. Given that every single measure's 
deterioration is documented to associate with forced turnover, their combined rankings are 
expected to explain forced turnover. Accordingly, the prediction powers of CEO rankings in 
forecasting forced turnover events are examined and compared with the above single 
performance measures, which are demonstrated in prior study to negatively associate with the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover (Warner et al., 1988; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; 
Huson et al., 2004; Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Jenter and Lewellen, 2014; Larcker and Tayan, 
2015). In this chapter, I include all long tenure CEOs from S&P 1500, not necessarily has 
                                                          
62
 Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Mitchell and Lehn (1990), Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach (1994), Kim 
(1996), and Fee and Hadlock (2003).   
63
 Mitchell and Lehn (1990) examine the relation between firm acquisition performance and the probability of 
being acquired. They hypothesize that acquirers announcing bad acquisition decisions should be penalized by 
the market for corporate control. They find that acquirers with bad acquisition performance are more likely to 
receive a takeover bid than firms that perform better. 
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CEO turnovers. The contribution of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I designed a 
comprehensive methodology for ranking CEOs, aim at improving Harvard Business Review 
ranking method. In specific, I ranked all S&P 1500 CEOs based on a SINGLE ranking, 
Weighted INDEX RANK I, that takes into account all dimensions, the average ranks of 
weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprises and M&A CARs (at least 3 out of 4). I also 
consider post turnover weighted performance in Weighted INDEX RANK II. Two sets of 
Top 100 CEO lists are generated at the end and compared with HBR 2010 rankings. I further 
examine the predictive power of CEO rankings in forecasting the probability of being 
retained versus fired. The forced turnover prediction models64
 
are built, and prediction power 
for ranking scores versus performance measures are compared. Also, the multinomial logistic 
models65 are built to test and compare prediction power for rank scores versus performance 
measures for differing turnover events.  
From the Univariate Test results, forced out CEOs do have significantly worse rankings, in 
terms of Weighted INDEX Rank I and Rank II and Un-weighted INDEX Rank I and Rank II, 
than voluntarily left CEOs and CEOs still serving at firms. This finding suggests that the 
combined CEO rankings with more dimensions in this study are more effective in forced 
turnover predictions. Better-ranked CEOs are less likely to be forced out. Also, CEO 
Rankings capture more dimensions and tend to be more consistent in measuring performance. 
Consistent with the findings from univariate analysis, Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores is 
negatively and, both statistically and economically, significantly associated with the forced 
turnover dummy. The specifications with INDEX Rank І Z-scores have higher Pseudo R2 
and ROC curve Area than other single performance measures, i.e., Weighted AROA, 
ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices and M&A CARs, suggesting that the combined CEO 
rankings have better prediction power in explaining forced turnover than any single 
performance measures in the multivariate analysis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, hypotheses are built. 
Sample and Data are then presented in Section 3, followed by difference tests results of the 
univariate analysis in Section 4. Section 5 carries out the multivariate analysis predicting 
forced turnover. CEO Rankings are further compared in the Multinomial Logistic Regression 
                                                          
64
 In the forced turnover prediction models, Y=0 if voluntary turnover or no turnover, and Y=1 if forced 
turnover 
65
 In the multinomial logistic models, Y=0 if voluntary turnover, Y=1 if forced turnover and Y=2 if no turnover 
until the end of 2009. 
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framework, and test results are presented. In Section 6, CEOs ranked as top 100 for INDEX 
Rank І, and ІІ are presented. Section 7 concludes. 
5.2 Research Design and Hypotheses Development 
Previous literature has documented the great sensitivity between firm performance and forced 
turnover. Worse stock, operating, analyst forecast surprise or investment performance 
increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover (Warner et al., 1988; Huson et al., 2004; 
Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Jenter and Lewellen, 2014; Larcker and Tayan, 2011). The ranks 
constructed by these performance measures should have negative and significant relations 
with forced turnover; whereas the difference between voluntary turnover and no turnover 
events should not be distinct. Based on the conjecture, this chapter is mainly guided by the 
following research questions: 
Are CEOs with higher rankings less likely to be forced out? If yes, do the combined rankings 
have better prediction power than other forced turnover models with single performance 
measure? To test the research questions, I develop two corresponding hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher ranked CEOs are less likely to be forced out  
Support: CEO performance rankings is negatively and significantly associated with forced 
turnover dummy  
Reject:  CEO performance rankings is not negatively and significantly associated with forced 
turnover dummy  
Hypothesis 2: Combined ranking measure has better prediction power than other 
forced turnover models with single performance measure 
Support: CEO performance rankings have higher explanation power than stock, operating, 
analyst forecast surprise and investment performance along (in terms of higher Pseudo R-
Squire or Area under ROC curve) 
Reject: CEO performance rankings do not have higher explanation power than single 
performance measure-stock, operating, analyst forecast surprise and investment performance  
To test the two hypotheses, I used Logit model for model prediction power comparisons and 
Multinomial Logistic Regressions for forced turnover forecast.  
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5.3 Sample, Data and Methods 
5.3.1 Data and Sample 
To test the hypotheses, forced, voluntary and non-turnover cases amongst S&P 1500 firms66
 
are examined. Turnover events are classified as forced or voluntary based on the news from 
LexisNexis around turnover announcement date. Similar to Parrino (1997), I categorise the 
turnover as forced when a CEO is fired, forced out of the position, or leave due to policy 
differences or conflict; whereas retirement, resignation, normal succession, accept other 
position or pursue other interests, deceased or poor health are categorised as voluntary 
turnover. Turnover events, CEO characteristics and executive compensation are derived from 
ExecuComp. Turnover reasons, step down announcement for predecessors, hire 
announcement for successors are manually collected from LexisNexis, Businessweek website 
and firm proxy statement. Performance measurements are calculated for predecessors 
(successors) 5 years prior (3 years post) turnover for forced and voluntary turnover events. 
Present CEOs' performance over the past five years is calculated for non-turnover cases. 
Specifically, annual industry and firm financial data are from Compustat, and monthly stock 
market data are gathered from CRSP. Quarterly actual EPS and the corresponding consensus 
median analysts’ forecasted EPS immediately preceding the quarterly earnings announcement 
date are collected from IBES unadjusted detail history database.  
Merger and acquisition announcements and deal characteristics are collected from Thomson 
Financial SDC and deals are announced between 1980 and 2012. Acquirers are U.S. public 
firms and targets are either U.S. or non-U.S. public, private or subsidiary firms. Spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, self-tenders, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, exchange offers and privatisations are excluded from the M&As sample. 
Deal transaction value is limited to no less than 1 million dollars and only completed deals 
are included. Moreover, Acquirer's ownership of the target is required to be less than 10% 
before acquisition announcement and more than 50% following the deal completion. Target-
to-acquirer relative size should be no less than 1%, and the targets and the bidders are 
different companies. The M&As deals sample from SDC is matched with CEO sample using 
6-digit CUSIP to get CEO initiated deals over past five years and CARs.   
                                                          
66
 S&P 1500 firms, including all S&P 500, S&P MidCap and S&P SmallCap firms, between 1992 and 2009 
were included and these firms’ performance were examined elaborately from 1982 to 2012. S&P 1500 firms are 
selected since these firms have public history so that I can access to the data required and they cover 90% of 
U.S. firms’ market capitalization. 
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The sample is first derived from ExecuComp between 1992 and 2013 with CEO flag on and 
fiscal year is limited to 2009 to leave enough time to calculate the post-turnover performance. 
HBR's 2010 Top CEO List contains large public companies'
67
 best-performing CEOs over 
their entire time in the office or still in the job up until September 30, 2009. To be 
comparable, I construct 2010 Top CEO List including S&P 1500 firms' top CEOs involves or 
not involve with turnovers until December 31, 2009. Different from HBR methodology, I 
include only firms in the U.S. and CEOs with no less than five years tenure rather than 1.5 
years to leave enough time for CEOs to implement business strategies and for the board of 
directors to evaluate CEO’s ability to mitigate CEO luck. CEOs’ tenure is calculated as date 
left firm minus date become CEOs from ExecuComp and estimated from the date became 
CEO to 2009.12.31 for present CEOs who have not left office yet as of the end of 2009. A 
total number of S&P 1500 CEOs by the end of 2009 from ExecuComp is 6476, while the 
CEOs with no less than five years tenure is 3155. The final turnover sample consists of 139 
forced turnover, 1433 voluntary and 1583 no turnover cases from 1992 to 2009. Both forced 
and voluntary turnovers are retained when generating CEO lists since CEOs can be forced out 
for reasons unrelated to their performance, that is, a fired CEO can, in fact, be a successful 
CEO. Also, excluding forced turnovers would introduce a bias towards more successful 
CEOs and distort the CEO performance distribution, based on which CEOs are ranked before 
the turnover. To test the variation of the top CEO lists across years, I construct the 2007 and 
2008 CEO lists using the same methodology. The CEO sample is then matched with 
Compustat, CRSP, IBES and SDC databases, and annual median industry-adjusted ROA, 
BHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs over the past five years are calculated accordingly. 
For CEO ranks' construction, firm performance five years before their departure and three 
years after was calculated accordingly. To ensure data continuity, I impose the restrictions 
that at least five continuous years’ AROA before turnover events and at least three out of the 
four performance measures data should be available for each CEO rank. More weights are 
given to the most recent years' AROA before the turnover. In specific, the operating 
performance Index is composited of 30% of most recent year AROA before the turnover, 
25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% of five years 
before the turnover. The same weights are applied to ABHR and EPS Surprise for stock 
                                                          
67
 HBR list contains CEOs of all publicly traded companies that had made Standard & Poor’s Global 1200 or 
BRIC 40 lists since 1997. They imposed the restrictions that CEOs had to have assumed the job after January 
1995 and no later than December 2007, suggesting at least 1.5 years tenure for Top CEOs. They also include 
companies from Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  
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performance and EPS Surprise performance Indices. For the three years' post-turnover 
performance, more weights are given to the most recent year's AROA after turnover. The 
post turnover operating performance Index is composited of 50% of most recent year AROA 
post turnover, 30% of 2 years post and 20% of 3 years post turnover AROA. The same 
weights apply to ABHR and EPS Surprise performance. 
CEOs are then ranked based on weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise performance 
Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively to ensure champion CEOs are not limited to 
those who have to initiate M&A deals. In specific, each CEO is ranked from best to worst for 
each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-
ranked from 1 to construct the Weighted Index Rank І. Weighted Index Rank ІІ is built in a 
similar way, but also take into account the post-turnover firm performance, 70% weighted for 
pre-five years' Weighted INDEX Rank I and 30% weighted for post three years' CEO 
Weighted INDEX Rank І_POST. The CEO list used for regression analysis in this chapter 
includes only CEOs with turnover classifications (2379), while the Top 100 CEOs by 
Weighted INDEX RANK I take into consideration all the CEOs (2623).   
5.3.2 Methods 
5.3.2.1 Logistic Regressions analysis 
To estimate the probability of forced turnover, I formulate the estimated logistic regression 
equation as below. The coefficients α and 𝛽𝑘 are determined according to a maximum 
likelihood approach, and it allows me to estimate the probability of the dependent variable, 
turnover dummy taking on the value 1 for given values of 𝑥𝑘. 
Estimate of P (y=1|𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, … 𝑥𝑝) =1/ (1+𝑒
−(𝛼+∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)
𝑘 )     k = 1... p        (17) 
The dependent variables, turnover I (II) dummy equals to 1 if the turnover is a forced 
turnover. CEOs are ranked based on Weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and 
M&A CARs mutually exclusively. Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, 
and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to 
bottom to construct the Weighted INDEX RANKІ. The vector of explanatory variables 𝑥𝑘 
includes a set of explanatory variables: performance measures (WEIGHTED AROA INDEX, 
WEIGHTED ABHAR INDEX, WEIGHTED EPS Surprise INDEX, M&A CAR), Weighted 
INDEX Rank І Z-SCORE, and control variables: Log (Firm Assets), MTB, GSALES, Log 
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(Firm Age), AGE (year), TENURE (year), COMPENSATION, Industry and Year fixed 
effects. The impact of 𝑥𝑘  is recorded in the vector 𝛽𝑘. 
5.3.2.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions analysis 
To test if CEO Ranking has better prediction power than other forced turnover models with 
single performance measure, multinomial logistic regressions of turnover on the single 
measures and Weighted INDEX Rank I are compared. The multinomial logit model, where 
the dependent variable has more than two categories, has a different parameterisation from 
the logit model because the response variable has more than two categories. It focuses on the 
probability to choose one of the j categories knowing some explanatory variables. 
The analytical expression of the model is as follows: 
Log [p(y =j | 𝑥𝑖) / p(y =1 | 𝑥𝑖)] =𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖                                        (18) 
Where the category 1 represents the reference or control category, which is the none-turnover 
sample in this study. All obtained parameters have to be interpreted relative to this reference 
category. The probability of choosing category j is: 
                                          p(y =j | 𝑥𝑖) = 𝑒
(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖 ) / [1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖)
𝑗
𝑘=2
] 
For the reference category: 
                                          p(y =1 | 𝑥𝑖) = 1 / [1 + ∑ 𝑒
(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖)
𝑗
𝑘=2
] 
When equation (18) is applied to analysing the forced turnover prediction power of different 
models, the dependent variable Turnover III dummy is measured as an indicator variable, 
which equals to 1 if the turnover is a forced turnover, zero if the turnover is a voluntary 
turnover and 2 if it was not involved with turnover events. The vector of explanatory 
variables 𝑥𝑖 includes a set of explanatory variables: performance measures, Weighted INDEX 
Rank І Z-SCORE, and control variables: Log (Firm Assets), MTB, GSALES, Log (Firm 
Age), AGE (year), TENURE (year), COMPENSATION, Industry and Year fixed effects. The 
impact of 𝑥𝑖  is recorded in the vector 𝛽𝑗. 
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5.4 Univariate Analysis-Difference Tests   
Table 5.1 compares CEO, firm characteristics, long-term performance over the past five, ten 
years, and post three years of S&P 1500 long-tenure CEOs for forced, voluntary and none 
turnover sample. Panel A provides CEO characteristics comparisons between CEOs in forced 
and no turnover sample, and CEOs in the voluntary and forced turnover sample. Forced out 
CEOs tend to be significantly younger than voluntarily departed CEOs, whereas no 
significant age difference between CEOs in forced and none turnover sample is found given 
CEOs in the none-turnover sample are still in office. Regarding average CEO tenure, neither 
significant differences between forced and voluntary, nor differences between forced and no 
turnover are identified. This mainly results from the imposed restriction of minimum five 
years tenure for the sample.  
When it comes to compensation, on average, forced out CEOs are paid with the higher salary, 
bonus, and total compensation than CEOs who left voluntarily or still in office. After scaled 
by firm’s total assets, forced out CEOs earned significantly lower relative total compensation 
than CEOs with no turnover. This finding demonstrates that CEOs in the forced turnover 
sample used to work for relatively larger corporations and suggests that firm size tend to be 
positively related to forced turnover. The samples have the similar low percentage of female 
CEOs. Panel B compares firm characteristics amongst CEOs in forced, voluntary and none 
turnover sample. Firms involved with forced turnover have significantly larger market 
capitalizations than firms in the voluntary turnover sample, further reinforce the finding in 
Panel A that larger firm size is more likely to relate to forced turnover. Similar results are 
found for assets, which is measured as the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted 
total assets over CEO’ tenure (maximum ten years). Firms of CEOs in the forced turnover 
sample tend to be mature firms and are significantly larger in size than those of voluntarily 
left CEOs and CEOs who still in office. Forced out CEOs' firms have significantly lower Q 
than those of voluntarily left CEOs, indicating that these are mature firms with fewer growth 
opportunities. However, there is no material difference in terms of Market-To-Book ratio. 
In Panel C, the weighted performance of CEOs over the past five years are compared for 
voluntary, forced and none turnover sample. More weights are given to the most recent years' 
measures. In detail, the operating performance weighted AROA Index is composited of 30% 
of most recent year AROA before the turnover, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 
15% of four years prior and 10% of five years before the turnover. The same weights are 
applied to the weighted ABHR Index and weighted EPS Surprise Index for stock 
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performance and EPS Surprise performance. CEOs are then ranked based on weighted 
AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise performance Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively. 
Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) 
measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Weighted 
Index Rank І. CEOs in forced turnover sample tend to significantly underperform CEOs in 
the other two samples in terms of operating and stock performance indices. No significant 
results are found for mean EPS surprise index and median M&A investment performance. 
However, Weighted INDEX RANK І, which is the combination of the four measures, is 
demonstrated to be efficient in both forced versus voluntary turnover and forced versus none 
turnover comparisons.  
Panel D shows three years' post-turnover performance indices; more weights are given to the 
most recent year's measures after turnover. The post-turnover performance Index is 
composited of 50% of most recent year's performance post turnover, 30% of 2 years post and 
20% of 3 years post turnover. The same weights apply to Weighted AROA, ABHR and EPS 
Surprise performance Indices_POST. CEOs are then re-ranked from 1 to bottom based on the 
average rank of weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise performance Indices_POST and 
M&A CARs to construct the Index Rank І_POST. In Panel D, firms tend to have 
significantly better median EPS Surprise, M&A CAR performance and mean ABHAR after 
predecessors being forced out; whereas still underperforming in terms of operating 
performance. In line with the previous literature of recovery in firm performance (Huson et 
al., 2004), there is no significant difference between post three years' firm performance ranks 
of forced and voluntary turnovers. Weighted Index Rank ІІ is constructed in a similar way as 
Index Rank І but also take into account post turnover firm performance. Weighted Index 
Rank ІІ is 70% weighted for prior five years' Weighted Index Rank І and 30% weighted for 
post three years' Weighted Index Rank І_POST. After considering post-turnover performance 
indices, forced turnover CEOs also have significantly lower ranks than voluntary turnover 
CEOs and CEOs still in office. 
Prior turnover 10-year un-weighted firm performance is compared for voluntary, forced and 
no turnover sample in Panel E. Compared with none turnover sample, long-term performance 
of CEOs in the forced turnover sample did not significantly underperform in terms of single 
performance measures, with the only exception of M&A sum CARs. Similarly, forced out 
CEOs only significantly underperform voluntarily left CEOs in terms of un-weighted 
ABHAR INDEX. However, forced turnover CEOs do have significantly lower ranks, both 
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Un-weighted INDEX Rank I and Rank II, than voluntarily left CEOs and CEOs still serving 
at firms, suggesting that CEO rankings with more dimensions provide more stable 
performance measure and are effective in forced turnover predictions. 
In sum, the results from the univariate analysis demonstrate that forced out CEOs tend to 
have significantly worse rankings, suggesting that higher ranked CEOs are less likely to be 
forced out. Thus, hypothesis one is supported. Also, CEO Rankings capture more dimensions 
and tend to be more consistent in measuring performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
                                                          
 
68
 TENURE (YEAR) for non-turnover CEOs is estimated from the date they became CEO until 2009.12.31. 
Table 5.1: CEO characteristics, and Long-run Performance of S&P 1500 long-tenure 
CEOs 
This table presents CEO, firm characteristics, long-term performance over five years before or 3 years post (if any) for S&P 
1500 long-tenure CEOs. Panel A compares CEO characteristics at the fiscal years of turnover (or 2009 if no turnover). AGE 
(YEARS) is the age of the CEO in the year of leaving (or 2009 for present CEOs). TENURE68 (YEARS) is the tenure of the 
CEO served as CEO in the firm. SALARY and BONUS are items from ExecuComp. TOTAL COMPENSATION is the 
TDC1 item from ExecuComp, which comprises of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, the total value of restricted 
stock granted, the total value of stock options granted (using black-scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensation. COMPENSATION (%) is the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their 
departure. Female (%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is Female and zero if is Male. In Panel B, MKTCAP is 
the market value of equity from Compustat. ASSETS is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets 
over CEO’ tenure (max ten years) from Compustat. MARKET-TO-BOOK is the market value of equity over book value of 
equity. Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of current liabilities and long-term debt divided by book 
value of equity plus book value of current liabilities and long-term debt. The market-to-book ratio and Q have been 
winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Performance measures indices are defined in Appendix A. Difference tests are based on t-
tests for means and Wilcoxon-tests for medians. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (3) - (1)  (2) - (1) 
    
Forced 
Turnover 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
No 
Turnover 
Difference  Difference 
Panel A: CEO Characteristics           
AGE (YEARS) mean 56.27 61.11 56.46 0.19   4.84 *** 
  median 56.00 62.00 56.00 0.00   6.00 *** 
  n 66 1114 1549         
TENURE (YEARS) mean 11.65 12.24 12.23 0.59   0.59   
  median 8.78 9.76 9.92 1.14 * 0.98   
  n 139 1433 1583         
SALARY  mean 849.47 702.85 695.90 -153.56 *** -146.62 *** 
  median 782.77 643.25 636.65 -146.12 *** -139.52 *** 
  n 139 1433 1583         
BONUS  mean 861.55 644.12 372.40 -489.14 ** -217.43   
  median 0.00 211.80 0.00 0.00 *** 211.80 ** 
  n 139 1433 1583         
TOTAL 
COMPENSATION 
  
mean 9069.97 4563.58 4052.30 -5017.67 *** -4506.39 *** 
median 3526.13 2177.65 2287.10 -1239.03 *** -1348.48 *** 
  n 138 1428 1579         
COMPENSATION 
(%)  
mean 2.41 2.68 4.41 2.01 ** 0.28   
  median 0.87 1.16 1.78 0.90 *** 0.29 *** 
  n 138 1428 1564         
FEMALE (%) mean 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00   -0.01   
  n 139 1433 1583         
                  
Panel B: Firm Characteristics             
                  
MKTCAP mean 13841.21 9452.88 4499.53 -9341.68 *** -4388.34   
 
median 2611.44 1882.40 1235.73 -1375.71 *** -729.04 * 
 
n 117 1181 1005 888   1064   
ASSETS mean 8.81 8.16 7.66 -1.14 *** -0.65 *** 
  median 8.55 8.00 7.50 -1.05 *** -0.55 *** 
  n 117 1181 1006         
Q mean 1.95 2.32 2.02 0.07   0.37 *** 
  median 1.43 1.65 1.61 0.18   0.23 ** 
  n 117 1178 1001         
MTB mean 3.32 3.19 2.94 -0.37 * -0.13   
  median 2.73 2.44 2.33 -0.40 * -0.29   
153 
 
 
Panel C: Prior Turnover Five- year's WEIGHTED Firm Performance INDEX 
  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) - (1)    (2) - (1) 
    
Forced 
Turnover 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
No 
Turnover 
Difference    Difference 
WEIGHTED AROA 
INDEX 
mean 6.85% 9.33% 8.24% 1.39% 
 
2.48% ** 
median 3.71% 5.95% 5.40% 1.69% * 2.24% *** 
 
n 117 1181 1006 
    WEIGHTED ABHAR 
INDEX 
mean 12.22% 20.07% 19.85% 7.63% *** 7.85% *** 
median 7.89% 15.21% 16.35% 8.46% *** 7.32% *** 
 
n 114 1148 939 
    WEIGHTED EPS 
SURPRISE INDEX 
mean 1.46% 1.83% 4.71% 3.25% 
 
0.37% 
 median 2.28% 2.58% 4.76% 2.48% ** 0.30% 
 
 
n 111 1148 968 
    M&A CARS mean -1.55% 0.19% 1.25% 2.80% ** 1.74% 
 
 
median -0.64% 0.22% 0.40% 1.04% 
 
0.86% 
 
 
n 67 680 643 
    WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK І 
mean 1504 1267 1195 -308 *** -237 *** 
median 1606 1286 1181 -426 *** -320 *** 
  n 117 1181 1006         
         Panel D: Post-Turnover Three- year's WEIGHTED Firm Performance INDEX 
 
      (1) (2) (2) - (1)   
       
Forced 
Turnover 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
Difference   
   
WEIGHTED AROA 
INDEX_POST 
mean 6.73% 9.65% 2.92% ** 
   median 3.39% 6.06% 2.67% *** 
   
 
n 107 1071 964 
    WEIGHTED ABHAR 
INDEX_POST 
mean 22.79% 16.81% -5.98% * 
   median 16.15% 12.68% -3.47% 
    
 
n 106 1052 946 
    WEIGHTED  
EPS SURPRISE 
INDEX_POST 
mean 2.52% 3.51% 0.99% 
    median 7.83% 3.67% -4.16% ** 
   
 
n 104 1056 952 
    M&A CAR_POST mean 1.72% -0.27% -1.99% 
    
 
median 1.17% -0.20% -1.37% ** 
   
 
n 47 495 448 
    WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK І_POST 
mean 616 631 15 
   
  
median 666 629 -37 
   
  
 
n 107 1071 
    
  
WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK ІІ 
  
mean 676 581 -95 *** 
  
  
median 681 579 -102 *** 
  
  
n 107 1071     
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Panel E: Prior turnover Ten- year's UNWEIGHTED firm performance    
    (1) (2) (3) (3) - (1) (2) - (1) 
    
Forced 
Turnover 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
No 
Turnover 
Difference Difference 
UN-WEIGHTED AROA 
INDEX 
 
 AROA 
  
mean 7.17% 8.84% 7.37% 0.20%   1.67%   
median 4.91% 5.83% 5.24% 0.33%   0.92% * 
  n 139 1429 1370         
UN-WEIGHTED 
ABHAR INDEX 
  
mean 26.57% 46.59% 32.30% 5.73%   20.02% *** 
median 17.53% 20.42% 16.30% -1.23%   2.89% *** 
  n 126 1266 1092         
UN-WEIGHTED EPS 
SURPRISE INDEX 
  
  
mean 2.55% 2.09% 5.25% 2.70% * -0.46%   
median 2.06% 2.30% 4.38% 2.33%   0.24%   
n 114 1183 1130         
M&A CARs mean 0.52% 1.08% 1.81% 1.30% *** 0.56%   
 
median -0.54% 0.39% 0.52% 1.06%   0.92%   
  n 79 818 925         
UN-WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK I 
  
mean 1352 1194 1168 -184 *** -159 ** 
median 1373 1200 1167 -206 *** -173 *** 
  n 117 1187 1075         
UN-WEIGHTED 
AROA2 INDEX 
 
 AROA 
  
mean 66.12% 70.45% 64.98% -1.13%   4.33% * 
median 70.00% 70.00% 70.00% 0.00%   0.00% ** 
  n 139 1429 1296         
UN-WEIGHTED 
ABHAR2 INDEX 
  
mean 55.95% 56.63% 55.54% -0.41%   0.68%   
median 56.25% 56.67% 55.74% -0.51%   0.42%   
  n 126 1266 1092         
UN-WEIGHTED EPS 
SURPRISE2 INDEX 
  
  
mean 57.68% 57.40% 60.20% 2.53%   -0.28%   
median 56.83% 58.33% 60.00% 3.17% ** 1.50%   
 
n 114 1183 1130         
M&A CARs2 mean 46.42% 51.69% 51.42% 4.99%   5.27%   
 
median 45.45% 50.00% 50.00% 4.55%   4.55%   
  n 79 818 925         
UN-WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK ІІ 
  
mean 1336 1164 1203 -133 ** -171 ** 
median 1356 1157 1206 -150 ** -199 *** 
  n 117 1187 1075         
 
5.5 Multivariate Analysis  
5.5.1 Regressions of Force Turnover on Performance Measures and Weighted INDEX 
RANK I 
To test hypothesis one that higher ranked CEOs are less likely to be forced out, logistic 
regressions analysis of Turnover I dummy on performance measures and CEO rankings are 
performed in Table 5.2 and 5.3. The dependent variable is the turnover I dummy. Year and 
industry fixed effect dummies are included in all specifications. CEO and firm characteristics 
are controlled in specifications (1)-(3), whereas specifications (4)-(8) compare the sole effect 
between single performance measures and CEO rankings on forced turnover events.  
Table 5.2 reports the coefficients from logistic regressions of turnover I dummy, where 
Turnover I=1 if the CEO is forced out and 0 for voluntary leave and none turnover CEOs, on 
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Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores. In specification (4), Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores 
alone can explain 12.87% of the forced turnover dummy. The area under the ROC Curve is 
78.75% (with the highest accuracy of the test). The coefficient estimate is negative and 
economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. In specifications (1) and (2), 
Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores are significantly and negatively associated with the forced 
turnover dummy at 1% significance level after controlling for different characteristics 
variables, which indicates that CEOs with worse performance rankings are more likely to be 
forced out.  
The single operating performance Weighted AROA INDEX is also significantly and 
negatively relates to forced turnover in the specification (5), and after controlling for CEO 
and firm characteristics at 10% significance level in the specification (3). Similarly, stock 
performance Weighted ABHAR INDEX itself is significantly associated with the forced 
turnover while no significant results are found for Weighted EPS Surprise INDEX and M&A 
CARs. However, Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores alone in the specification (4) have 
higher Pseudo R
2 
and ROC curve Area than other performance measures across (5)-(8), 
suggesting that the combined CEO ranks have better prediction power in explaining forced 
turnover than any single performance measures. In line with previous literature, younger 
CEOs with longer tenure and larger firm size are more likely associated with forced turnover.   
Table 5.3 reports the coefficients from logistic regressions of turnover II dummy, where 
Turnover II=1 if the CEO is forced out and 0 for voluntary leave, on Weighted INDEX Rank 
І Z-scores. As seen from specifications (4)-(8), similar results are found in Table 5.3 that 
Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores alone provides higher explanatory power than other 
performance measures. In specifications (1) and (2), Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-scores are 
significantly and negatively associated with the forced turnover dummy at 1% significance 
level after controlling for different characteristics variables, suggesting that CEOs with worse 
performance rankings are more likely to be forced out. Firm size, CEO age, and tenure are 
also significantly related to forced turnover.  
In sum, Weighted INDEX Rank І is negatively and, both statistically and economically, 
significantly associated with the forced turnover dummy. CEO Ranking provides better 
prediction of forced turnover than other single performance measures; thus, hypotheses one 
and two are supported.  
 
156 
 
Table 5.2: Logistic Regressions of Forced Turnover I on Performance Measures and 
Weighted INDEX Rank І  
This table reports coefficients from Logistic Regressions of Turnover I dummy on performance measures and 
Weighted INDEX Rank І. Turnover I dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced 
turnover, and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover or it was not involved with turnover events. CEOs are 
ranked based on Weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively. Each 
CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are 
averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Weighted INDEX RANKІ. Weighted AROA INDEX 
is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over past five years with more weights in recent years, which is 
composited of 30% of most recent year AROA before turnover, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% 
of four years prior and 10% of five years before turnover. Weighted ABHAR INDEX is the Annual median 
industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return over past five years with more weights in recent years. 
Earnings Per Share Surprise (EPS Surprise) = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in 
quarter t. Weighted EPS Surprise INDEX is EPS Surprise averaged over past five years with more weights in 
recent years. Weighted ABHAR INDEX and EPS Surprise INDEX have the same weights as Weighted AROA 
INDEX. M&A CARs is SUM CARs of all deals over past five years. The requirements that at least five 
continuous years’ AROA before turnover events are imposed to ensure continuity. AROA and EPS Surprise are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number 
of year’s firms in operations before turnover from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural 
log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. GSALES is the 
annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. MTB 
is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over CEO tenure (max ten years) from 
Compustat. Age (years) is the age of the CEO in the year of leaving. Tenure (years) is the number of years CEO 
served in the firm. COMPENSATION is the ratio of total compensation (TDC1) to the firm’s total assets at the 
fiscal years of their departure. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of 
observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I 
INTERCEPT -4.5674*** -4.0170*** -4.3329*** -5.3221*** -5.3221*** -4.9334*** -5.4101*** -5.0543*** 
 
0.0020 0.0030 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK І (Z-SCORE)  
-0.6866*** -0.6696***   -0.5390*** 
    0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
    WEIGHTED AROA 
INDEX   
-3.0785* 
 
-2.8848*** 
   
 
 
WEIGHTED 
ABHAR INDEX 
  
0.0510 
 
0.0030 
   
     
-2.0363*** 
  
     
0.0000 
  
       
-0.5784 
 
WEIGHTED EPS 
Surprise INDEX       
0.2640 
 
   
-0.7708 
M&A CAR 
 
0.4190 
Log (Firm Assets) 0.4812*** 0.5862*** 0.5712*** 
     
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
MTB 0.0512 
       
 
0.4650 
       
GSALES -0.1228 
       
 
0.6420 
       
Log (Firm Age) 0.5352 
       
 
0.1250 
       
AGE (year) -0.1295*** -0.1196*** -0.1107*** 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TENURE(year) 
0.0449** 0.0435* 0.0435* 
 0.0490 0.0540 0.0510 
COMPENSATION -0.0013 
       
 
0.9630 
       
Industry&Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1954 1959 1959 2297 2297 2194 2220 1242 
Pseudo R2 21.71% 21.02% 18.83% 12.87% 11.22% 12.12% 10.65% 12.77% 
ROC curve Area 85.94% 85.72% 84.30% 78.75% 76.68% 77.66% 75.61% 77.61% 
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Table 5.3: Logistic Regressions of Forced Turnover II on Performance Measures and 
Weighted INDEX Rank І  
 
This table reports coefficients from Logistic Regressions of Turnover II dummy on performance measures and 
Weighted INDEX Rank І. Turnover II dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced 
turnover, and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover. CEOs are ranked based on Weighted AROA, 
ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively. Each CEO is ranked from best to worst 
for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to 
bottom to construct the Weighted INDEX RANKІ. Weighted AROA INDEX is the average of median industry-
adjusted ROA over past five years with more weights in recent years, which is composited of 30% of most 
recent year AROA before turnover, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% 
of five years before the turnover. Weighted ABHAR INDEX is the Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and 
Hold Abnormal Return over past five years with more weights in recent years. Earnings Per Share Surprise 
(EPS Surprise) = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for 
company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. Weighted EPS Surprise 
INDEX is EPS Surprise averaged over past five years with more weights in recent years. Weighted ABHAR 
INDEX and EPS Surprise INDEX have the same weights as Weighted AROA INDEX. M&A CARs is SUM 
CARs of all deals over past five years. The requirements that at least five continuous years’ AROA before 
turnover events are imposed to ensure continuity. AROA and EPS Surprise are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentile. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of year’s firms in 
operations before turnover from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-
adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. GSALES is the annual average 
inflation-adjusted growth in sales over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. MTB is the annual 
average market value of equity over book value of equity over CEO tenure (max ten years) from Compustat. 
Age (years) is the age of the CEO in the year of leaving. Tenure (years) is the number of years CEO served in 
the firm. COMPENSATION is the ratio of total compensation (TDC1) to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal 
years of their departure. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of 
observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnover II         Turnover II Turnover II Turnover II Turnover II Turnover II Turnover II Turnover II 
INTERCEPT 2.4043 1.5715 1.5497 -1.6601** -1.5785** -1.5189* -1.8008** -1.6316** 
 
0.1840 0.3040 0.3070 0.0330 0.0430 0.0520 0.0200 0.0390 
WEIGHTED 
INDEX RANK І 
(Z-SCORE)  
-0.6408*** -0.6496*** 
 
-0.5397*** 
 0.0010 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
WEIGHTED 
AROA INDEX 
 
-4.0523**  -3.0680***    
0.0130  0.0020    
WEIGHTED 
ABHAR INDEX      
-1.9504*** 
  
     
0.0000 
  
 
WEIGHTED EPS 
Surprise INDEX   
-0.5494 
 
0.3030 
 
 
-0.8480 
M&A CAR 
 
0.4040 
Log (Firm Assets) 0.4768*** 0.4719*** 0.4649*** 
     
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
MTB -0.0288 
 
0.7180 
GSALES -0.1838 
0.5210 
Log (Firm Age) -0.1360 
0.7330 
AGE (year) -0.1478*** -0.1437*** -0.1398*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TENURE(year) 0.0474** 0.0470** 0.0486** 
 0.0460 0.0470 0.0390 
COMPENSATION -0.0112 
 0.7560 
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 971 973 973 1291 1291 1255 1252 661 
Pseudo R2 18.58% 18.28% 16.63% 7.87% 6.32% 7.42% 5.62% 7.36% 
ROC curve Area 82.15% 81.92% 80.86% 72.33% 69.96% 71.27% 68.45% 70.27% 
 
5.5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Turnovers on Performance Measures and 
Weighted INDEX RANK I 
 
In this section, to further test hypothesis two that CEO Ranking has better prediction power 
than other forced turnover models with single performance measure, multinomial logistic 
regressions of turnover on the single measures and Weighted INDEX Rank I are compared in 
Table 5.4. Most prior research on forced turnover employs voluntary turnover as a control 
group, without taking into account CEOs still in office with no turnovers. Multinomial 
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Logistic Regression allows more than two discrete outcomes in the same model, which 
overcomes the limitation of building the forced turnover prediction model without 
considering active CEOs still in offices. The results of the multinomial logistic regression of 
forced turnover prediction models for the three types of turnovers are reported in Table 5.4.   
In specification (1), compared with the base outcome none turnover sample, forced turnovers 
can be better forecasted by the Weighted INDEX Rank I Z-scores alone since there is a 
statistically significant and adverse relation, at 1% significance level with -0.5860 coefficient, 
between forced turnovers and Weighted INDEX Rank I Z-scores. This indicates that the 
lower the CEO rankings, the higher the probability of them being forced out due to poor 
combined performance. Similarly, Weighted AROA and ABHAR indices in specifications 
(2) and (3) alone can well explain forced turnover at 10% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. However, the Pseudo R-Square for Weighted AROA and ABHAR indices are 
lower than Rank І Z-score’s. The coefficients for Weighted EPS Surprise and M&A CARs 
are not significant in forced turnover forecasting, and the Pseudo R-Squires are also smaller 
than Weighted INDEX Rank I Z-score’s. Thus, Weighted INDEX Rank І Z-score alone can 
provide better prediction powers in forecasting forced turnover events. On the other hand, 
compared with none turnover sample, only Weighted AROA INDEX, and M&A CARs can 
explain voluntary turnovers, indicating no significant differences in most performance 
measures and CEO ranks between voluntary and none turnover events. Specifications (6)-
(10) compare Weighted INDEX Rank I Z-score with other single performance measures 
when considering other explanatory variables. Log (Firm Age), Log (Firm Assets) and MTB 
are included in all specifications to control for growth and cyclicality, which are significant at 
1% level across most of the specifications. Compared with firms with none turnovers, firms 
with bigger size, higher in MTB and have a longer time in operation tend to involve with 
voluntary or forced turnover. Consistent with the results from specifications (1)-(5), forced 
turnovers can be better forecasted by Weighted INDEX Rank I Z-scores alone given the 
coefficient estimate between forced turnover and INDEX Rank І Z-scores is statistically 
significant and negative at -0.6899. Weighted AROA and ABHAR indices also significantly 
negative relate to forced turnover in specifications (7) and (8). Weighted CEO INDEX Rank І 
Z-scores have the highest prediction power in terms of relatively higher Pseudo R-Square 
than other performance measures.  
To sum up, CEO performance ranking has higher explanatory power than stock, operating, 
analyst forecast surprise and investment performance along; thus hypothesis two is supported.  
161 
 
Table 5.4: Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Turnover III on Performance Measures 
and Weighted INDEX Rank І 
 
This table reports coefficients from the multinomial logistic regressions of Turnover III dummy on performance 
measures and Weighted INDEX Rank І. Turnover III dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is 
a forced turnover, zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover and 2 if it was not involved with turnover events. 
CEOs are ranked based on Weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and M&A CARs mutually 
exclusively. Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) 
measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Weighted INDEX RANKІ. 
Weighted AROA INDEX is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over past five years with more 
weights in recent years, which is composited of 30% of most recent year AROA before turnover, 25% of 2 years 
prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% of five years before the turnover. Weighted 
ABHAR INDEX is the Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return over past five years 
with more weights in recent years. Earnings Per Share Surprise (EPS Surprise) = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), 
where et,k is the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and ê t,k is the 
corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. Weighted EPS Surprise INDEX is EPS Surprise averaged 
over past five years with more weights in recent years. Weighted ABHAR INDEX and EPS Surprise INDEX 
have the same weights as Weighted AROA INDEX. M&A CARs is SUM CARs of all deals over past five 
years. The requirements that at least five continuous years’ AROA before turnover events are imposed to ensure 
continuity. AROA and EPS Surprise are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. For the control variables, Log 
(Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of year’s firms in operations before turnover from Compustat. Log 
(Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum 
ten years) from Compustat. GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over CEO tenure 
(maximum ten years) from Compustat. MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of 
equity over CEO tenure (max ten years) from Compustat. Age (years) is the age of the CEO in the year of 
leaving. Tenure (years) is the number of years CEO served in the firm. COMPENSATION is the ratio of total 
compensation (TDC1) to the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure. Industry and year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations, and Pseudo R
2
 is the pseudo R-square. 
P-values are reported below regression estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Turnover III=1 Forced Turnover         
INTERCEPT -1.6519 -1.6584 -1.1874 -1.8715 -2.0791 -10.9855 -11.2842 -10.1944 -11.0448 -11.5817 
  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9990 1.0000 0.9960 0.9930 0.9960 0.9960 0.9980 
WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK I Z-SCORE 
-0.5860***         -0.6899***         
  0.0000         0.0000         
WEIGHTED AROA 
 INDEX 
  -1.9127*         -4.8795***       
    0.0720         0.0000       
WEIGHTED ABHAR 
 INDEX 
    -2.1001***         -2.2087***     
      0.0000         0.0000     
WEIGHTED EPS  
SURPRISE INDEX 
      -0.6298         -0.8727   
        0.2680         0.1600   
M&A CARs         -1.7801         -1.3541 
          0.1080         0.2430 
LOG (FIRM AGE)           1.6236*** 1.7403*** 1.5771*** 1.6514*** 1.7571*** 
            0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LOG (FIRM ASSETS)           0.4317*** 0.4386*** 0.4165*** 0.4272*** 0.3589*** 
            0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
MTB           0.1670*** 0.1956*** 0.1423** 0.0712 0.0487 
            0.0060 0.0020 0.0190 0.2560 0.5320 
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Turnover III=0  Voluntary Turnover 
INTERCEPT 15.7398 15.5675 15.6999 15.6811 16.2021 7.3762 6.1370 6.8693 7.1345 7.7285 
  0.9870 0.9870 0.9870 0.9870 0.9930 0.9940 0.9900 0.9930 0.9930 0.9960 
WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANK I Z-SCORE 
-0.0620         -0.0790         
  0.3570         0.2800         
WEIGHTED AROA 
 INDEX 
  1.4510**         -0.3066       
    0.0150         0.6600       
WEIGHTED ABHAR 
 INDEX 
    -0.0697         -0.0161     
      0.7570         0.9480     
WEIGHTED EPS  
SURPRISE INDEX 
      -0.0613         -0.1658   
        0.8500         0.6210   
M&A CARs         -1.3254*         -0.6884 
          0.0560         0.3410 
LOG (FIRM AGE)           1.9647*** 1.9676*** 2.0330*** 1.9574*** 1.8331*** 
            0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LOG (FIRM ASSETS)           0.0966** 0.0979** 0.0888* 0.0970* 0.1147* 
            0.0490 0.0460 0.0720 0.0560 0.0610 
MTB           0.1746*** 0.1695*** 0.1620*** 0.1593*** 0.1300*** 
            0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
Turnover III=2 No Turnover                                                                        Base Outcome  
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 N 2304 2304 2201 2227 1390 2303 2303 2200 2226 1390 
 Pseudo R2 33.42% 33.16% 32.39% 33.32% 33.23% 42.00% 41.73% 41.11% 41.77% 41.27% 
 
 
5.5.3 Robustness tests 
5.5.3.1 Regressions of Forced Turnover on Performance Measures and Un-weighted INDEX 
RANKs 
To examine the robustness of previous test results, I perform the logistic regressions analysis 
of forced turnover dummy on the Un-weighted performance measures over CEOs tenure 
(maximum ten years) and corresponding Un-weighted CEO rankings in Table 5.5 and 5.6. 
The dependent variable is force turnover I dummy, where Turnover I=1 if the CEO is forced 
out, 0 if it is voluntary turnover or non-turnover. Year and industry fixed effect dummies are 
included in all specifications. CEO and firm characteristics are controlled in the specification 
(1)-(3), whereas specification (4)-(8) compare the sole effect between single performance 
measures and CEO rankings on forced turnover events.  
Table 5.5 reports the coefficients from logistic regressions of forced turnover dummy on the 
first four performance measurements, and Un-weighted CEO INDEX RANK I. In 
specification (1) and (2), Un-weighted CEO INDEX RANK I Z-scores are significantly and 
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negatively associated with forced turnover dummy which indicates that CEOs with worse 
performance rankings are more likely to be forced out. Strikingly, operating performance 
AROA loses statistical significance level in explaining forced turnover after controlling for 
CEO and firm characteristics. In line with previous literature, younger CEOs with longer 
tenure and larger firm size are more likely associated with forced turnover. In specification 
(4), CEO Ranking I alone can explain 11.62% of the forced turnover dummy. The area under 
the ROC Curve is 77.27% (with the highest accuracy of the test). The coefficient estimates 
are, economically and statistically, significant and negative at the 1% level. After considering 
other CEO and firm characteristics, un-weighted AROA and ABHAR are also negatively 
associated with CEO Ranking I. However, CEO Ranking I alone provides better explanatory 
power in predicting forced turnover than other single performance measures in specifications 
(4)-(8).  
Table 5.6 reports the coefficients from logistic regressions of a forced turnover dummy on the 
four beat performance measurements over CEOs’ tenure (over past ten years maximum) and 
Un-weighted CEO INDEX RANK II. Similar results are found in Table 5.6 that Un-weighted 
CEO INDEX RANK II alone provides higher explanatory power than other performance 
measures. Firm size, CEO age, and tenure contribute to explaining forced turnover.  
In sum, Un-weighted CEO INDEX RANK І and ІІ are negatively and, both statistically and 
economically, significantly associated with a forced turnover dummy and provide better 
explanatory power in predicting forced turnover. Thus, hypotheses one and two are further 
supported.  
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Table 5.5: Logistic Regressions of Forced Turnover I on Performance Measures and 
Un-weighted INDEX Rank І  
This table reports coefficients from Logistic Regressions of Turnover I dummy on performance measures and 
Un-weighted INDEX Rank І. Turnover I dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced 
turnover, and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover or it was not involved with turnover events. CEOs are 
ranked based on Un-weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively. 
Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings 
are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Un-weighted INDEX RANKІ. Un-weighted 
AROA Index is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten years or tenure if CEO tenure is less than 
ten years. Un-weighted ABHAR INDEX is the Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal 
Return. Un-weighted EPS Surprise INDEX = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in 
quarter t. M&A CARs is SUM CARs of all deals over CEOs' tenure (max ten years). The requirements that at 
least five continuous years’ AROA, at least 60 continuous months’ ABHAR, and at least 20 continuous 
quarters’ EPS Surprise before turnover events are imposed to ensure continuity. AROA and EPS Surprise are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number 
of year’s firms in operations before turnover from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural 
log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. GSALES is the 
annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. MTB 
is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) 
from Compustat. Age (years) is the age of the CEO in the year of leaving. Tenure (years) is the number of years 
CEO served in the firm. COMPENSATION is the ratio of total compensation (TDC1) to the firm’s total assets 
at the fiscal years of their departure. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the 
number of observations. P-values are reported below regression estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
Turnover I             Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I 
INTERCEPT -4.1476*** -3.5993*** -3.6905*** -5.4529*** -5.3615*** -5.2633*** -5.4576*** -5.2340*** 
  0.0050 0.0030 0.0050 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
UNWEIGHTED 
INDEX RANK I 
(ZSCORE 
-0.2933* -0.2578*  -0.3658***     
0.0940 0.0610  0.0010     
 
UNWEIGHTED 
AROA INDEX 
  -0.4804  -1.7059*    
  0.7660  0.0910    
 UNWEIGHTED 
ABHAR INDEX 
 
     -0.6057**   
     0.0230   
UNWEIGHTED EPS 
SURPRISE INDEX 
  
      -0.4576  
      0.5370  
M&A CARs        0.1585 
         0.8400 
LOG (FIRM ASSETS) 0.4639*** 0.5558*** 0.5720*** 
       0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     MTB 0.0528 
         0.4580 
       GSALES -0.0657 
         0.7850 
       LOG (FIRM AGE) 0.4226 
         0.2470 
       AGE (YEAR) -0.1292*** -0.1233*** -0.1242*** 
       0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     TENURE(YEAR) 0.0517* 0.051** 0.0512** 
       0.0210 0.0410 0.0220 
     COMPENSATION -0.0056 
         0.8540 
       
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2013 2018 1973 2362 2314 2251 2274 1530 
Pseudo R2 19.98% 19.53% 19.14% 11.62% 10.56% 10.94% 10.76% 12.57% 
ROC curve Area 85.09% 84.88% 84.24% 77.27% 75.60% 76.39% 75.96% 77.61% 
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Table 5.6: Logistic Regressions of Forced Turnover I on Performance Measures and 
Un-weighted INDEX RANK ІІ 
This table reports coefficients from Logistic Regressions of Turnover I dummy on performance measures and 
Un-weighted INDEX Rank ІI. Turnover I dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced 
turnover, and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover or it was not involved with turnover events. CEOs are 
ranked based on Un-weighted AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 Indices, and M&A CARs2 mutually 
exclusively. Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each beat percentage metric, and the four (three if one is 
missing) beat percentage measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Un-
weighted INDEX RANK IІ. Un-weighted AROA2 Index is the number of years where AROA is positive 
divided by the corresponding total number of years. Un-weighted ABHAR2 INDEX is the number of months 
where ABHAR is positive divided by the corresponding total number of months. Un-weighted EPS Surprise2 
INDEX is the number of quarters where EPS Surprise is positive divided by the corresponding total number of 
quarters. M&A CAR2 is the number of deals made during CEO tenure (max ten years) which have positive 
CARs divided by the corresponding total number of deals. The requirements that at least five continuous years’ 
AROA2, at least 60 continuous months’ ABHAR2, and at least 20 continuous quarters’ EPS Surprise2 before 
turnover events are imposed to ensure continuity. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of 
the number of year’s firms in operations before turnover from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual 
average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. 
GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from 
Compustat. MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over CEO tenure 
(maximum ten years) from Compustat. Age (years) is the age of the CEO in the year of leaving. Tenure (years) 
is the number of years CEO served in the firm. COMPENSATION is the ratio of total compensation (TDC1) to 
the firm’s total assets at the fiscal years of their departure. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. N is the number of observations. P-values are reported below regression estimates. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I Turnover I 
INTERCEPT -4.4979*** -3.9805*** -3.4294*** -5.5255*** -4.9647*** -3.9741*** -5.3650*** -5.1215*** 
  0.0030 0.0020 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 
UNWEIGHTED 
INDEX RANK II 
(ZSCORE) 
-0.3638** -0.3371** 
 
-0.2378** 
    
0.0260 0.0340 
 
0.0250 
     
UNWEIGHTED 
AROA2 INDEX 
  
-0.6328  -0.7832** 
   
  
0.2610  0.0320 
   UNWEIGHTED 
ABHAR2 INDEX 
 
     
-2.6963 
 
     
0.1350  
 UNWEIGHTED EPS 
SURPRISE2 INDEX 
  
     
 -0.2144 
 
     
 0.7380 
 
M&A CARs2 
         
-0.2245 
       
0.5070 
LOG (FIRM 
ASSETS) 0.4854*** 0.5849*** 0.5713*** 
     
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
MTB 0.0454 
       
  0.5090 
       
GSALES -0.0899 
       
  0.7000 
       
LOG (FIRM AGE) 0.4660 
       
  0.2030 
       
AGE (YEAR) -0.1290*** -0.1216*** -0.1228*** 
     
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
TENURE(YEAR) 0.0573** 0.0565** 0.0578** 
     
  0.0100 0.0110 0.0110 
     
COMPENSATION -0.0080 
       
  0.8050 
       
  
        
Industry & Year FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2012 2017 1973 2361 2314 2251 2274 1530 
  
        
 Pseudo R2 20.39% 19.91% 19.36% 10.96% 10.74% 10.21% 10.73% 12.64% 
ROC curve Area 85.25% 85.01% 84.40% 76.19% 75.66% 75.14% 75.86% 77.66% 
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5.5.3.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Turnovers on Performance Measures and Un-
weighted INDEX RANK I 
In this section, to examine the robustness of previous Multinomial Logistic Regression test 
results, Multinomial Logistic Regression of Turnover on un-weighted CEO performance 
measures over CEOs tenure (maximum ten years) and corresponding un-weighted CEO 
ranking І are performed in Table 5.7. 
In specification (1), there is a statistically significant and negative relation (with -0.3535 
coefficient) between forced turnovers and Un-weighted INDEX RANK I Z-scores. Thus, 
forced turnovers can be better forecasted by Un-weighted INDEX RANK I Z-scores alone 
compared with the base outcome none-turnover sample. The lower the CEO rankings, the 
higher the probability being forced out due to poor performance. On the other hand, in the 
specification (2), single operating performance measure Un-weighted AROA INDEX is 
better employed to explain voluntary turnover, i.e., compared to none turnover sample, CEOs 
in the voluntary turnovers sample tend to have higher AROA over CEOs’ tenure. Although 
Un-weighted ABHAR INDEX in the specification (3) alone can also provide great 
explanatory power in forced turnover predictions, it is statistically significant at 5% level, and 
the Pseudo R-Squire is lower than Un-weighted INDEX RANK I Z-score’s.  
Specifications (4)-(8) compare Un-weighted INDEX RANK I Z-scores with the other four 
performance measures as well as considering other CEO and firm characteristics. Log (Firm 
Age), Log (Firm Assets) and MTB are included in all specifications to control for firm 
growth and cyclicality. In line with findings in the previous section, firms bigger in size, 
higher in MTB and have a longer time in operation on average tend to be involved with 
turnovers, either forced or voluntary turnovers. Un-weighted INDEX RANK I Z-scores have 
the highest prediction power in terms of relatively higher Pseudo R-Squire compared with 
other single performance measures.  
To sum up, CEO performance rankings for the un-weighted and longer terms sample have 
higher explanatory power than stock, operating, analyst forecast surprise and investment 
performance along; thus hypothesis two is further supported.  
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Table 5.7: Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Turnover III on Performance Measures 
and Un-weighted INDEX RANK І 
This table reports coefficients from the multinomial logistic regressions of Turnover III dummy on performance 
measures and Un-weighted INDEX Rank І. Turnover III dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
turnover is forced turnover, zero if the turnover is voluntary turnover and 2 if it was not involved with turnover 
events. CEOs are ranked based on Un-weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices, and M&A CARs 
mutually exclusively. Each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is 
missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the Un-weighted INDEX 
RANKІ. Un-weighted AROA INDEX is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten years or tenure 
if CEO tenure is less than ten years. Un-weighted ABHAR INDEX is the Annual median industry-adjusted Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Return. Un-weighted EPS Surprise INDEX= (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the 
actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst 
forecasted EPS in quarter t. M&A CARs is SUM CARs of all deals over CEOs' tenure (maximum ten years). 
The requirements that at least five continuous years’ AROA, at least 60 continuous months’ ABHAR, and at 
least 20 continuous quarters’ EPS Surprise before turnover events are imposed to ensure continuity. AROA and 
EPS Surprise are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. For the control variables, Log (Firm Age) is the natural 
log of the number of year’s firms in operations before turnover from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual 
average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over CEO tenure (maximum ten years) from Compustat. 
MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over CEO tenure (maximum ten 
years) from Compustat. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of 
observations.. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnover III=1 Forced Turnover 
    Intercept -1.6470 -1.8413 -1.4566 -10.0652 -10.6322 -9.9349 -10.3629 -11.4892 
  0.9990 0.9990 0.9990 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940 0.9970 0.9980 
Un-weighted INDEX 
RANK I Z-score 
-0.3535***     -0.3493***         
0.0030     0.0100         
Un-weighted AROA   -0.3570     -2.3723*       
INDEX    0.7460     0.0610       
Un-weighted ABHAR     -0.5772**     -0.5680*     
INDEX     0.0320     0.0520     
Un-weighted EPS 
Surprise INDEX 
            -0.4404   
            0.6100   
M&A CARs               0.7375 
                0.4290 
Log (Firm Age)       1.4354*** 1.5055*** 1.4526*** 1.4878*** 1.6568*** 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log (Firm Assets)       0.4207*** 0.4643*** 0.4118*** 0.4176*** 0.4331*** 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MTB       0.1721*** 0.1751*** 0.1600*** 0.0991 0.0962 
        0.0040 0.0040 0.0090 0.1090 0.1810 
 
                
Turnover III=0  Voluntary Turnover 
Intercept 14.7602 15.5254 14.17941 6.3788 6.1546 6.1219 7.7645 8.5252 
  0.9800 0.987 0.975 0.9900 0.9900 0.9900 0.9940 0.9960 
Un-weighted INDEX 
RANK I Z-score 
  
0.0198     0.0369         
0.7570     0.6090 
        
Un-weighted AROA   2.0680***     0.6982       
INDEX    0.0010     0.3380       
Un-weighted ABHAR     0.0461     0.0372     
INDEX     0.3960     0.5130     
Un-weighted EPS 
Surprise INDEX 
  
            -0.0799   
            0.8570 
  
M&A CAR               0.2824 
                0.5860 
Log (Firm Age)       1.9427*** 1.9238*** 2.0155*** 1.9236*** 1.7691*** 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log (Firm Assets)       0.0831* 0.1113** 0.0712 0.0764 0.1220** 
        0.0840 0.0240 0.1440 0.1250 0.0300 
MTB       0.1626*** 0.1646*** 0.1556*** 0.1652*** 0.1418*** 
        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Turnover III=2 No Turnover                                                                        Base Outcome  
Industry & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 N 2369 2321 2258 2368 2320 2257 2279 1648 
 Pseudo R2 32.69% 33.00% 31.68% 41.26% 41.54% 40.52% 41.37% 40.66% 
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5.6 Top 100 CEOs by Weighted INDEX RANK І and Weighted INDEX RANK ІІ 
5.6.1 Top 100 CEOs by Weighted INDEX RANK І 
Slow growth, shareholder activism, and political turmoil are the main reasons that most 
CEOs tend to focus on the short-term performance. Yet, top-performed CEOs still manage to 
train their sights on the long-term and deliver strong performance over many years. In this 
section, the top 100 CEO lists by Weighted INDEX Rank І and ІІ reveal who they are.  
To compile the list of the top 100 CEOs, I begin with the CEOs that at the end of 2009 were 
included in ExecuComp. To ensure a sufficient track record to evaluate, CEOs who had been 
on the job for less than five years are excluded. I then calculate four weighted performance 
metrics towards turnover year for each CEO over the past five years and post three years after 
stepping down. Finally, each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric equally and 
averaged the four rankings (three if anyone is missing) to obtain an overall financial rank. 
The overall rank is re-ranked from best to worst to generate Weighted INDEX RANK list І. 
Incorporating four metrics is a balanced and robust approach: While industry-adjusted 
operating and stock performance risk being skewed toward smaller companies, EPS surprise, 
and M&A CARs offset the skewness towards small firm. The final turnover sample consists 
of 139 forced turnover, 1433 voluntary and 1583 no turnover cases from 1992 to 2009. To 
test the variation of top CEO list across years, I construct the 2007 and 2008 lists following 
the same methodology.  
After taking a longer perspective and more dimensions into account, the new CEO lists do 
bring to light certain hidden gems. Most of the top CEOs who delivered outstanding results 
year in and year out are not superstars and away from the glare of the cover stories. These 
quiet CEOs' success makes a persuasive argument for a new approach to evaluate CEOs. 
Firms in the top 100 lists tend to be smaller in size, which might subject to less short-term 
target pressure from public and shareholders. Information Technology firms take a large 
proportion in the list thank to high growth and because their CEOs are not normally penalised 
much for short-term failure. As seen from Table 5.8, the Weighted INDEX Rank І does not 
shift significantly since 2007. 2008 brought ten new CEOs onto the list, whereas 15 more 
new CEOs are ranked among top 10 for 2009. At the same time, 69 CEOs have made the list 
for the third year in a row. In fact, 2009's top three CEOs were all top three for 2008 and 
2007, and Michel de Rosen of ViroPharma Inc. has earned the top spot for the third year in a 
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row. Michel held several CEO roles
69
 before appointed as CEO and president of ViroPharma 
Inc. As an outsider, Michel replaced the company's founder Claude Nash when share price 
plummeting 70 percent due to the disappointing clinical study results and led the company to 
a big success. My list overlaps few with lists of the superstar CEOs or highest-paid CEOs, but 
do include some big names. Ranked as No.1 on 2010 Harvard Business Review's Top 100 
CEO, Steven P. Jobs of Apple Inc. ranked 26th on Weighted CEO INDEX RANK І. Other 
big names, to name a few, who stay on the top list across three years include John P. 
Morgridge of Cisco Systems Inc., William H. Gates III of Microsoft Corp., Andrew S. Grove 
of Intel Corp. and Stephen M. Case of Time Warner Inc. 
5.6.2 Top 100 CEOs by Weighted INDEX RANK ІІ 
Apart from generating continuously growing shareholder returns, to be ranked as top CEOs, 
they also have an important task to cultivate internal talent and pave the way for their 
successors. Success seems so hard to sustain, the most potent measure of CEOs' performance 
should go beyond their tenure and examine how well CEOs set companies up for success 
after departure, i.e., whether a CEO leaves behind a strong or a weak company. Top 100 
CEOs by Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ list in Table 5.9 comprise CEOs whose companies 
performed well not only during their tenure but also for the three years after their departure. 
To construct Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ, I combine the Weighted INDEX Rank І (weighted at 
70%) and Weighted INDEX Rank І_POST (weighted at 30%). 
Given the restriction that CEOs on Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ list have to involve with 
turnover events, there is 39 CEOs with three consistent year’s top performance on Weighted 
INDEX Rank І also earned places on the Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ list. Among them, 
Michel de Rosen of ViroPharma Inc. also earned the top spot for Top 100 CEOs by Weighted 
INDEX Rank ІІ list. Achieved consistent superior performance before and after turnover, 
William H. Gates III of Microsoft Corporation ranked 11
th
 in Weighted INDEX RANK list 
ІІ. The rank of John P. Morgridge of Cisco Systems Inc. jumped to sixth place on Weighted 
INDEX RANK list ІІ after taking into account the three years’ superior post-turnover 
performance of his insider successors John T. Chambers, suggesting he did an excellent job 
in cultivating successors. In line with HBR's rank, his top-performed successors John T. 
Chambers earned No. 10 among the HBR top 100 CEO list. 
                                                          
69
 Michel de Rosen was CEO of Pharmuka (1983-1986), Rhône-Poulenc Fibres and Polymères (1988-1993), 
then CEO and chairman of Rhône Poulenc Rorer (1993-1999) before joining ViroPharma Inc. 
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Table 5.8 Top 100 CEOs by Weighted INDEX RANK І over the Three Year Period 
This table presents the top 100 CEOs ranked by Weighted INDEX Rank І from 2007 to 2009. Weighted INDEX Rank І is constructed as follows. CEOs are required to have 
at least five years tenure, and their firms should have no less than five consecutive years’ AROA before turnover years. At least three out of the four performance measure 
indices data should be available. Five years weighted and industry-adjusted AROA INDEX, ABHAR INDEX, EPS Surprise INDEX and M&A sum CARs are calculated 
accordingly. More weights are given to the most recent years' performance before the turnover. In specific, the performance Index is composited of 30% of measures in most 
recent year, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% of five years before the turnover. The same weights are applied to Weighted AROA, 
ABHR and EPS Surprise Indices. CEOs are then ranked based on weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise performance Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively, by 
which each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to construct the 
Weighted Index Rank І. CEO name and firm name are listed accordingly.  
 
INDEX 
RANK1 
2009 2008 2007 
CEO NAME FIRM NAME CEO NAME FIRM NAME CEO NAME FIRM NAME 
1 Michel de Rosen VIROPHARMA INC Michel de Rosen VIROPHARMA INC Michel de Rosen VIROPHARMA INC 
2 Evan Jones DIGENE CORP Evan Jones DIGENE CORP Evan Jones DIGENE CORP 
3 Gary J. Sbona VERITY INC Gary J. Sbona VERITY INC Gary J. Sbona VERITY INC 
4 Thomas E. Gottwald NEWMARKET CORP Lonnie M. Smith INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC T. Kendall Hunt VASCO DATA SEC INTL INC 
5 Leonard Bell, M.D. ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC Laurence Jay Korn PDL BIOPHARMA INC Martine A. Rothblatt UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORP 
6 Laurence Jay Korn PDL BIOPHARMA INC Edward V. Fritzky IMMUNEX CORP Lonnie M. Smith INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC 
7 Lonnie M. Smith INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC T. Kendall Hunt VASCO DATA SEC INTL INC Laurence Jay Korn PDL BIOPHARMA INC 
8 Robin Raina EBIX INC William R. McLaughlin SELECT COMFORT CORP Edward V. Fritzky IMMUNEX CORP 
9 Edward V. Fritzky IMMUNEX CORP Robert Delmont Kennedy UNION CARBIDE CORP William R. McLaughlin SELECT COMFORT CORP 
10 Timothy Joseph Barberich SEPRACOR INC Timothy Joseph Barberich SEPRACOR INC Robert Delmont Kennedy UNION CARBIDE CORP 
11 William R. McLaughlin SELECT COMFORT CORP Robert J. Doris SONIC SOLUTIONS Robert J. Doris SONIC SOLUTIONS 
12 Robert J. Doris SONIC SOLUTIONS Robin Raina EBIX INC Timothy Joseph Barberich SEPRACOR INC 
13 Robert Delmont Kennedy UNION CARBIDE CORP Philip M. Pead PER-SE TECHNOLOGIES INC Philip M. Pead PER-SE TECHNOLOGIES INC 
14 Wayne T. Hockmeyer MEDIMMUNE INC Stephen M. Case TIME WARNER INC Wayne T. Hockmeyer MEDIMMUNE INC 
15 Philip M. Pead PER-SE TECHNOLOGIES INC Wayne T. Hockmeyer MEDIMMUNE INC Robin Raina EBIX INC 
16 Stephen W. Bershad AXSYS TECHNOLOGIES INC Stephen W. Bershad AXSYS TECHNOLOGIES INC Stephen M. Case TIME WARNER INC 
17 Warren V. Musser SAFEGUARD SCIENTIFICS INC Warren V. Musser SAFEGUARD SCIENTIFICS INC Jen-Hsun Huang NVIDIA CORP 
18 Walter C. Herlihy, PhD. REPLIGEN CORP Walter C. Herlihy, PhD. REPLIGEN CORP Warren V. Musser SAFEGUARD SCIENTIFICS INC 
19 Stephen M. Case TIME WARNER INC Michael W. Bonney, B.A. CUBIST PHARMACEUTICALS INC John P. Morgridge CISCO SYSTEMS INC 
20 Reed Hastings NETFLIX INC John P. Morgridge CISCO SYSTEMS INC Michael J. Emmi SYSTEMS & COMPUTER TECH CORP 
21 Michael J. Emmi SYSTEMS & COMPUTER TECH CORP Michael J. Emmi SYSTEMS & COMPUTER TECH CORP Alphonse M. Lucchese CONCERTO SOFTWARE INC 
22 Richard C. Adkerson FREEPORT-MCMORAN COP&GOLD Alphonse M. Lucchese CONCERTO SOFTWARE INC Nicholas Csendes ANSOFT CORP 
23 Nicholas Csendes ANSOFT CORP Richard A. Meeusen BADGER METER INC Dennis M. Jones JONES PHARMA INC 
24 John P. Morgridge CISCO SYSTEMS INC Nicholas Csendes ANSOFT CORP Norman D. Schwartz BIO-RAD LABORATORIES INC 
25 Alphonse M. Lucchese CONCERTO SOFTWARE INC Steven P. Jobs APPLE INC Lawrence L. Garlick REMEDY CORP 
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26 Steven P. Jobs APPLE INC Dennis M. Jones JONES PHARMA INC Steven P. Jobs APPLE INC 
27 Stephen N. Joffe LCA VISION INC Lawrence L. Garlick REMEDY CORP Stephen N. Joffe LCA VISION INC 
28 Joseph P. Keithley KEITHLEY INSTRUMENTS INC Leonard Bell, M.D. ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC Clinton H. Severson ABAXIS INC 
29 Dennis M. Jones JONES PHARMA INC Stephen N. Joffe LCA VISION INC Joseph P. Keithley KEITHLEY INSTRUMENTS INC 
30 Einar W. Sissner ALPHARMA INC  -CL A Joseph P. Keithley KEITHLEY INSTRUMENTS INC Einar W. Sissner ALPHARMA INC  -CL A 
31 John F. Coyne WESTERN DIGITAL CORP Einar W. Sissner ALPHARMA INC  -CL A Frank D. Guidone, Jr. MEASUREMENT SPECIALTIES INC 
32 Richard R. Woolcott VOLCOM INC John F. Coyne WESTERN DIGITAL CORP Michael J. Saylor MICROSTRATEGY INC 
33 Lawrence L. Garlick REMEDY CORP Gabriel Battista TALK AMERICA HOLDINGS INC James E. Cashman, III ANSYS INC 
34 Gabriel Battista TALK AMERICA HOLDINGS INC William B. Yarmuth ALMOST FAMILY INC Gabriel Battista TALK AMERICA HOLDINGS INC 
35 William B. Yarmuth ALMOST FAMILY INC Cyril C. Baldwin, Jr. CAMBREX CORP Richard A. Meeusen BADGER METER INC 
36 Ingrid Wiik ALPHARMA INC  -CL A Ingrid Wiik ALPHARMA INC  -CL A Cyril C. Baldwin, Jr. CAMBREX CORP 
37 Cyril C. Baldwin, Jr. CAMBREX CORP Mark C. Rohr ALBEMARLE CORP William H. Gates III MICROSOFT CORP 
38 William H. Gates III MICROSOFT CORP William H. Gates III MICROSOFT CORP Mark C. Rohr ALBEMARLE CORP 
39 Mark C. Rohr ALBEMARLE CORP John Edward Warnock ADOBE SYSTEMS INC Ingrid Wiik ALPHARMA INC  -CL A 
40 William D. Morean JABIL CIRCUIT INC William D. Morean JABIL CIRCUIT INC William D. Morean JABIL CIRCUIT INC 
41 Philip Frey, Jr. MICROSEMI CORP Douglas W. Kohrs AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HLDS Stephen W. Bershad AXSYS TECHNOLOGIES INC 
42 Thomas G. Wiggans CONNETICS CORP Marvin J. Gralnick CHICOS FAS INC John Edward Warnock ADOBE SYSTEMS INC 
43 John Edward Warnock ADOBE SYSTEMS INC Thomas G. Wiggans CONNETICS CORP Douglas W. Kohrs AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HLDS 
44 Marvin J. Gralnick CHICOS FAS INC Dino A. Rossi BALCHEM CORP  -CL B Walter C. Herlihy, PhD. REPLIGEN CORP 
45 Douglas W. Kohrs AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HLDS Philip Frey, Jr. MICROSEMI CORP Marvin J. Gralnick CHICOS FAS INC 
46 Carol A. Bartz, PhD. AUTODESK INC Dale R. Olseth SURMODICS INC Zan Guerry CHATTEM INC 
47 Dale R. Olseth SURMODICS INC Carol A. Bartz, PhD. AUTODESK INC Thomas G. Wiggans CONNETICS CORP 
48 Jeffery S. Fraser NIC INC Andrew Rudd BARRA INC Philip Frey, Jr. MICROSEMI CORP 
49 Andrew Rudd BARRA INC Jeffery S. Fraser NIC INC Dale R. Olseth SURMODICS INC 
50 Carolyn J. Logan SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS LTD Zan Guerry CHATTEM INC Carol A. Bartz, PhD. AUTODESK INC 
51 Zan Guerry CHATTEM INC Christopher B. Begley HOSPIRA INC Robert A. Kotick ACTIVISION INC 
52 Keith G. Myers LHC GROUP INC David E. Maguire KEMET CORP Edward W. Stack DICKS SPORTING GOODS INC 
53 William M. Lasky JLG INDUSTRIES INC Leonard S. Schleifer REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS Andrew Rudd BARRA INC 
54 Dino A. Rossi BALCHEM CORP  -CL B Donald R. Sellers SCICLONE PHARMACEUTICALS INC Jeffery S. Fraser NIC INC 
55 Christopher B. Begley HOSPIRA INC Michael R. Gaulke EXPONENT INC William W. Smith, Jr. SMITH MICRO SOFTWARE INC 
56 Donald R. Sellers SCICLONE PHARMACEUTICALS INC Francis F. Lee SYNAPTICS INC Christopher B. Begley HOSPIRA INC 
57 David E. Maguire KEMET CORP William M. Lasky JLG INDUSTRIES INC David E. Maguire KEMET CORP 
58 Charles E. Sykes SYKES ENTERPRISES INC Joseph H. Scarlett, Jr. TRACTOR SUPPLY CO Donald R. Sellers SCICLONE PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
59 Michael R. Hsing MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS INC Gordon M. Binder AMGEN INC Michael R. Gaulke EXPONENT INC 
60 David S. Seltzer HI TECH PHARMACAL CO INC Floyd D. Gottwald, Jr. ALBEMARLE CORP Reed Hastings NETFLIX INC 
61 Michael R. Gaulke EXPONENT INC H. Tom Buelter ON ASSIGNMENT INC Francis F. Lee SYNAPTICS INC 
62 Michael W. Bonney, B.A. CUBIST PHARMACEUTICALS INC William J. Cadogan ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC Joseph H. Scarlett, Jr. TRACTOR SUPPLY CO 
63 John R. Gibson AMERICAN PACIFIC CORP John R. Irwin ATWOOD OCEANICS Dino A. Rossi BALCHEM CORP  -CL B 
64 Joseph H. Scarlett, Jr. TRACTOR SUPPLY CO Norman D. Schwartz BIO-RAD LABORATORIES INC Gordon M. Binder AMGEN INC 
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65 Francis F. Lee SYNAPTICS INC Robert Mehrabian TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC John R. Irwin ATWOOD OCEANICS 
66 Donald E. Brown, M.D. INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE GRP John R. Gibson AMERICAN PACIFIC CORP William J. Cadogan ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 
67 Kenneth D. Tuchman TELETECH HOLDINGS INC David A. Duffield PEOPLESOFT INC William M. Lasky JLG INDUSTRIES INC 
68 Gordon M. Binder AMGEN INC Theodore M. Solso CUMMINS INC David P. Yeager HUB GROUP INC  -CL A 
69 Floyd D. Gottwald, Jr. ALBEMARLE CORP James C. Morgan APPLIED MATERIALS INC Floyd D. Gottwald, Jr. ALBEMARLE CORP 
70 William J. Cadogan ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC Jen-Hsun Huang NVIDIA CORP David A. Duffield PEOPLESOFT INC 
71 Aaron D. Todd, III AIR METHODS CORP David D. Stevens ACCREDO HEALTH INC Sudhir Steven Singh CONCUR TECHNOLOGIES INC 
72 Jen-Hsun Huang NVIDIA CORP Andrew S. Grove INTEL CORP H. Tom Buelter ON ASSIGNMENT INC 
73 H. Tom Buelter ON ASSIGNMENT INC Joseph D. Rupp OLIN CORP Robert Mehrabian TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC 
74 John R. Irwin ATWOOD OCEANICS William W. Smith, Jr. SMITH MICRO SOFTWARE INC John R. Gibson AMERICAN PACIFIC CORP 
75 Theodore M. Solso CUMMINS INC Thomas G. Cigarran HEALTHWAYS INC Donald E. Brown, M.D. INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE GRP 
76 David A. Duffield PEOPLESOFT INC Christopher T. Seaver HYDRIL CO David D. Stevens ACCREDO HEALTH INC 
77 James C. Morgan APPLIED MATERIALS INC Reed Hastings NETFLIX INC James C. Morgan APPLIED MATERIALS INC 
78 David D. Stevens ACCREDO HEALTH INC Russell A. Gullotti NATIONAL COMPUTER SYS INC Theodore M. Solso CUMMINS INC 
79 Thomas G. Cigarran HEALTHWAYS INC Aaron D. Todd, III AIR METHODS CORP David R. Mueller COMAIR HOLDINGS INC 
80 Andrew S. Grove INTEL CORP Henry L. Nordhoff GEN-PROBE INC Thomas G. Cigarran HEALTHWAYS INC 
81 John R. Ambroseo, Ph.D. COHERENT INC David R. Mueller COMAIR HOLDINGS INC Christopher T. Seaver HYDRIL CO 
82 Christopher T. Seaver HYDRIL CO Donald E. Brown, M.D. INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE GRP Andrew S. Grove INTEL CORP 
83 Rodney C. Sacks MONSTER BEVERAGE CORP James E. Cashman, III ANSYS INC Russell A. Gullotti NATIONAL COMPUTER SYS INC 
84 Russell A. Gullotti NATIONAL COMPUTER SYS INC Dwight C. Schar NVR INC Rene Champagne ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES INC 
85 Henry L. Nordhoff GEN-PROBE INC Anthony M. Marlon SIERRA HEALTH SERVICES Henry L. Nordhoff GEN-PROBE INC 
86 Frederick J. Rowan, II CARTER'S INC David P. Yeager HUB GROUP INC  -CL A Dwight C. Schar NVR INC 
87 Robert E. Harmon HARMON INDUSTRIES INC Robert E. Harmon HARMON INDUSTRIES INC Anthony M. Marlon SIERRA HEALTH SERVICES 
88 James F. Halpin COMPUSA INC Sudhir Steven Singh CONCUR TECHNOLOGIES INC Robert E. Harmon HARMON INDUSTRIES INC 
89 Leonard S. Schleifer REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS Frederick J. Rowan, II CARTER'S INC Edward L. Gallup IMMUCOR INC 
90 Anthony M. Marlon SIERRA HEALTH SERVICES Rene Champagne ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES INC Frederick J. Rowan, II CARTER'S INC 
91 David R. Mueller COMAIR HOLDINGS INC James Hagedorn SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO Kendrick B. Melrose TORO CO 
92 Kendrick B. Melrose TORO CO Kendrick B. Melrose TORO CO Louis E. Silverman QUALITY SYSTEMS INC 
93 Edward L. Gallup IMMUCOR INC Edward L. Gallup IMMUCOR INC John B. Carrington WEBSENSE INC 
94 Jean Madar INTER PARFUMS INC John B. Carrington WEBSENSE INC C. Michael Armstrong AT&T CORP 
95 John S. Marr, Jr. TYLER TECHNOLOGIES INC Louis E. Silverman QUALITY SYSTEMS INC Sterling L. Williams STERLING SOFTWARE INC 
96 Rene Champagne ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES INC C. Michael Armstrong AT&T CORP James F. Halpin COMPUSA INC 
97 Bruce P. Bickner DEKALB GENETICS CORP  -CL B James F. Halpin COMPUSA INC Walter E. Boomer ROGERS CORP 
98 Thomas N. Urban PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL Sterling L. Williams STERLING SOFTWARE INC Rodney Smith ALTERA CORP 
99 James Hagedorn SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO James L. Herbert NEOGEN CORP Robert P. LoCascio LIVEPERSON INC 
100 Sterling L. Williams STERLING SOFTWARE INC Eran Broshy INVENTIV HEALTH INC Edward P. Campbell NORDSON CORP 
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Table 5.9 Top 100 CEOs by Weighted INDEX RANK ІІ and their Performance 
  
This table presents the top 100 CEOs ranked by Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ. Weighted INDEX Rank ІІ is composed of 70% of pre-turnover and 30% of post-turnover 
weighted performance indices. Pre-turnover indices construction is described in Table 5.8. For post-turnover weighted performance indices, three years weighted and 
industry-adjusted AROA INDEX, ABHAR INDEX, EPS Surprise INDEX and M&A sum CARs after CEOs' stepping down are calculated, and at least three out of the four 
indices data should be available. More weights are given to the most recent years' performance after turnover. In specific, the post-turnover operating performance index is 
composited of 50% of most recent year AROA post turnover, 30% of 2 years post and 20% of 3 years post turnover AROA. The same weights are applied to Weighted 
ABHR and EPS Surprise performance indices. CEOs are then ranked based on weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise performance Indices, and M&A CARs mutually 
exclusively, by which each CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four (three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-ranked from 1 to 
construct the Weighted INDEX Rank І_POST. Weighted Index Rank ІІ is composed of 70% of Weighted INDEX Rank І and 30% of Weighted INDEX Rank І_POST. CEO, 
firm name and individual performance indices over and post CEO tenure are listed.  
 
RANK CEO NAME FIRM NAME 
PERFORMANCE OVER TENURE PERFORMANCE POST TENURE 
AROA 
INDEX 
ABHAR 
INDEX 
EPS SURPRISE 
INDEX 
M&A 
CAR 
AROA 
INDEX 
ABHAR 
INDEX 
EPS SURPRISE 
INDEX 
M&A 
CAR 
1 Michel de Rosen VIROPHARMA INC 51.9% 145.9% 
 
14.9% 51.1% 50.9% -37.0% -8.3% 
2 Gary J. Sbona VERITY INC 28.0% 110.8% 42.4% 24.0% 23.7% -27.3% 9.9% 6.1% 
3 Alphonse M. Lucchese CONCERTO SOFTWARE INC 29.7% 43.2% 21.9% 
 
28.9% 36.0% 43.2%   
4 Ingrid Wiik ALPHARMA INC  -CL A 38.8% 20.8% 60.5% 16.6% 41.2% 33.6% 30.5%   
5 Robert Delmont Kennedy UNION CARBIDE CORP 27.1% 51.3% 21.3% 14.7% 33.5% 22.0% 6.4%   
6 John P. Morgridge CISCO SYSTEMS INC 39.0% 
 
13.3% 11.1% 38.2% 
 
6.5% 1.4% 
7 Andrew Rudd BARRA INC 32.0% 43.3% 8.2% 12.6% 37.6% 129.6% 27.3%   
8 Timothy Joseph Barberich SEPRACOR INC 35.1% 34.4% 56.8% 
 
40.9% -1.4% 16.8% -8.8% 
9 Laurence Jay Korn PDL BIOPHARMA INC 20.4% 83.2% 41.0% 
 
22.0% 20.0% 0.2%   
10 Einar W. Sissner ALPHARMA INC  -CL A 32.4% 
 
17.0% 7.7% 35.0% 
 
0.4% 18.6% 
11 William H. Gates III MICROSOFT CORP 44.6% 69.7% 9.0% 5.4% 49.8% 30.4% 8.1% -2.9% 
12 Robert J. Doris SONIC SOLUTIONS 15.9% 90.2% 
 
23.1% 21.6% -29.1% 25.5% -5.7% 
13 Wayne T. Hockmeyer MEDIMMUNE INC 29.9% 136.3% 37.7% 2.4% 42.4% -6.5% 9.3% -3.3% 
14 Warren V. Musser SAFEGUARD SCIENTIFICS INC 14.6% 72.6% 
 
25.6% 20.6% -15.3% 
 
21.1% 
15 Philip Frey, Jr. MICROSEMI CORP 10.5% 72.3% 
 
36.0% 9.7% 102.7% 11.6% -4.7% 
16 Stephen M. Case TIME WARNER INC 23.9% 161.8% 16.6% 
 
23.6% -2.8% 11.3%   
17 Cyril C. Baldwin, Jr. CAMBREX CORP 26.3% 52.0% 
 
4.1% 30.6% 24.7% 3.6% -2.9% 
18 John Edward Warnock ADOBE SYSTEMS INC 46.5% 99.0% 7.5% 
 
57.5% -2.6% 9.0% 5.9% 
19 William D. Morean JABIL CIRCUIT INC 17.4% 242.6% 10.1% 13.0% 17.7% 7.8% 2.3% 28.8% 
20 David A. Duffield PEOPLESOFT INC 22.9% 67.0% 10.2% 2.3% 27.9% 47.0% 31.2% -12.7% 
21 Timothy Koogle YAHOO INC 27.2% 175.8% 48.3% -25.5% 29.6% 52.6% 22.6% 4.9% 
22 Henry L. Nordhoff GEN-PROBE INC 47.5% 28.5% 15.2% 1.7% 45.1% 29.2% 8.5% 2.5% 
23 Michael R. Gaulke EXPONENT INC 19.8% 38.9% 15.4% 
 
22.1% 21.6% 11.3%   
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24 Marvin J. Gralnick CHICOS FAS INC 34.9% 90.4% 6.7% 10.9% 37.1% 13.1% 2.6%   
25 Douglas W. Kohrs AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTMS HLDS 23.6% 
 
24.7% 4.2% 25.3% 
 
2.6% -20.9% 
26 Dale R. Olseth SURMODICS INC 30.4% 57.5% 12.9% 3.8% 42.0% 11.1% -1.7% 2.2% 
27 Frederick J. Rowan, II CARTER'S INC 9.2% 
 
32.4% 8.2% 8.7% 
 
77.8% 2.3% 
28 Carol A. Bartz, Ph.D. AUTODESK INC 26.6% 50.6% 34.8% 0.9% 27.8% 3.4% 5.1% -5.2% 
29 Edward L. Gallup IMMUCOR INC 57.1% 143.1% 5.1% 1.2% 63.2% 36.0% 11.3% -25.1% 
30 Edward P. Campbell NORDSON CORP 17.6% 30.1% 13.8% 5.2% 18.8% 30.5% 11.3% 2.4% 
31 Andrew S. Grove INTEL CORP 28.9% 55.9% 4.9% 8.4% 29.7% 72.7% 4.3% -25.6% 
32 King P. Kirchner UNIT CORP 10.7% 43.1% 
 
6.6% 13.3% 19.7% 
 
11.4% 
33 Douglas E. Swanson OIL STATES INTL INC 15.9% 28.0% 13.7% 3.8% 17.6% 51.5% 14.0% 8.8% 
34 Richard J. LaPorte CAPTARIS INC 35.9% 48.1% 4.8% 
 
39.7% 20.4% 20.7%   
35 Gordon M. Binder AMGEN INC 59.5% 62.8% 5.2% 
 
60.0% 18.2% 1.4% -5.5% 
36 Joseph H. Scarlett, Jr. TRACTOR SUPPLY CO 11.2% 86.7% 19.7% 
 
11.8% 20.5% -2.2% 7.9% 
37 Robert Kamerschen ADVO INC 37.3% 35.9% 5.6% 
 
46.2% 41.2% 6.0%   
38 William R. Chaney TIFFANY & CO 11.4% 37.4% 13.1% 
 
12.8% 103.9% 13.2% 7.0% 
39 Robert E. Harmon HARMON INDUSTRIES INC 16.5% 45.1% 28.5% -0.1% 16.8% 3.7% 54.5%   
40 Thomas G. Cigarran HEALTHWAYS INC 10.8% 116.9% 15.7% 
 
14.0% 24.3% 3.9%   
41 Floyd D. Gottwald, Jr. ALBEMARLE CORP 37.3% 35.6% 7.0% 9.0% 36.3% -2.5% 2.3% 1.0% 
42 Kendrick B. Melrose TORO CO 18.4% 49.8% 27.5% -1.0% 18.7% 5.9% 19.0%   
43 Dwight C. Schar NVR INC 35.8% 29.3% 9.4% 
 
34.0% 10.0% 10.0%   
44 Albert P. L. Stroucken, Ph.D. FULLER (H. B.) CO 41.6% 28.9% 18.3% -1.1% 43.8% 16.6% 9.6%   
45 John F. Keane KEANE INC 37.4% 44.8% 5.0% 2.9% 45.3% 29.4% 6.8% -10.1% 
46 Sidney W. Emery, Jr. MTS SYSTEMS CORP 23.5% 28.2% 11.1% 
 
24.5% 10.9% 16.7% 0.8% 
47 Allen J. Lauer VARIAN INC 20.6% 
 
5.8% 12.7% 20.6% 
 
6.8% -1.2% 
48 Steven J. Lee POLYMEDICA CORP 23.1% 51.8% 5.6% 
 
28.4% 47.9% 2.4%   
49 Frank P. Popoff DOW CHEMICAL 26.7% 20.5% 23.1% 
 
31.7% 27.6% 1.5% 1.5% 
50 James Brian Ferguson EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO 43.5% 24.4% 11.1% -1.2% 41.2% 52.0% 14.0% 8.3% 
51 George H. Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC 4.8% 191.2% 23.7% 4.2% 13.7% 90.6% 4.8% -0.6% 
52 David E. Maguire KEMET CORP 15.7% 61.3% 14.9% 
 
14.8% 2.8% -46.4% 2.7% 
53 Louis E. Silverman QUALITY SYSTEMS INC 33.6% 38.2% 7.1% 
 
35.5% 34.1% -5.7%   
54 G. Kirk Raab GENENTECH INC 20.9% 20.9% 21.6% 
 
26.5% 20.8% 9.9%   
55 Stephen N. Joffe LCA VISION INC 12.5% 114.9% 44.7% 
 
18.8% -27.4% -28.2%   
56 Rene Champagne ITT EDUCATIONAL SERVICES INC 31.9% 32.1% 9.4% 
 
32.0% -2.7% 11.4%   
57 James C. Morgan APPLIED MATERIALS INC 13.2% 41.4% 21.8% 4.6% 7.6% -7.4% 19.5% -4.2% 
58 Bernard J. Couillaud COHERENT INC 13.4% 66.5% 6.3% 8.1% 12.9% 6.0% 39.4% -4.9% 
59 Matthew E. Massengill WESTERN DIGITAL CORP 17.2% 59.2% 31.6% -19.5% 19.2% 37.5% 15.0% -0.4% 
60 Howard B. Witt LITTELFUSE INC 15.8% 27.3% 17.0% 5.7% 15.5% 7.0% 8.4% -3.4% 
61 Ben T. Harris GENESCO INC 8.8% 40.5% 26.2% 
 
11.3% -2.1% 38.8% 2.8% 
62 Rodney Smith ALTERA CORP 24.4% 67.1% 4.8% 5.1% 27.0% 10.7% 3.1%   
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63 Thomas N. Urban PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONL 20.9% 36.8% 10.2% 
 
22.0% 31.4% -28.0%   
64 Thomas R. Pledger DYCOM INDUSTRIES INC 20.7% 123.1% 
 
-2.3% 21.6% 15.9% 6.8% -14.2% 
65 H. Tom Buelter ON ASSIGNMENT INC 48.2% 57.6% 5.5% 
 
50.1% -21.1% -23.2% -0.5% 
66 William J. Cadogan ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 13.7% 49.1% 8.5% 32.5% 10.3% -24.8% 10.3%   
67 John B. Carrington WEBSENSE INC 15.0% 43.9% 11.4% 
 
13.0% -8.6% 10.1% -3.0% 
68 Robert F. Spoerry, Dipl. Masch METTLER-TOLEDO INTL INC 22.4% 31.5% 7.0% 
 
24.3% 19.8% 7.8%   
69 Donald George Fisher GAP INC 22.4% 41.5% 4.1% 
 
19.4% 56.1% 6.4%   
70 Walter E. Boomer ROGERS CORP 37.8% 31.9% 10.5% 1.9% 40.0% -4.4% 3.0%   
71 Robert A. Davies III CHURCH & DWIGHT INC 41.1% 26.1% 10.8% -2.2% 42.6% 25.7% 9.5% 0.0% 
72 John S. Brinzo CLIFFS NATURAL RESOURCES INC 26.8% 48.8% 2.2% 
 
33.6% 70.1% 5.0%   
73 James D. Armstrong JDA SOFTWARE GROUP INC 19.0% 35.0% 40.4% -3.9% 14.7% -4.3% 37.0% -3.4% 
74 Richard A. Aurelio VARIAN SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMT 11.1% 28.6% 27.4% 
 
7.2% 41.3% 3.1%   
75 C. B. Rogers, Jr. EQUIFAX INC 17.7% 31.1% 4.5% 7.4% 19.2% 41.2% 3.2%   
76 Douglas V. Smith LUFKIN INDUSTRIES INC 22.6% 45.1% 2.6% 
 
25.2% 38.7% 12.2% 0.4% 
77 Martin H. Loeffler AMPHENOL CORP 22.1% 35.4% 5.1% 1.3% 22.5% 32.9% 6.2%   
78 Fred M. Butler MANITOWOC CO 12.3% 45.0% 7.9% 0.6% 15.7% 37.7% 3.3% 44.4% 
79 William H. Rastetter BIOGEN IDEC INC 36.3% 48.8% 2.4% 
 
34.5% 29.1% 0.5% 2.1% 
80 Wendell P. Hurlbut ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES CORP 9.9% 51.6% 17.5% 2.7% 11.9% 17.9% -1.7% -1.9% 
81 Christopher A. Kuebler COVANCE INC 17.9% 42.7% 5.1% 
 
18.7% 32.6% 1.6% 3.8% 
82 Eric J. Crown INSIGHT ENTERPRISES INC 20.1% 69.1% 9.3% -5.5% 23.9% 22.8% 3.7% 18.4% 
83 Darwin Deason AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICES 22.1% 
 
3.4% 13.4% 27.7% 
 
0.6% 1.1% 
84 Charles B. Wang CA INC 35.8% 29.6% 2.1% 
 
39.3% 64.7% 23.6%   
85 Richard M. Levy, Ph.D. VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC 28.5% 31.3% 9.9% 0.2% 29.6% 5.2% 7.8% -6.5% 
86 Robert J. O'Toole SMITH (A O) CORP 9.1% 26.0% 21.8% 2.8% 7.2% 18.9% 18.7% 5.0% 
87 James B. Perry ARGOSY GAMING CO 13.3% 41.7% 25.6% -3.5% 9.7% 37.8% 6.4%   
88 Lawrence J. Mosner DELUXE CORP 28.8% 
 
3.3% 4.4% 23.4% 
 
9.3% -0.8% 
89 Anthony L. Andersen FULLER (H. B.) CO 27.2% 26.8% 5.5% 3.7% 29.7% 21.1% 4.2%   
90 Matthew Szulik RED HAT INC 4.4% 32.0% 17.3% 33.2% 4.1% 35.2% 14.4% -7.0% 
91 James W. Bagley LAM RESEARCH CORP 14.2% 17.2% 25.5% 
 
18.1% 28.4% 12.0% 0.3% 
92 Mark C. Smith ADTRAN INC 18.5% 42.8% 8.8% 
 
20.6% -2.3% 2.2%   
93 William S. Kellogg KOHL'S CORP 14.1% 68.5% 3.5% 
 
13.2% 52.0% 7.7%   
94 Clark A. Johnson PIER 1 IMPORTS INC/DE 12.3% 65.0% 6.0% 
 
16.1% 25.2% 3.6%   
95 Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 29.9% 43.3% 2.2% 9.0% 29.2% 0.0% 3.0% -3.6% 
96 John P. Jones, III AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC 44.2% 29.5% 2.3% 3.1% 45.8% 21.7% 2.4% 3.9% 
97 David Schwartz BIO-RAD LABORATORIES INC 21.7% 54.9% 
 
-8.3% 24.8% 3.0% 12.7% 7.5% 
98 Scott M Niswonger FORWARD AIR CORP 26.0% 31.9% 6.9% 
 
24.9% -1.7% 5.2%   
99 Pete M. Nicholas BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 27.6% 39.8% 2.2% 5.7% 25.5% -27.3% 6.2% 7.7% 
100 Terry D. Growcock MANITOWOC CO 12.2% 57.3% 9.6%   15.5% 16.3% -14.7%   
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5.7 Conclusion 
The main research objectives in chapter three and four are to define long-term successful 
CEO Champions and examine their successors; whereas this chapter mainly aims at 
constructing effective measurement indices to rank CEOs, current or left ones, by their long-
term performance. With methodology in chapter three and four improved, chapter five 
employs five- year-prior weighted performance indices. Five years are utilised to both reflect 
variance across time and performance over the long term. The new ranking system aims at 
improving Harvard Business Review's ranking method and encouraging the board of 
directors, analysts and shareholders to evaluate CEOs based on long-term performance from 
various dimensions. Similar to HBR’s ranking, this study does reveal hidden gems, who are 
away from the glare of the cover stories and successfully manage relatively smaller firms 
amongst the top 1500 firms in the U.S over the five years period.  
HBR’s performance metrics mainly focus on stock returns, i.e., country-adjusted company 
returns, industry-adjusted company returns, and market capitalization change. However, 
HBR’s method is substantially improved in this study by introducing not only stock 
performance metric but also operating, investment and EPS surprise performance metrics. 
The diverse dimensions ensure that CEOs ranked on the top have created value for firms’ 
shareholders in every respect. Also, the innovative ranking method provides the board of 
directors with a new judgemental approach to CEO evaluation and reward system. Apart 
from creating value for their firms over their tenure, CEOs have another vital task to cultivate 
and pave the way for their successors. Thus, in the separate ranking, CEOs’ three-year post 
turnover weighted performance is also taken into account for the overall rankings. The top 
100 CEO lists are presented to reveal the successful CEOs who create value for the past five 
years, and for prior and post the turnovers, respectively. From the tests of logistic regressions 
and multinomial logistic regressions of forced turnovers on single performance measures and 
CEO rankings, CEO performance ranking is found to negatively and significantly associated 
with a forced turnover dummy, suggesting hypothesis one that higher ranked CEOs are less 
likely to be forced out is supported. Also, CEO ranking measure has better prediction power 
than other forced turnover models with single performance measure, i.e., AROA, ABHAR, 
M&A CARs and EPS Surprise, indicating hypotheses two is supported. The results combined 
demonstrate the weighted performance ranking in this study is a better ranking method than 
HBR’s stock returns focus method and the single performance measures.  
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6 Conclusion and Further Research 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion of the Thesis 
This thesis has studied several aspects of CEO turnover events and CEO performance 
measurements. In Chapter 2, the general literature on firm performance around CEO turnover 
and potential measures in defining successful CEOs are reviewed, with a particular focus on 
firm performance in defining successful CEOs. The review also explains how board quality, 
corporate governance, and CEO succession plan may affect managerial successions. 
Moreover, it highlights the potential key drivers of successful replacement. 
Based on the theoretical foundations of the literature, the second part of this thesis presents 
three in-depth empirical analyses of CEO Champions’ replacement and CEO rankings. 
Chapter three examines whether corporate boards manage to replace successful CEOs with 
equally (or even superior) capable successors who manage to drive their companies to 
continuous success. Also, whether successors’ performance relies on that of their 
predecessors’. I construct two measure indices to define champion CEOs. From Huson et al. 
(2004)’ improved management hypothesis, poor firm performance could result from either 
poor manager quality or bad luck. Thus, successors' performance after a forced turnover is 
expected to increase due to either the anticipated increase in manager quality or the reversion 
of bad luck. The same applies to champions’ departure, and the performance of their 
successors are expected to reverse due to luck reversion. Besides, growth cyclicality and 
priorities diversion may also lead to champions’ successors’ performance reversion. On the 
other hand, champions’ successors are expected to be able to sustain the above average 
performance, i.e., better predecessors tend to be replaced by better successors based on the 
CEO Champions effective replacement conjecture, remaining influence conjecture, and 
legacy conjecture. The results show that CEO Champions' successors outperform non-
champions’ successors. Although champion’ successors cannot sustain their predecessors’ 
performance in the univariate framework due to luck reversion, growth cyclicality and 
priorities diversion, they tend to generate as superior operating performance as their 
predecessors after controlling for growth cyclicality in the multivariate framework. Also, 
predecessors’ legacy significantly affects successors’ performance in voluntary turnover 
events. As a result, corporate boards are able to replace CEO Champions effectively. 
Chapter 4 explores under what circumstances successors tend to outperform their champion 
predecessors and examines the conflicting arguments regarding the relation between insider 
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dummy and successful replacement. There is a divergence of views on the relations between 
firm performance and insider origin since replacement by insiders can either suggest good 
succession plans or increased managerial entrenchment; thus, the second analysis in this 
thesis explores whether insider or outsider successors are more likely to replace their 
champion predecessors successfully. It documents a robust negative relation between insider 
dummy and successful replacement, indicating that outsiders are more apt to replace 
champion predecessors effectively.  
In line with the reputational capital view of directorships, the busy board is found to have 
better capability to replace champion CEOs successfully. This finding reinforces the 
argument that busy boards tend to have valuable experience while sitting on different boards 
simultaneously. The firms operated by champions require less monitor but broader visions 
and more strategic direction than other firms. Champion predecessors are more likely to be 
reappointed to the board, and their successors are more likely to sustain the continuous 
success. Champion founders' successors are demonstrated to have better performance 
improvement, indicating that champion founders are less likely to be entrenched.  
The final empirical analysis focuses on constructing two weighted performance-based 
measurement indices to build top 100 CEO lists, which can be applied to rank CEOs who 
have stepped down or still in office. Compared with HBR's CEO ranking method, I employ 
more firm performance dimensions and impose more restrictions. The innovative ranking 
measures provide corporate boards with valuable reference, which can prompt directors to 
restore poor performance proactively by hiring new CEOs and reward CEO Champions. 
Results from the logistic regressions and multinomial logistic regression of turnover on single 
performance measures and CEO ranking show that CEO ranking is negatively and 
significantly associated with a forced turnover dummy. This result indicates that higher 
ranked CEOs are less likely to be forced out. Most importantly, I test CEO rankings in 
forecasting forced turnover events, and CEO ranking is demonstrated to have better 
prediction power than other forced turnover models with single performance measure.  
6.2 Implications for Finance Practice 
This study provides the board of directors with a new method to rank CEOs and evaluate 
CEOs’ performance from eight various respective. Evaluated by rankings of  industry-
adjusted operating, stock performance, EPS surprise, and investment performance, CEOs 
qualified in the list are more likely to generate great value for their shareholders and meet the 
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majority expectations from investors, analysts and shareholders. As the results from this 
study indicated, CEOs with worse rankings are more likely to be forced out due to poor 
performance. The Top 100 CEO lists can be updated on an annual basis and published to the 
public for the Board of Directors’ reference and for CEOs’ self-evaluation purposes.  
6.3 Research Limitations 
Some limitations should be noted in this dissertation. First, the actual performance 
measurements employed by the board of directors to evaluate CEOs are unobservable to the 
public, and this “soft” information is critical in assessing and firing CEOs (Cornelli, 
Kominek, and Ljungqvist, 2013). Selecting available performance measurements to 
evaluate CEOs is vital in this study and choosing the wrong measures might distort the 
results. Stock returns are widely used by most studies (HBR focus mainly on stock 
performance). However, it tends to be a problematic measure of CEO performance since 
share prices are forward-looking and incorporate investors’ expectation and assessment of the 
firm. Also, there is overvaluation or undervaluation issue involved with stock returns. Engle, 
Hayes, and Wang (2003) argue that accounting measurements should be weighted more 
heavily and market-based performance should receive less weight in turnover decisions when 
accounting returns are relatively more precise and highly correlated with stock returns. Stock 
returns tend to capture many factors and contain many noises which are not related to current 
CEO’s performance. This partially explains why stock returns show different results from 
other three performance measures in the univariate analysis of performance comparisons of 
champions and their successors. The adverse effect of choosing inappropriate measures have 
been partially mitigated by constructing two different measure indices using eight different 
measurements in this study. The beat % method should be free of firm size effect, and the 
issue relates to noises in the stock returns. Moreover, the main sample in this study includes 
the voluntary succession events that occurred amongst S&P 1500 firms, which restricts the 
scope of this study to CEOs of relatively large companies with U.S. headquarter. Finally, this 
dissertation cannot and does not attempt to understand the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions, but instead controls for them through the fixed effect of the hiring year for each 
CEO. 
As Weisbach (1995) suggested, CEO turnovers are essential events for firms since they lead 
to reversals of poor prior decisions. In specific, CEOs are more likely to be fired for poor 
performance, and voluntary restructurings tend to follow poor performance (John, Lang and 
Netter, 1992). However, CEO turnover is endogenous and partially determined by the firm’s 
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performance, and the econometric evidence of reversals could merely reflect the endogeneity 
of turnover. For investment performance, the reversals in firm performance might be 
consistent with firms making an optimal acquisition and divestiture decisions independent of 
any management successions. Firms might divest poorly performing divisions and CEOs 
might be fired merely because firms realised that acquisitions are not value-maximizing and 
should be sold. The same endogeneity issue might apply to champions’ voluntary leave. The 
superior performance over champions’ tenure might reflect the greater operating or financial 
synergies at the earlier stage of the acquisitions, which might be deteriorating during their 
successor’s tenure. The endogeneity issue should have been further addressed.    
6.4 Discussion on potential issues 
6.4.1 Endogeneity concerns 
Although the findings of this study are informative, it is open to multiple interpretations. 
Companies of CEO Champions perform well even after them stepping down, and the 
relatively good performance after turnovers could be attributed to either the board of 
directors' replacement decisions or the legacy of departing champions. Champions’ legacy 
could lead to better performance regardless of successors' quality. Another possible driver is 
the endogeneity between successful firms and good CEOs, i.e., successful companies will 
seek to hire better quality CEOs and, similarly, capable candidates will aim to become the 
CEOs at successful firms. Another potential endogeneity issue in this study is omitted 
variables concern. Control variables have been demonstrated to be varied across studies on 
CEO turnover and firm performance; thus, the potential for omitted variables and 
endogeneity biases are present in most CEO turnover studies. The same concerns apply to 
this study. CEO turnover event itself is also endogenous and partially determined by firm 
performance. The poor operating and stock performance tends to lead to a forced turnover, 
and performance is more likely to be improved after the forced turnover event. It seems CEO 
turnover leads to the reversal of poor performance; however, the econometric evidence of 
reversals could merely reflect the endogeneity of turnover events. The same applies to the 
investment performance. Reversals in firm investment performance might be consistent with 
firms making an optimal acquisition and divestiture decisions independent of management 
successions. 
The selected style hypothesis proposed by Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) suggest that 
causal managerial-style effects are deliberately selected by the board to induce the 
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corporation to move in a particular direction. However, firms may select new CEOs precisely 
when they have decided to make other changes. On the other hand, better quality successors 
are more likely to seek a career in more successful firms. Given the endogeneity of CEO 
selection, it is difficult to identify separately the effect of a new CEO on firm policies and the 
effect of the board’s directive for the firm to pursue a new direction, i.e., it is unclear whether 
any altered firm choices are the reflection of the style of the new CEO or the board would 
instruct the new CEO to make prescribed changes no matter who is the successor. Previous 
studies tried to circumvent these issues arising from endogeneity concerns by focusing on 
CEO unexpected deaths since the exit of the departing CEO and need for replacement are 
exogenous (Johnson et al., 1985; Sala, 2010; Bennedsen et al., 2008). Other research study 
turnover events involved with age-based natural retirements as exogenous turnovers (e.g., 
Denis and Denis, 1995). These turnover events can shed more lights on whether CEO style 
plays an independent role in firm policies.  
Fee et al. (2013) also study exogenous CEO departures to circumvent endogeneity concerns, 
and their finding is consistent with the causal relationship between style and firm policies and 
with the board’s anticipation of these effects in their choice of replacement. Their 
documented evidence implies this study that the board of directors is likely to select one CEO 
who fit the company’s strategies and may continue to do so to select the successor. This 
behaviour further implies that the underlying mechanism governing firm policies should 
reflect the economic factors at the board or firm level, rather than at the CEO level. This 
study intends to circumvent endogeneity concerns and focus only on exogenous CEO 
departures, i.e., voluntary turnover events. Although Fee et al. (2013) did not identify any 
CEO style on firm policies for the whole exogenous CEO departures sample, this study 
provides insightful results by focusing on management changes of the top-performers among 
exogenous CEO departures. However, the continuous superior performance might attribute to 
the endogenous between excellent board choices in successful firms and successful CEO’s 
career choices. The ambiguity of the source of the continuous success after turnover events 
should have been resolved. This endogenous issue could have been solved by studying the 
matched successful CEO sample without turnover events. In specific, one possible solution is 
to match pairs of successful CEOs’ companies that do not have turnovers with the CEO 
Champions’ sample. The matching criteria would serve to show that these companies have 
been similar regarding CEOs characteristics and performance up until the point of the 
turnovers. The differences in their performance after turnover events can then be measured 
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and compared. If successors of champions are found to outperform incumbent CEOs, the 
continuous success can be attributed to the newly appointed CEOs. On the other hand, it will 
demonstrate that legacy is not significant enough to maintain super performance if successors 
underperform incumbent CEOs. The outcome will be uninformative if the performance 
comparisons are similar since performance may persist because either the successor has been 
capable or the legacy is strong enough to sustain super performance momentum. 
6.4.2 Performance measures bias concerns 
This study constructs unique CEO performance measures and rankings, which are based on 
long-term firm performance from different dimensions. Performance measures aim at 
capturing the value created for shareholders over CEOs' tenure. However, constraining top 
CEOs with a high ranking of AROA, ABHR, EPS Surprise and MA CARs may lead the 
author to select firms with relatively smaller size within S&P 1500. Whereas the second 
ranking method (AROA2, ABHR2, EPS Surprise2 and MA CARs2) based only on how 
many times beat control sample or analyst forecasts should be free from this issue. Although 
size is controlled in the regression framework, it is ideal to create an unbiased ranking in the 
first place. In detail, earnings are more volatile for smaller firms; therefore smaller firms with 
good performance are more likely to be in the top of the performance distribution, i.e., within 
the top performers, earnings volatility is in favour of the smaller companies. Earnings 
surprises are more likely for firms suffering from more information asymmetry between 
management and investors. Small firms and extra-large firms may suffer more from the 
information asymmetry, with the former due to secrecy and the latter due to the sheer size or 
institutional complexity. It is a well-documented fact that fewer analysts follow small firms; 
and thus, smaller firms with less attention tend to be misvalued. Mergers and acquisitions are 
more likely for a small number of firms. Literature suggests that the majority of acquisitions 
can be attributed to a small group of serial acquirers. The fewer the number of deals 
performed by a CEO, the less likely it is to judge the CEO's quality in investment decisions. 
Overall, it seems that not accounting for size has created classification issues and it could 
lead to spurious results. The same may hold for other factors, such as growth opportunities 
(value-growth) and momentum (stock-market component).  The potential approach to solving 
this size induced issue is to control for size in the measurements. Fama and French's 25 size 
and book-to-market portfolio BHAR measurements (FF-BHAR) could have been chosen as 
alternatives to replace industry-adjusted BHAR. However, FF-BHAR did not control for 
industry, which is widely and commonly controlled in CEO turnover study. For operating 
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performance, although most turnover literature used industry-adjusted ROA, Barber and 
Lyon (1996)'s control group ROA may also be considered to control for mean reversion. In 
specific, adjust ROA for the median ROA of a control group of firms that are from the same 
industry and have similar prior operating performance (±10% ROA) in each fiscal year. By 
adjusting similar prior operating performance, the degree of earnings volatility should have 
been restricted, which may avoid selecting smaller firms. For investment performance, 
investment efficiency could be a potential alternative to MA sum CARs.  
On the other hand, there might be the persistent difference in practices across firms due to 
specific unobservable factors, which might be correlated with the manager fixed effects. It 
implies that manager fixed effects should have been separated from firm fixed effects to 
study individual CEO’s performance (Bertrand and Shoar, 2003). However, this study 
focuses on voluntary turnovers, with 80% CEO successors are promoted within. The effect of 
managers on corporate practices cannot be estimated separately from their firm fixed effects 
for these insiders. Also, top executives are not randomly allocated to the firms. Thus, the firm 
fixed effect is not controlled in this study.  
6.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
Several results presented in this thesis can be extended and developed further in different 
ways. This section describes possible directions of future research based on the findings of 
the empirical analyses. 
6.5.1 Underinvestment and CEO Turnover 
Chapter three has demonstrated that corporate boards did an excellent job in replacing CEO 
Champions who delivered superior investment performance over their tenure. Also, Mitchell 
and Lehn (1990) and Lehn and Zhao (2006) find evidence that CEOs could be penalised for 
making value-decreasing acquisition decisions and the corporate board can successfully 
replace the value-destroying CEOs. However, the agency problems of managerial 
underinvestment tend to be understated by the board, while those of overinvestment have 
been overstated. Under efficient contracting prediction theory, once board found 
underinvestment, they tend to increase performance-based compensation to motive CEO to 
increase investment (Baxamusa, 2012). On the other hand, Yim (2013) argues that 
under/overinvestment is driven by age effect. In specific, CEOs tend to invest more in the 
earlier stage and reduce investment in the later stage of their tenure due to age-varying 
incentives. Both young and old CEOs who initiate more M&A deals (even bad deals) are less 
188 
 
likely to be fired, compared to non-bidders. Firms with above average level investment 
opportunities that managed by old CEOs could suffer from massive underinvestment problem 
(Serfling, 2012). There are contradictory findings in Pan et al.’s (2016) that CEOs tend to 
disinvest at the beginning of their tenure and increase investment (CAPEX, M&A) in the 
later years during their term of office. Given the recent debate about age effect and 
overstate/understate of CEOs’ underinvestment, it would be important to examine whether 
corporate boards (internal control mechanisms) tend to penalise underinvestment? If yes, how 
corporate boards penalise the underinvestment? Is forced CEO turnover mainly driven by 
underinvestment, overinvestment or bad investment? Underinvestment/Overinvestment (the 
proxy for CEO optimism) is measured in Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and 
Stanley (2011)’s as the firm’s industry-adjusted70 investment level that maximises firm’s 
value. Low-optimism CEOs are CEOs manage companies with investment rates in the 
bottom quintile of their industry, while high-optimism CEOs are CEOs manage firms with 
investment rates in the top quintile of their industry. They find that CEO optimism is the 
main determinant for forced CEO turnover, which infers that under/overinvestment could be 
the main determinant for a forced turnover as well. 
6.5.2 CEO Champions as Successors 
Another interesting extension of the evidence shown in Chapter 3 would be to analyse the 
CEO sample who held CEO roles in more than one organisations. Among these CEOs, 
champions can be identified by examining firm performance over their tenure. It would be 
important to test whether CEO Champions who have stepped down but re-appointed as other 
firms’ CEOs tend to sustain their superior performance in new organisations with different 
culture sets. 
6.5.3 CEO Ranking with Investment Efficiency 
Chapter 5 has constructed CEO rankings by using four firm performance in various 
dimensions. I impose the requirement that at least three out of four measures should be 
available to mitigate the fact that some CEOs might not initiate any M&A deals during their 
tenure. To improve this, the M&A sum CARs can be replaced by investment efficiency 
measures. To construct investment efficiency measures, a model which predicts firm 
investment levels can be built. The residuals from the model are the proxy for inefficient 
                                                          
70
 To compare with the industry average investment level: subtract the firm's investment (CAPEX, M&A, 
R&D/Sales, % Change in Assets) from the median/mean 3-digit SIC industry investment to measure the 
under/overinvestment (Baxamusa, 2012).            
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investment for the firm. The data are from the Compustat Annual file from 1980 to 2003 
(Richardson
71
, 2006). His measure uses an accounting-based framework to estimate new 
investment as the difference between total investment and investment required for 
maintenance of assets in place. On the other hand, Hubbard (1998) only use capital 
expenditures as a proxy for investment, which is frequently utilised in the literature. By using 
industry-adjusted operating, stock performance, EPS surprise and investment efficiency as 
metrics to construct the rankings, CEOs should have all four performance measures data 
available to be qualified in the list. The improved Top 100 CEO lists can be updated on an 
annual basis and published to the public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71
 Total new Investment in a given firm-year is the sum of capital expenditures (item 128), R&D expenditures 
(item 46), and acquisitions (item 129) minus sales of PPE (item 107) and depreciation and amortization (item 
125) multiplied by 100 and scaled by average total assets (item 6) from Compustat. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definition  
Variables   Definition  
PANEL A: CEO CHARACTERISTICS 
AGE (YEARS)    
Age of the CEO in the year of hiring (successors) or leaving 
(predecessor).  
 Tenure of the CEO served as CEO in the firm. Tenure (year) for 
successors is estimated from the date they became CEO until the 
last day in our dataset for those who have not left office until 31 
Dec 2012.  
TENURE (YEARS) 
  
 
SALARY  
 
Salary is the Salary item from ExecuComp 
 
BONUS  
 
Bonus is the Bonus item from ExecuComp 
 
 TDC1 item from ExecuComp, which comprises of salary, bonus, 
other annual compensation, the total value of restricted stock 
granted, the total value of stock options granted (using black-
scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensation.  
TOTAL COMPENSATION 
 
  
COMPENSATION (%)  The ratio of total compensation (TDC1) to the firm’s total assets 
(AT from Compustat) at the fiscal years of their departure 
(appointment).    
FEMALE (%)  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and zero if the 
CEO is male from ExecuComp. 
  
FOUNDER (%)  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor is (co-) founders 
of the firm and zero otherwise. 
  
REMAIN_BOARD (%) An indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served on 
the board after departure.  
  
REMAIN_CHAIR (%)  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the predecessor still served as 
chairman after departure.  
  
INSIDER (%)  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the successor holds other 
managerial position (s) in the firm for no less than one years before 
becoming CEOs (Huson et al., 2004). INSIDER is the proxy for a 
succession plan.      
SERVEYEAR Number of years that insider successors hold other managerial 
positions in the firms before becoming CEOs.  
  
CHAIRMAN DUALITY (%)  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the 
BoD and zero otherwise. 
 
SAMEDATE  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover announcement dates 
and successors’ hire announcement dates are the same dates. 
SAMEDATE is the proxy for a succession plan.    
     
PANEL B: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
ASSETS  
 
Total assets (in millions) from Compustat.  
SALES  
 
Sales (in millions) from Compustat.  
  
MKTCAP 
 Common shares outstanding (in millions) multiplied by fiscal year 
end stock price from Compustat. 
  
MARKET-TO-BOOK The market value of equity over book value of equity from 
Compustat.  The market-to-book ratio has been winsorized at 1% 
and 99% level.    
  
Calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of current 
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liabilities and long-term debt divided by book value of equity plus 
book value of current liabilities and long-term debt from 
Compustat. Q has been winsorized at 1% and 99% level.  Q  
GASSETS 
 
Annual average Growth in Assets 
GSALES 
 
Annual average Growth in Sales 
GMARKETCAP 
 
Annual average Growth in Market capitalization 
GMARKET-TO-BOOK 
 
Annual average Growth in Market-to-Book ratio 
GQ 
 
Annual average Growth in Q 
FIRST1 
 First1 is one year before the first fiscal year when predecessors take 
office (maximal ten years before turnover). 
  
TENURE1 
 
Tenure1 is over predecessors’ tenure or 10 years if their tenure 
exceeds ten years.  
TURNOVER 
Turnover is one year before the fiscal year predecessors stepped 
down.  
FIRST2 
 First2 is one year before the fiscal year successors take office . 
  
TENURE2 
 
Tenure2 is over successors' tenure ( maximum 10 years) 
LAST 
 Last is one year before successors' (estimated) tenure end year 
(maximal ten years after a turnover). 
  
     
PANEL C: CEO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
AROA 
 
Annual median industry-adjusted ROA, which is the average of 
median industry-adjusted ROA over CEO tenure (maximum ten 
years). 2-digit Compustat SIC code is used (1-digit Compustat SIC 
code is used if the 2-digit code is missing) and firms in my sample 
are excluded from calculating the industry median ROA for the 
same 2-digit (1-digit) Compustat SIC code and same year as 
sample firms. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), ROA is 
calculated as Operating Income after Depreciation divided by the 
average of the Beginning period and Ending period Total Assets. 
AROA is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ABHAR 
 
Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return 
BHARi = BHRi - BHRind, Where BHRi is the buy and hold return 
of firm i over CEO's tenure (maximum 10 years), and BHRind is 
the median buy and hold return of all firms in the same industry 
(same 2-digit Compustat SIC code or 1-digit if 2-digit code is 
missing) for the same period. BHARi is then annualised to get 
annual median industry-adjusted BHAR. The requirement that at 
least five consecutive years’ stock return before the turnover and at 
least one year’s stock return after a turnover is imposed to ensure 
continuity and the final stock performance sample is 1522 cases.  
Compustat SIC code was used across all databases to do industry-
adjusted analysis since more than 36% of the classifications 
between Compustat and CRSP disagree at the 2-digit level and 
Compustat matched samples are more powerful than CRSP 
matched samples in detecting abnormal performance (Kahle and 
Walkling, 1996). Also, the main sample is derived from 
Execucomp, and major performance measurement is AROA.  
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 EPS SURPRISE 
 
Earnings Per Share Surprise over CEO's tenure (maximum ten 
years)= (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter 
t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. 
In specific, analyst forecasted EPS is the median forecast from all 
analysts those made a forecast in the last 90 days before firms' 
earning announcement. If an analyst made multiple forecasts 
during this period, the most recent one is taken. Similarly, the 
requirement that at least five consecutive years’ EPS Surprise 
before the turnover and at least one year’s EPS Surprise after a 
turnover was imposed to ensure continuity and the final EPS 
Surprise sample is 1498 cases. EPS Surprise is winsorized at the 1 
and 99 percentile.  
 M&A CARs SUM CARs of all deals made by predecessors (successors) over 
their tenure (maximum ten years). Following Brown & Warner 
(1985), acquisition Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are 
calculated over (-1, +1) window using CRSP value-weighted index 
(the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
stocks). Market model parameters were estimated over (-250,-15) 
window relative to the acquisition announcement day. 
  
  
  
AROA2 
 The number of years where AROA is positive divided by the 
corresponding total number of years. 
  
ABHAR2  
 
The number of years (months in chapter 5) where ABHAR is 
positive divided by the corresponding total number of years 
(months in Chapter 5).    
EPS SURPRISE2 The number of years (quarters in chapter 5) where EPS Surprise is 
positive divided by the corresponding total number of years 
(quarters in chapter 5).    
M&A CARs2 The number of deals made by predecessors (successors) over their 
tenure or 10 years before (after) the turnover if their tenure exceeds 
ten years which have positive CARs divided by the corresponding 
total number of deals.  
  
  
     
PANEL D: CEO CHAMPIONS VARIABLES 
AVG RANKING1 To identify CEO Champions, all predecessors in the voluntary 
turnover sample are first ranked based on the four performance 
measures (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs) 
mutually exclusively. I require that each CEO should have data for 
at least any three of the four measures. By doing this, champion 
CEOs are not limited to those who have to initiate M&A deals 
during their tenure, and it gives 1371 turnover cases. I rank each 
CEO—from 1 (best) to 1371 (worst)—for each metric and get the 
AVG RANKING1, which is the average of the four (three if 
anyone is missing) performance measurements’ rankings.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
AVG RANKING2 To identify CEO Champions, all predecessors in the voluntary 
turnover sample are first ranked based on the four performance 
measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2) 
mutually exclusively. Each CEO should have data for at least any 
three of the four measures. I rank each CEO—from 1 (best) to 1371 
(worst)—for each metric and get the AVG RANKING2, which is 
the average of the four (three if anyone is missing) performance 
measurements’ rankings.  
  
  
  
  
  
 MEASURES INDEX ONE 
 AVG RANKING1 is re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create CEO 
Champion Measures Index One. 
 
 
 MEASURE INDEX TWO 
 AVG RANKING2 is re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create CEO 
Champion Measures Index Two. 
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CEO CHAMPION LEAGUE І        
 
Top tercile performed (458) CEOs ranked by Measures Index One. 
CEO CHAMPION LEAGUEII    
 
Top tercile performed (458) CEOs ranked by Measure Index Two. 
     
PANEL E: MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
CHAMPION І/ІІ   
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is one of the top-
tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measures Index One/Two, 0 
otherwise. 
SUCCESSOR  
 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 
otherwise. 
CHAMPION І/ІІ'S  Dummy variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion 
league І/ІІ CEO’s successor, 0 otherwise.  SUCCESSOR 
 The natural log of the number of years firms in operations from 
Compustat.  LOG (FIRM AGE)  
 
The annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets 
over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around 
turnover from Compustat. The annual CPI Data for inflation 
calculation are from Bob Shiller’s Web site 
(www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm).  
  
LOG (FIRM ASSETS) 
 
  
GSALES  
 
The annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over 
predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around 
turnover from Compustat.   
MTB 
 
The annual average market value of equity over book value of 
equity over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) 
around turnover from Compustat.    
PRE 
 
The pre-turnover predecessors Measures Index One z-scores. I 
transfer Measures Index One into z-scores since ranks are discrete 
data. After transferring into normally distributed continuous data, I 
can use t statistics to interpret the results. The opposite number of 
z-scores is used to ensure that larger Z-scores reflect better CEOs' 
performance. 
  
  
  
SIZE 
 
Board size, which is the total number of directors sitting on the 
board from RiskMetrics Director one year before the turnover 
events.    
  
Board of director independence percentage, which is the percentage 
of independent directors sitting on the board relative to the firm’s 
total directors from RiskMetrics one year before the turnover 
events.  
INDEP 
 
  
BUSY 
 
Busy board dummy, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
more than 50% independent directors serve on three or more boards 
from RiskMetrics Director one year before the turnover events.   
GINDEX  
 
GIM index equals the sum of 24 anti-takeover provisions following 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), from RiskMetrics Governance 
one year before the turnover events.    
  
Entrenchment index, defined as the sum of six anti-takeover 
provisions following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) and 
downloaded from the shared datasets on Bebchuk’s Harvard Law 
School profile. Data on the Entrenchment Index 1990-2006 is 
available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. All the 
corporate governance variables are matched with the turnover 
sample one year before the turnover and filled with the missing 
data using nearest available data. 
  
EINDEX 
 
  
  
  
OWNER 
 Average stock ownership of all directors sitting on the board from 
RiskMetrics one year before the turnover events.  
  
∆AGE  
 
CEO age difference in the year of hiring (successors), leaving 
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(predecessor) 
∆TENURE  
 
Post-pre turnover years the CEO served as CEO in the firm. 
 
∆DUALITY  Post-pre turnover CEO also served as chairman.  
 
∆COMPENSATION  Post-pre turnover the ratio of total compensation to the firm’s total 
assets at the fiscal years of their departure (appointment).  
  
∆ASSETS  
 Changes in annual average Ln (Assets) around turnover over 
predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years).  
  
∆GSALES 
 Changes in the annual average growth in sales around turnover 
over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years).  
  
∆MTB  
 
Changes in the annual average market value of equity over book 
value of equity around turnover over predecessors’ and successors’ 
tenure (max ten years).    
 
PANEL E: MAIN DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MEASURES INDEX ONE  
(Z-SCORES) 
AVG RANKING1 is re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create CEO 
Champion Measures Index One. Measures Index One is transferred 
into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After transferring into 
normally distributed continuous data, t statistics can be used to 
interpret the results.  
  
MEASURE INDEX TWO  AVG RANKING2 is re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create CEO 
Champion Measures Index Two. Measures Index Two is 
transferred into z-scores since ranks are discrete data. After 
transferring into normally distributed continuous data, t statistics 
can be used to interpret the results.  
(Z-SCORES) 
 
  
REPLACE 
 
REPLACE is coded to take the value of one if successors are also 
ranked among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking 
methodology as their champion predecessors, suggesting that 
successors have successfully replaced their predecessors by 
inhering the championship among their peers. 
  
  
BEAT  
 BEAT is coded to take the value of one if the successor who ranked 
among the top 458 CEOs following the same ranking methodology 
as champions beat predecessor' rank, suggesting that the successor 
has successfully replaced the champion predecessor by achieving a 
higher rank among the peers. 
  
  
TURNOVER I 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced turnover, 
and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover or it was not 
involved with turnover events.   
TURNOVER II 
 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced turnover, 
and zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover. 
  
TURNOVER III 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the turnover is a forced turnover, 
zero if the turnover is a voluntary turnover, and 2 if it was not 
involved with turnover events. 
  
Panel G: CEO RANKINGS 
WEIGHTED AROA INDEX Weighted Industry-adjusted Returns on Assets of CEOs over the 
past five years. AROA Index is composited of 30% of most recent 
year AROA before the turnover, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 
years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% of five years before 
the turnover. 
  
  
 
Weighted Industry-adjusted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns of 
CEOs over the past five years. ABHAR Index is composited of 
30% of most recent year ABHAR before the turnover, 25% of 2 
years prior, 20% of 3 years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% 
of five years before the turnover.  
WEIGHTED ABHAR INDEX 
 
  
  
WEIGHTED EPS SURPRISE INDEX Weighted EPS SURPRISE of CEOs over the past five years. EPS 
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SURPRISE INDEX is composited of 30% of most recent year EPS 
SURPRISE before the turnover, 25% of 2 years prior, 20% of 3 
years prior, 15% of four years prior and 10% of five years before 
the turnover.  
 
  
 
SUM CARs of all deals made by CEOs over past five years.  
Following Brown & Warner (1985), acquisition Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated over (-1, +1) window 
using CRSP value-weighted index (the value-weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks). Market model parameters 
were estimated over (-250,-15) window relative to the acquisition 
announcement day. 
 
  
 M&A CARs 
 
  
  
WEIGHTED INDEX RANK I CEOs are ranked based on AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise 
performance Indices, and M&A CARs mutually exclusively. Each 
CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four 
(three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-
ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the WEIGHTED INDEX 
RANKІ.  
 
  
  
  
WEIGHTED AROA INDEX_POST Weighted Industry-adjusted Returns on Assets of CEOs 3 years 
after turnover. AROA INDEX_POST is composited of 50% of 
most recent year's AROA post turnover, 30% of 2 years post and 
20% of 3 years post turnover.  
 
  
  
WEIGHTED ABHAR INDEX_POST Weighted Industry-adjusted Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns of 
CEOs 3 years after turnover. ABHAR INDEX_POST is 
composited of 50% of most recent year's ABHAR post turnover, 
30% of 2 years post and 20% of 3 years post turnover.  
 
  
  
WEIGHTED EPS SURPRISE 
INDEX_POST 
Weighted EPS Surprise of CEOs 3 years after turnover. EPS 
SURPRISE INDEX_POST is composited of 50% of most recent 
year's EPS SURPRISE post turnover, 30% of 2 years post and 20% 
of 3 years post turnover.  
 
  
  
M&A CAR_POST SUM CARs of all deals made by CEOs 3 years after turnover. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated over (-1, +1) 
window using CRSP value-weighted index. Market model 
parameters were estimated over (-250,-15) window relative to the 
acquisition announcement day. 
 
  
  
WEIGHTED INDEX  CEOs are ranked based on AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise 
Indices_POST, and M&A CARs_POST mutually exclusively. Each 
CEO is ranked from best to worst for each metric, and the four 
(three if one is missing) measure rankings are averaged and re-
ranked from 1 to bottom to construct the INDEX RANKІ_POST.  
 
RANK I_POST 
  
  
WEIGHTED INDEX  Index Rank ІІ is built in a similar way as Index Rank І but also take 
into account post turnover firm performance. Index Rank ІІ is 70% 
weighted for pre-five years' Index Rank І and 30% weighted for 
post three years' Index Rank І_POST.  
 
RANK II 
  
  
UN-WEIGHTED AROA INDEX  
 
Annual median industry-adjusted ROA, which is the average of 
median industry-adjusted ROA over past ten years or tenure. 2-
digit Compustat SIC code is used (1-digit Compustat SIC code is 
used if the 2-digit code is missing) and firms in the sample are 
excluded from calculating the industry median ROA for the same 
2-digit (1-digit) Compustat SIC code and same year as sample 
firms. AROA is winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile.  
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UN-WEIGHTED ABHAR INDEX  
Annual median industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return 
BHARi = BHRi - BHRind, Where BHRi is the buy and hold return 
of firm i over past ten years or tenure and BHRind is the median 
buy and hold return of all firms in the same industry (same 2-digit 
Compustat SIC code or 1-digit if 2-digit code is missing) for the 
same period. BHARi is then annualised to get annual median 
industry-adjusted BHAR.   
UN-WEIGHTED EPS SURPRISE 
INDEX  
 
Earnings Per Share Surprise= (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where 
et,k is the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for 
company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst 
forecasted EPS in quarter t. In specific, analyst forecasted EPS is 
the median forecast from all analysts those made a forecast in the 
last 90 days before firms' earning announcement. If an analyst 
made multiple forecasts during this period, the most recent one is 
taken.  The EPS Surprises over the past ten years or tenure are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile.  
 
UN-WEIGHTED AROA2 INDEX   
The number of years where UN-WEIGHTED AROA is positive 
divided by the corresponding total number of years. 
 
UN-WEIGHTED ABHAR2 INDEX   
The number months where UN-WEIGHTED ABHAR is positive 
divided by the corresponding total number of months.  
 
UN-WEIGHTED EPS SURPRISE2 
INDEX  
 The number of quarters where UN-WEIGHTED EPS Surprise is 
positive divided by the corresponding total number of quarters.  
 
 
M&A CARs 2 
The number of deals made by predecessors (successors) over their 
tenure or 10 years before (after) the turnover if their tenure exceeds 
ten years which have positive CARs divided by the corresponding 
total number of deals.  
  
  
UN-WEIGHTED INDEX 
 RANK I  
All CEOs are ranked from 1 to bottom based on ten years (or 
tenure) un-weighted AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise Indices and 
M&A CARs mutually exclusively. The average rank of the four 
(three if anyone is missing) is re-ranked from 1 to bottom to 
construct UN-WEIGHTED INDEX RANK I.               
  
  
  
 
 
All CEOs are ranked from 1 to bottom based on ten years (or 
tenure) un-weighted AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 Indices 
and M&A CARs2 mutually exclusively. The average rank of the 
four (three if anyone is missing) is re-ranked from 1 to bottom to 
construct UN-WEIGHTED INDEX RANK II.     
UN-WEIGHTED INDEX  
RANK II 
 
209 
 
Appendix B: Additional Results on Performance Comparisons   
Table B.1: Average Rankings, Measures Indices Comparisons for Champions and Bottom-performed CEOs 
This table compares the Measure Indices for Champion CEOs, and Bottom terciles performed CEOs. AVG RANKING1 is the average ranking of the first 
four (three if anyone is missing) measures (AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs). AVG RANKING1 was then re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create 
CEO Champion Measures Index One. AVG RANKING2 is the average ranking of the four (three if anyone is missing) beat percentage performance 
measures (AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A CARs2). AVG RANKING2 was then re-ranked from 1 to 1371 to create CEO Champion Measure 
Index Two. Thus, I got two sets of Champion CEOs’ sample (458 CEOs each) ranked by either to what extent or how many times they beat peers or 
expectations. Champion CEOs’ are then compared with bottom terciles performed CEOs and their successors accordingly. Mean difference tests are based on 
t-test, and median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
    Predecessor   Successor   Predecessor-Successor 
    
AVG 
RANKING1 
Measures 
Index One 
AVG 
RANKING2 
Measure 
Index Two 
  
AVG 
RANKING1 
Measures 
Index One 
AVG 
RANKING2 
Measure 
Index Two 
  
AVG 
RANKING1 
Measures 
Index One 
AVG 
RANKING2 
Measure 
Index Two 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (1)-(5) (2)-(6) (3)-(7) (4)-(8) 
Champion mean 375 230 331 230   522 520 509 562   -147*** -291*** -178*** -333*** 
CEOs median 398 230 350 230   486 474 472 518   -88*** -244*** -122*** -288*** 
  n 458 458 458 458   458 458 458 458           
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16)   (9)-(13) (10)-(14) (11)-(15) (12)-(16) 
Bottom mean 767 915 710 915   690 769 633 748   76*** 146*** 76*** 167*** 
Terciles median 744 915 677 915   677 815 610 772   67*** 100*** 67*** 143*** 
  n 913 913 913 913   913 913 913 913           
    (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24)   (17)-(21) (18)-(22) (19)-(23) (20)-(24) 
All mean 636 686 583 686   634 686 592 686   2 0 -9 0 
Terciles median 615 686 568 686   591 686 558 686   25 0 10 0 
  n 1371 1371 1371 1371   1371 1371 1371 1371           
                                
Top-
Bottom 
mean -392*** -686*** -378*** -686***   -168*** -249*** -124*** -186***   -224*** -437*** -254*** -499*** 
median -346*** -686*** -327*** -686***   -190*** -342*** -138*** -255***   -155*** -344*** -190*** -431*** 
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                                            Table B.2: Regressions of EPS Surprise on Champions and Successors for Champion League І and ІІ 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of EPS Surprise on Champion League І & ІІ dummy, successor dummy and champion І & ІІ's successor 
dummy. EPS Surprise=( et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), where et,k is the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter t, and êt,k is the corresponding 
analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. Champion League І (ІІ) is the 458 top tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measure Index (One) Two. Champion І (ІІ) dummy is a dummy 
variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is one of the top tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measure Index (One) Two, 0 otherwise. Champion І (ІІ)'s successor is a dummy 
variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion CEO’s successor, 0 otherwise. Successor dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 
otherwise. Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of year’s firms in operations from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-
adjusted Total Assets over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. The annual CPI Data for inflation calculation is from Bob 
Shiller’s Web site (www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm). GSALES is the annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure 
(max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. MTB is the annual average market value of equity over book value of equity over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure 
(max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted 
R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Y=EPS Surprise 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)   
Y=EPS Surprise 
(6)   (7)   (8)   (9)    (10)   
All CEOs Pre Post  Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & 
Their successors 
All CEOs   Pre   Post    Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & 
Their successors Pre+Post     Pre+Post           
Intercept 0.0058 -0.0036 0.0813 0.4703***  0.3522***  Intercept 0.0452  0.0626  0.0854  0.1624*  0.0819  
  0.9090 0.9400 0.3470 0.0000  0.0020    0.3980  0.2320  0.3100  0.0710  0.3950  
Successor=1 0.0287***     0.0467***  -0.0241**  Successor=1 0.0207**        0.0507***  -0.0043  
  0.0010     0.0000  0.0410    0.0250        0.0000  0.6890  
Champion І=1 0.0799*** 0.0941***         Champion ІІ=1 0.0325***  0.0385***           
  0.0000 0.0000           0.0000  0.0000           
Champion І's Successor -0.0632***   0.0058       Champion ІІ's Successor -0.0355***     -0.0080        
  0.0000   0.7140         0.0060     0.5390        
Log (Firm Age) -0.0227** -0.0180* -0.0283 -0.0444***  -0.0226  Log (Firm Age) -0.0273**  -0.0253**  -0.0294*  -0.0273**  -0.0115  
  0.0450 0.0870 0.1210 0.0020  0.2080    0.0160  0.0240  0.0960  0.0370  0.5130  
Log (Firm Assets) 0.0117*** 0.0095*** 0.0132** -0.0050  -0.0048  Log (Firm Assets) 0.0101***  0.0058**  0.0135***  -0.0087***  -0.0073*  
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.1700  0.2940    0.0010  0.0260  0.0080  0.0030  0.0990  
GSALES 0.0081 0.0100 0.0159 0.0053  0.0015  Growth in Sales 0.0065  0.0037  0.0165  0.0194  0.0007  
  0.2990 0.1430 0.3420 0.8720  0.8570    0.3870  0.5830  0.3200  0.5830  0.9260  
MTB 0.0050*** -0.0009 0.0091*** -0.0055***  -0.0004  MTB 0.0072***  0.0029**  0.0096***  -0.0026**  0.0042*  
  0.0030 0.5290 0.0010 0.0070  0.8590    0.0000  0.0500  0.0000  0.0470  0.0610  
Industry &Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y  Industry &Year FE Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
N 2621 1311 1310 878  886  N 2621  1311  1310  871  872  
Adj R2 7% 21% 4% 14%  5%  Adj R2 6%  14%  4%  17%  5%  
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                                                     Table B.3: Regressions of EPS Surprise2 on Champions and Successors for Champion League І and ІІ 
This table reports the coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of EPS Surprise on Champion League І & ІІ dummy, successor dummy and champion І & ІІ's successor 
dummy. EPS Surprise2 is the number of years where EPS Surprise is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. Champion League І (ІІ) is the 458 top 
tercile performed CEOs ranked by Measure Index (One) Two. Champion І (ІІ) dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the predecessor is one of the top-tercile performed 
CEOs ranked by Measure Index (One) Two, 0 otherwise. Champion І (ІІ)'s successor is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the incoming CEO is champion CEO’s successor, 0 
otherwise. Successor dummy is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is a successor, 0 otherwise. Log (Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of years firms in 
operations from Compustat. Log (Firm Assets) is the annual average natural log of inflation-adjusted Total Assets over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) 
around turnover from Compustat. The annual CPI Data for inflation calculation is from Bob Shiller’s Web site (www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm). GSALES is the 
annual average inflation-adjusted growth in sales over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. MTB is the annual average 
market value of equity over book value of equity over predecessors’ and successors’ tenure (max ten years) around turnover from Compustat. Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. N is the number of observations and Adj. R
2
 is the adjusted R-square. P-values are reported below regression estimates and are calculated using 
heteroscedasticity- and clustered-consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Y=Y=EPS Surprise2 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)   
Y=EPS Surprise2 
(6) (7) (8) (9)    (10)   
All CEOs Pre Post  Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & Their 
successors 
All CEOs Pre Post  Champions &Top 
successors 
Champions & Their 
successors Pre+Post     Pre+Post     
Intercept 0.3914*** 0.4943*** 0.3563*** 0.6946***  0.6304***  Intercept 0.4530*** 0.5882*** 0.3770*** 0.5615***  0.5816***  
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  
Successor=1 0.0423***     0.0472***  -0.0464***  Successor=1 0.0426***     0.0888***  -0.0415***  
  0.0000     0.0000  0.0000    0.0000     0.0000  0.0000  
Champion І=1 0.1214*** 0.1294***         Champion ІІ=1 0.1132*** 0.1201***         
  0.0000 0.0000           0.0000 0.0000         
Champion І's Successor -0.0905***   0.0250**       Champion ІІ's Successor -0.0846***   0.0220*       
  0.0000   0.0360         0.0000   0.0590       
Log (Firm Age) -0.0162 -0.0306*** -0.0060 -0.0512***  -0.0329**  Log (Firm Age) -0.0243** -0.0432*** -0.0092 -0.0411***  -0.0498***  
  0.1080 0.0070 0.6640 0.0010  0.0470    0.0190 0.0000 0.5000 0.0010  0.0050  
Log (Firm Assets) 0.0239*** 0.0195*** 0.0287*** 0.0156***  0.0139***  Log (Firm Assets) 0.0208*** 0.0144*** 0.0279*** 0.0077*  0.0104**  
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010  0.0070    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580  0.0490  
GSALES 0.0097 0.0042 0.0197 0.0459  0.0123  Growth in Sales 0.0084 -0.0006 0.0196 0.1105***  0.0127  
  0.2740 0.6290 0.1680 0.4740  0.2950    0.3650 0.9420 0.1640 0.0010  0.4040  
MTB 0.0009 -0.0059*** 0.0043 -0.0028  -0.0003  MTB 0.0026 -0.0031 0.0045 -0.0017  0.0014  
  0.6660 0.0060 0.1340 0.2140  0.9200    0.2000 0.1440 0.1100 0.4010  0.6590  
Industry &Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y  Industry &Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y  
N 2621 1311 1310 878  886  N 2621 1311 1310 871  872  
Adj R2 15% 25% 9% 15%  12%  Adj R2 15% 25% 9% 27%  13%  
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Table B.4: Decile Table of CEO Performance Measurements over Ten Years 
This table compares 1786 predecessors with their corresponding successors using four 
performance measurements, i.e., AROA, ABHAR, EPS Surprise and M&A CARs. All 
predecessor CEOs are ranked based on these four performances mutually exclusively and 
then split into deciles. AROA is the average of median industry-adjusted ROA over ten 
years or the tenure if CEO tenure is less than ten years. ABHAR is the Annual median 
industry-adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Return. The requirement that at least five 
consecutive years’ stock return before the turnover and at least one year’s stock return 
after a turnover is imposed to ensure continuity and the final stock performance sample is 
1522 cases. Earnings Per Share Surprise (EPS Surprise) = (et,k - êt,k) / absolute (êt,k), 
where et,k is the actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) announcement for company k in quarter 
t, and êt,k is the corresponding analyst forecasted EPS in quarter t. I imposed the 
requirement that at least five consecutive years’ EPS Surprise before the turnover and at 
least one year’s EPS Surprise after turnover to ensure continuity and the final EPS 
Surprise sample is 1498 cases. M&A CARs are SUM CARs of all deals made by 
predecessors (successors) over their tenure or 10 years before (after) the turnover if their 
tenure exceeds ten years. I report results where AROA and EPS Surprise are winsorized at 
the 1 and 99 percentile. Mean difference tests are based on t-test, and median difference 
tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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    Predecessor Successor Successor-Predecessor 
    AROA ABHAR EPS Surprise  M&A CARs AROA ABHAR EPS Surprise  M&A CARs AROA   ABHAR   EPS Surprise    M&A CARs   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (5)-(1)   (6)-(2)   (7)-(3)   (8)-(4)   
90--100 mean 32.04% 295.0% 26.25% 27.44% 28.50% 9.2% 10.27% 1.68% -3.54% *** -285.78% *** -15.98% *** -25.76% *** 
 
  
median 30.37% 125.0% 22.89% 21.36% 32.17% 5.5% 10.14% 2.39% 1.81%   -119.48% *** -12.75% *** -18.97% *** 
n 178 152 149 104 178 152 149 67                 
80--90 mean 17.84% 59.7% 12.04% 9.95% 13.33% 10.4% 7.78% 0.75% -4.51% *** -49.37% *** -4.26% * -9.19% *** 
 
  
median 17.56% 57.7% 11.76% 9.90% 12.41% 5.3% 8.30% 0.79% -5.16% *** -52.43% *** -3.46% *** -9.11% *** 
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 62                 
70--80 mean 12.33% 39.9% 7.55% 5.45% 10.17% 16.3% 4.08% 0.79% -2.16% *** -23.54% *** -3.47%   -4.66% *** 
 
  
median 12.40% 39.6% 7.36% 5.43% 9.23% 11.5% 5.85% 1.58% -3.17% *** -28.11% *** -1.51% * -3.86% *** 
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 71                 
60--70 mean 8.81% 29.4% 4.95% 3.07% 7.54% 10.5% 4.92% -0.56% -1.27% ** -18.92% *** -0.03%   -3.63% *** 
 
  
median 8.74% 29.0% 4.93% 3.06% 7.31% 7.7% 4.74% 0.15% -1.43% *** -21.32% *** -0.19%   -2.91% *** 
n 178 153 150 104 178 153 150 60                 
50--60 mean 6.25% 22.3% 3.11% 1.10% 4.39% 13.8% 5.06% 1.04% -1.86% *** -8.53% *** 1.95%   -0.06%   
 
  
median 6.38% 22.1% 3.17% 1.08% 4.51% 8.7% 2.95% 0.71% -1.87% *** -13.37% *** -0.21%   -0.38%   
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 60                 
40--50 mean 3.93% 16.9% 1.64% -0.52% 2.92% 10.2% 1.72% -0.53% -1.02% * -6.62% *** 0.08%   -0.01%   
 
  
median 3.91% 16.8% 1.63% -0.59% 2.31% 6.3% 2.53% 0.63% -1.60% *** -10.52% *** 0.90% *** 1.22% ** 
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 68                 
30--40 mean 1.99% 11.8% 0.32% -1.84% 1.94% 12.6% 2.01% -0.99% -0.05%   0.77%   1.69%   0.85%   
 
  
median 2.01% 11.8% 0.32% -1.83% 1.03% 8.8% 2.11% -0.20% -0.98% *** -3.05% ** 1.80% *** 1.63% *** 
n 178 153 150 104 178 153 150 64                 
20--30 mean 0.56% 7.0% -1.82% -3.91% 0.52% 8.7% 1.90% -1.05% -0.04%   1.74%   3.71% *** 2.85% *** 
 
  
median 0.53% 7.0% -1.64% -3.71% 0.54% 5.2% 1.54% -1.27% 0.02%   -1.78%   3.19% *** 2.44% *** 
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 75                 
10--20 mean -0.63% 2.0% -5.98% -7.67% 0.22% 11.1% 2.45% 0.01% 0.85% * 9.15% *** 8.44% *** 7.68% *** 
 
  
median -0.60% 1.6% -5.69% -7.54% -0.24% 5.9% 3.80% -0.03% 0.36% *** 4.32% *** 9.49% *** 7.51% *** 
n 179 152 150 104 179 152 150 74                 
0--10 mean -7.09% -6.8% -24.78% -23.74% -6.35% 14.1% -5.69% -2.23% 0.74%   20.98% *** 19.09% *** 21.51% *** 
 
  
median -3.19% -3.6% -19.56% -19.45% -1.90% 7.6% 0.83% -1.91% 1.29% *** 11.20% *** 20.39% *** 17.54% *** 
n 178 152 149 104 178 152 149 75                 
All cases mean 7.60% 47.67% 2.33% 0.93% 6.31% 11.69% 3.45% -0.15% -1.29% *** -35.98% *** 1.12%   -1.08% * 
 
  
median 5.04% 19.47% 2.31% 0.23% 3.36% 6.71% 3.74% 0.36% -1.68% *** -12.75% *** 1.42% *** 0.13%   
n 1786 1522 1498 1040 1786 1522 1498 676                 
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    Table B.5: Decile Table of Beat Percentage Performance Measurements over Ten Years 
This table compares 1786 predecessors with their corresponding successors using another four 
performance measurements related to table 2, i.e., AROA2, ABHAR2, EPS Surprise2 and M&A 
CARs2. Measurements in Table 2 captured the extent to which predecessors and successors 
performed while measurements in this table value how many times the returns or surprises are 
positive. All predecessors are ranked based on these four performance measures mutually 
exclusively, and then split into deciles. AROA Beat% (AROA2) is the number of years where 
IAROA is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. ABHAR Beat% 
(ABHAR2) is the number of years where ABHAR is positive divided by the corresponding total 
number of years. EPS Surprise Beat% (EPS Surprise2) is the number of years where EPS Surprise 
is positive divided by the corresponding total number of years. M&A CARs Beat% (M&A 
CARs2) is the number of deals made by predecessors (successors) over their tenure or 10 years 
before (after) the turnover if their tenure exceeds ten years which have positive CARs divided by 
the corresponding total number of deals. Mean difference tests are based on t-test, and median 
difference tests are based on Wilcoxon-test ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
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    Predecessor Successor Successor-Predecessor 
    AROA2 ABHAR2 
EPS 
Surprise2 
M&A 
CARs2 AROA2 ABHAR2 
EPS 
Surprise2 
M&A 
CARs2 AROA2   ABHAR2   
EPS 
Surprise2   
M&A 
CARs2   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (5)-(1)   (6)-(2)   (7)-(3)   (8)-(4)   
90--100 
mean 100.00% 94.11% 86.03% 100.00% 51.58% 69.99% 69.92% 58.88% -48.42% *** -24.13% *** -16.11% *** -41.12% *** 
median 100.00% 90.00% 85.00% 100.00% 50.00% 70.00% 73.91% 60.00% -50.00% *** -20.00% *** -11.09% *** -40.00% *** 
  n 430 158 149 240 430 158 149 133                 
80--90 
mean   85.86% 75.23%     62.16% 65.68%       -23.69% *** -9.55% ***     
median   85.71% 75.00%     66.67% 66.67%       -19.05% *** -8.33% ***     
  n   160 150     160 150                   
70--80 
mean 90.00% 80.00% 69.39% 77.63% 44.78% 59.24% 63.07% 54.44% -45.22% *** -20.76% *** -6.32% *** -23.19% *** 
median 90.00% 80.00% 69.23% 75.00% 40.00% 60.00% 65.00% 50.00% -50.00% *** -20.00% *** -4.23% *** -25.00% *** 
  n 157 176 138 72 157 176 138 52                 
60--70 
mean 80.00% 76.24% 64.74% 65.17% 43.02% 60.08% 62.52% 54.59% -36.98% *** -16.16% *** -2.22%   -10.58% *** 
median 80.00% 75.00% 64.86% 66.67% 40.00% 61.25% 66.03% 58.33% -40.00% *** -13.75% *** 1.16%   -8.33% ** 
  n 179 94 174 112 179 94 174 69                 
50--60 
mean 70.00% 70.32% 60.19% 55.92% 39.95% 58.38% 59.06% 48.47% -30.05% *** -11.94% *** -1.13%   -7.45%   
median 70.00% 70.00% 60.00% 56.35% 30.00% 60.00% 60.00% 47.22% -40.00% *** -10.00% *** 0.00%   -9.13%   
  n 207 240 136 32 207 240 136 26                 
40--50 
mean   66.67% 55.51% 49.95%   59.64% 60.64% 51.94%     -7.03% *** 5.13% *** 1.99%   
median   66.67% 55.26% 50.00%   60.00% 61.65% 50.00%     -6.67% *** 6.39% *** 0.00% ** 
  n   115 152 169   115 152 116                 
30--40 
mean 60.00% 60.59% 50.86% 36.16% 38.41% 54.98% 59.68% 50.99% -21.59% *** -5.60% *** 8.82% *** 14.83% *** 
median 60.00% 60.00% 51.28% 33.33% 30.00% 58.57% 61.54% 50.00% -30.00% *** -1.43% ** 10.26% *** 16.67% *** 
  n 232 192 153 120 232 192 153 90                 
20--30 
mean 50.00% 56.50% 45.53% 23.49% 33.94% 56.67% 56.38% 49.76% -16.06% *** 0.17%   10.86% *** 26.27% *** 
median 50.00% 57.14% 45.71% 25.00% 30.00% 60.00% 57.92% 50.00% -20.00% *** 2.86%   12.20% *** 25.00% *** 
  n 175 72 150 61 175 72 150 50                 
10--20 
mean 35.40% 50.00% 39.30%   30.23% 56.01% 53.04%   -5.16% *** 6.01% *** 13.75% ***     
median 40.00% 50.00% 39.74%   20.00% 55.56% 54.55%   -20.00% *** 5.56% *** 14.81% ***     
  n 215 165 146   215 165 146                   
0--10 
mean 9.95% 36.31% 28.16% 0.00% 16.44% 53.57% 52.16% 48.24% 6.49% *** 17.26% *** 24.00% *** 48.24% *** 
median 10.00% 40.00% 29.41% 0.00% 10.00% 57.14% 52.40% 50.00% 0.00% * 17.14% *** 22.98% *** 50.00% *** 
  n 191 150 150 234 191 150 150 140                 
All 
cases 
mean 66.14% 68.20% 57.50% 50.86% 39.01% 59.04% 60.25% 52.58% -27.13% *** -9.15% *** 2.75% *** 1.72%   
median 70.00% 70.00% 57.89% 50.00% 30.00% 60.00% 62.50% 50.00% -40.00% *** -10.00% *** 4.61% *** 0.00%   
  n 1786 1522 1498 1040 1786 1522 1498 676                 
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The End 
 
